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ABSTRACT
When late 19th-century Romanticist thinking culminated in 
modern individualism, there resulted a philosophic shift from univer­
sal objectivity to individual subjectivity, from absolute morality to 
relative morality. Artists wishing to express the new philosophy had 
to search out fresh methods of presenting their material. Writers of 
fiction realized that the traditional omniscient approach to the 
problem of rendering unspoken thought was no longer acceptable, since 
omniscience rested its argument on the concept of universality, 
whereas Relativism demanded a concern with the problem of point of 
view. Moreover, the new science of psychoanalysis soon conceived of 
man as governed chiefly by his most primitive, irrational impulses. 
Consequently, the question of point of view became the problem of 
rendering not only the individual's consciousness but also his meta- 
conscious states as well. Thus, the concern with point of view also 
became a concern with the convention of stream of consciousness, 
that is, with a convention capable of expressing a totally subjective 
perspective.
After the novelist Henry James clearly articulated the problem,
iv
a number of impressive experiments with point of view in general, and 
stream of consciousness in particular, came from such novelists as 
Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner. So striking were these experiments that 
some students of the novel have assumed that the problem is indigenous 
only to fiction. Actually, the issue of point of view is basic and 
vital to the whole concept of Relativism, and in appropriately altered 
form it stands as the essential question of rnqst modern arts.
It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that point of 
view, or the subjective perspective, is the primary and distinctive 
feature of modern dramaturgy. To support this contention, the 
development of modern drama is presented as paralleling that of the 
modern novel. Like Zola and Flaubert in fiction, Ibsen first 
attempted to present his Relativism through third-person dramatization, 
but when this approach failed to satisfy him, Ibsen tried to pierce 
third-person objectivity with symbolism. That he was not totally 
successful in his attempt did not keep his younger contemporary 
Strindberg from completely discarding third-person in favor of first- 
person dramatization. After Strindberg had stated the problem, many 
important dramatists followed him in exploring and exploiting the 
subjective perspective.
This study investigates eight significant point-of-view experi­
ments in drama. Strindberg's The Dream Play and Evreinov's The
Kaiser's From Morn to Midnight and Pirandello's Six Characters in 
Search of an Author are offered as plays concerned with point of view 
because their themes centered about the concept of the disappearing 
ego. O'Neill'8 Strange Interlude and Giraudoux's The Madwoman of 
Chaillot are studied as solutions drawing upon older dramatic tech­
niques. Finally, Death of a Salesman by Miller and The Waltz of the 
Toreadors by Anouilh are presented as representative of recent trends 
toward compromise.
Viewed in terms of method, modern drama need not be considered 
as a mass of conflicting and confusing "ism's," for it consists, 
briefly, of two broad, interrelated directions, both of which share 
a common romantic background. The first direction, popularly called 
Realism, is based on a third-person objective dramatization; the 
second direction, a later stage and consummation of the first, is that 
of first-person subjective dramatization. For identification, the 
two directions may be labeled Externalism and Pan-psychism. Pan­
psychism, the more subjective and irrational direction, had tended 
toward deep pessimism. This pessimism apparently touched bottom with 
Pirandello, for recent point-of-view dramas have tended to compromise 
with approaches involving saner and more lucid subject-object 
relationships.
vi
PREFACE
This study is one in dramaturgic method. In a very broad 
sense, it is also a study in comparative literary forms, for the 
particular dramatic problem which is investigated is that struc­
tural issue long known to students of the modern novel as point of 
view. Regarded in another light, the study may also be considered 
as a historical-philosophical presentation of certain trends in 
modern dramatic literature, for although the main emphasis is on 
close critical analysis of eight plays by eight representative 
modem playwrights, the'general historical background and the past 
and present philosophic implications of the matter under study are 
not ignored as if the plays and playwrights existed in a cultural 
vacuum. On the other hand, this work is not intended as an 
exhaustive treatment of history, philosophy, or comparative 
literature. It is, first and last, chiefly concerned with the 
place and function and evolution of the convention of point of 
view in contemporary drama.
The question of point of view as an important structural 
problem first began seriously to be considered by the authors of 
the late 19th-century, who, acting under the pressure of a philo­
sophic shift from universality to individuality, from absolutism 
to relativism, began to be less interested in the total action of a 
story and more interested in the post from which the action was
vii
observed. Thus, many of the major novelists of the time began to 
exchange their omniscient approach for that of a third-person 
objectivity. As the twin concepts of relativism and individualism 
gained more and more acceptance, writers dropped third-person 
objectivity for first-person subjectivity. Subsequent experi­
mentation with first-person presentation ultimately produced the 
technique known as stream of consciousness, a device which 
attempted to present the most basic and unintellectual areas of 
human thought.
The critics of the novel have produced a number of long 
studies of the nature and evolution of the concept of point of view 
in the modern novel. In terms of the drama no such studies exist. 
Indeed, some students of the novel even feel that the problem of 
point of view is peculiar to the novel, but a number of the more 
respected dramatic critics— men like John Gassner, Allardyce 
Nicoll, and Alan Downer— have, at one time or another, commented 
on the presence of the problem of point of view in the modern play. 
None of these comments, however, has been very extended. There 
seems, therefore, to be a need for a study of some length on the 
problem of the subjective perspective, i.e., point of view, in 
drama.
In general the investigation is divided into two major parts. 
The first, and shorter part, presents the general background.
Chapter One offers a broad consideration of the total concept of
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point of view in literature. In brief fashion, the chapter presents 
the development of the modern problem of point of view out of the 
ancient and continuing issue of unspoken thought. The modern 
convention is related to the philosophic shift from absolutism to 
relativism, and the chapter concludes with a brief glance at some 
of the solutions, from James to Faulkner, which have been attempted 
in the contemporary novel.
Chapter Two concentrates only on drama. Those men and forces 
in drama which shaped and influenced the 20th-century playwright's 
concern with first-person presentation are presented and briefly 
discussed. In general, the chapter traces the late 19th-century 
dramatist's attempts to present his relativistic philosophy, first, 
through third-person objectivity and, finally, through more sub­
jective approaches. The chapter presents these attempts as forces 
which caused modern drama to take both a subjective and an objective 
direction, two seemingly opposed but on a structural level, quite 
closely related forms.
The second and longer portion of the study is an examination 
of eight plays by eight different playwrights. Ihe playwrights 
are selected for various reasons. First, because as a group, they 
form a representative cross-section of trends in modern drama. 
Second, because as an international company, they suggest the scope 
and extent of the problem of point of view in modern dramaturgy. 
Finally, the playwrights fall into a rough chronological pattern
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which provides a basis for a general consideration of the evolution 
of the subjective perspective within the modem dramatic framework.
The playwrights are studied in pairs. Strindberg and Evreinov 
are considered first because they serve as examples of early 
experimenters with the new problem. Kaiser and Pirandello are 
next presented as two slightly later playwrights who took up the 
problem of viewpoint because of their need for a device which would 
adequately present their philosophy of the ego as a spiritually 
isolated, constantly eroding and dissolving phenomenon. The third 
pair of playwrights considered are O'Neill and Giraudoux. These 
two writers are among that group which sought to solve the problem 
of point of view by reintroducing older dramatic techniques, tech­
niques which were held in disfavor by early modem dramatists. The 
last two playwrights studied are Miller and Anouilh. The two men 
exemplify certain recent tendencies toward compromise. Miller 
attempts to reunite third-person with first-person subjective 
dramatization; Anouilh returns to an even earlier tradition and 
combines the modern subjective perspective with the omniscient 
technique of Moliere.
x
CHAPTER ONE
FROM EURIPIDES TO ULYSSES 
THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM OF UNSPOKEN THOUGHT
Sophocles begins the second choral ode of Antigone with the 
triumphant:
Many are the wonders of the world 
And none so wonderful as Man.
And after listing the many achievements of man, the poet cries out:
Language withal he learnt,
And thought that as the wind Is free,
And aptitudes of civic life:
Ill-lodged no more he lies,
His roof the sky, the earth his bed,
Screened now from piercing frost and pelting rain;
All-fertile in resource, resourceless never 
Meets he the morrow...1
In these ringing words, Sophocles not only pays tribute to the 
indomitable human spirit and Intelligence, but he also hints at one 
of the most difficult problems which confront any artist when he
attempts to capture within the limits of an art form the reality
which is man— the problem of basing his work on some manifestation 
of human "thought that as the wind is free." And Sophocles all but 
acts as prophet to the many and varied forms which this artistic 
difficulty will produce when he sings that man is "all-fertile in 
resource, resourceless never."
^•Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Ed., An Anthology of Greek 
Drama (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 112.
1
2The Sophoclean metaphor which catches up thought and wind 
Into a single complex brings to mind those medieval icons which 
depict the winds as blustery and full-cheeked gentlemen strongly 
suggestive of cloud formations. The relationship, of course, 
between the two devices is truly of the slimmest, but they jointly 
suggest certain problems which face any artist who addresses a 
particular art form, be it poetry, painting, sculpture, or— and 
these especially— narration or drama. Art is, despite the 
currency of the term abstract, to some extent always concrete, limit­
ing, tangible. What Mark Schorer says of fiction can be extended 
to all the arts. "Fiction, we propose, is solid, is formal, is
9
selective." On the other hand, much of natural and most of human, 
activity is nonlimiting, nontangible, in short, nonobjective. The 
artist's basic task then is to reconcile irreconcilables, to fix, at 
least for an instant, boundaries for the boundless; to give form 
to the formless; to create concrete counterparts for the irretriev­
ably abstract. Some of the aspects of this labor are solved by the 
very act of selecting an art form; others, however, are compounded 
by that very selection.
The painter, for instance, who selects a canvas of a given 
size has by that act set limits to limitless space, although he 
may, as did the painters of the Renaissance, feel that the limits 
are too binding and immediately set out to enlarge them through
^Mark Schorer, Ed,, The Story. A Critical Anthology (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 5.
3such devices as perspective. Actually, viewed from one angle, the 
entire history of painting since the Renaissance can be told as 
the struggle of the artist to extend the spatial restrictions 
imposed by the very selection of his medium. Segfried Giedion 
in his monumental and aptly titled work, Space. Time and Architecture, 
attempts Just such a historical study in terms of architecture. In 
fact, when considering the problem of space in the plastic arts, 
we may be forced to a strange conclusion: the nature of the
spatial arts constrains those working in them to attack reality just 
at that point where the art form is most restrictive— in the area 
of space. This paradox, in appropriately altered form, can be 
extended to all arts.
Thus the poet, dealing most often with nonverbal matter, 
directs a great portion of his energy to extending the frontiers 
of the words and rhythms which define his peculiar art. In like 
manner the musician is often at odds with the very bars and measures 
which he cherishes most. The ways of this paradox are devious, and 
its resolutions, usually only partially successful, are as numerous 
as the possessors of the "all-fertile" human resource, but as 
Sophocles's metaphor and the medieval geographer's rendering of the 
winds suggest, the solutions have a certain common ground, a 
certain affinity. Each attempts to lay open the puzzle through 
some fashion of alternate- or even anti-reality, to substitute, as 
it were, some type of artistic pattern for the general disorder of 
reality, and consequently to solve the difficulty by partially or 
completely ignoring the real world. At the risk of oversimplification,
4these patterns may, as a whole, be encompassed by the critical 
term "artistic convention."
Conventions and their uses often become the key to a given 
art form, for the manner in which an artist chooses to counter­
attack, that is, to ignore or conventionalize, reality can usually 
provide us with the basic clue to what the artist wishes to say 
about man in the universe. Moreover, while there are other avenues 
of approach open to the critical mind, the way to art through 
its conventions may often be the most fruitful way. As H. D. F.
Kitto argues, and there are many to support his claim, there is 
no dividing of form and meaning.3 The two are functions of one 
another. The former may be found only through the latter; the 
latter will usually suggest and dictate the former.
Now there is a certain truth in arguing that "a rose is a 
rose," but such an argument is, after all, nought but an admission 
that the work of art has left us with nothing to say. It is only 
by careful and close analysis that we are able to understand and 
demonstrate that a play by Shakespeare is superior to one by Pinero, 
and analysis implies a study of meanings, intentions, and, above 
all, conventions of form and structure— conceived and conceivable. 
Moreover, even as it is possible to study and understand conventional 
uses within a given work of art, it is also possible to extract these 
from several works within a particular period in order to compare them
3h .D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama, a Study of Six 
Greek Plays and of Hamlet. (London: Methuen, 1951), p. v.
5to each other and to trends In the era as a whole.
Nothing will be gained by denying that some violence is 
necessarily done to the single work by disturbing its inherent 
unity, but such violence is justified if insight can be gained 
into the total corpus of a given period. Ultimately, what damage 
is done to the single work will be more than compensated for by 
our gaining a greatly enriched understanding of the individual 
work when the so rudely separated and studied part is once more 
returned to its rightful whole. It is with this hope of an 
improved understanding that our attention will presently be brought 
to bear on a particular artistic convention in a given period of 
creative activity.
The period which will be the ultimate focus of our 
attention will be that era which extends from the last quarter 
of the 19th-century to the present.day, the era which we have 
roughly tenned "modern." The convention which will be studied is 
that of point of view, in particular the peculiarly modem interest 
in first-person subjective point of view, an interest which arose 
out of a philosophical shift from absolutism to relativism, from 
rational objectivity to irrational subjectivity. Prior to the 
modem period, artists, like the rest of humanity, assumed that 
all men took the same general view of reality. Individual dif­
ferences were, of course, recognized, but these were assumed to be 
minor variations within an unchanging over-all pattern. Thus, 
paintings were executed to be observed by the universal viewer from 
the universal viewpoint. Stories, dramatic and narrative, were
6presented omnisciently. With the coining of modern relativism, all 
this was changed. Each post of observation was understood to be 
decidedly different; each was considered equally valid. To the 
painter this meant an abandonment of perspective: to the writer,
a discovery of new narrative means to isolate and give emphasis 
to individual subjectivity as opposed to universal objectivity.
In other words, there was a great effort made to perfect and 
exploit the various possibilities of point of view. It is this 
effort, as it manifests itself in modern drama, which forms the 
basic matter of this study.
Before an Investigation of point of view in the modem drama 
is undertaken, however, it will first be necessary to isolate the 
convention historically and artistically in order to establish in a 
general manner its nature and importance. To do this, let us return 
to Sophocles and the problem suggested by his figure, "thought that 
as the wind is free."
That paradox which we have been discussing— "i.e., an art 
form seems to focus the activity of the artist on the very area in 
which he is most limited— centers itself especially in the related 
arts of narrative and drama near to, or in the very center of, the 
fugitive phenomenon of human thought. In both narration and drama, 
the principal tools of comment are human character and human action. 
The writer, be he author of novel or epic, classical tragedy or 
modem melodrama, must make his major statements in terms of these 
two elements. Now the common source of both character and action—  
indeed their fountainhead— is the hidden, motivating thought, which
7as Sophocles suggests, Is as elusive as the wind. To precise, we 
may say that it is neither character nor action, but that it may 
manifest itself as one or both of these. Thus, one of the major 
problems of the playwright and the narrative artist is not only 
to depict character and action but also to reveal or suggest the 
thought which lies both beneath and beyond these two literary 
elements. In short, the author must devise a convention which will 
be an acceptable vehicle, _i.e., counterpart or substitute, for the 
reality which is thought.
The attempts to meet the challenge of presenting thought in 
a literary art are sometimes facile, sometimes subtle, sometimes 
heavy-handed, but almost always interesting, for among all the 
structural problems this is the one which as Ellis-Fermor says 
"goes near the roots and is closely linked with many others."^
Stated in a different manner, all narrative and dramatic art is 
ultimately centered on the inner thoughts of the characters, those 
things which form character and prompt decisions and external 
actions, and it is in the area of thought that the writer is 
most restricted; to this restricted space he bends his inventive 
efforts in an attempt to open it as perspective opened the interior 
space of a Renaissance painting.
As early as the fifth-century B. C., the problem of hidden 
thought was faced and partially solved by the Greek tragedians in
^Una Ellis-Fermor, The Frontiers of Drama (London: Methuen 
& Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 121.
8their reworking of an existing convention and in their particular 
attitude toward the playhouse, an attitude which was to lose ground 
during the succeeding centuries. When the Greek playwright turned 
his attention to matters psychicj he found one ready instrument for 
his needs in the chorus, which had survived from an earlier, more 
ritualistic period. Thus, among its many burdens, the chorus was 
also asked to function, from time to time, as a "reflector" of 
the moods or thoughts of the characters. Sometimes this was done 
by having the chorus act as a confidant, one who obtains moods or 
motivations by questioning actions or simply by acting as an avail­
able listener to one who wishes to complain or explain. Or again, 
in a more ritualized variant of the convention, the chorus may 
directly or indirectly take up the unspoken thoughts of the character. 
This technique is most frequently employed by Euripides, though it 
may be found in several isolated instances in the work of Sophocles, 
and its use is especially apparent in the Orestia of Aeschylus. An 
excellent example of Euripides's method may be seen in the choral 
ode which follows Medea's sending of her children, with their fatal 
gift, to the new bride of Jason. Though the chorus ostensibly 
comments only on the situation, the direction taken is obviously 
that of the silent thoughts of Medea herself.
A second device used by all three of the ancient tragedians 
was the direct public address, a device which grew out of the very 
nature of the Greek theatre. A theatre, springing from religious 
ritual and still lingering within the shadow of that ritual, may 
allow its characters certain formalized activities. Apparently,
9one of these permissible activities was direct public address to the 
audience. In fact, not only was this device permissible, it seems 
to have been expected as one of the early speeches of the central 
character; usually, it was the first speech he delivered. The 
early speeches of Oedipus, Creon, and Clytemnestra in the Oedipus, 
the Antigone, and the Agamemnon stand as examples of this practice.
In these direct addresses to the audience— or through the chorus 
to the audience— the speaker is allowed to cover some or all of 
the expository matter and to disclose to the audience certain 
essential traits of his character. In line with the latter 
privilege, he sometimes articulates what would normally be con­
sidered unspoken or unspeakable thought. This convention of 
direct public address is heavily stylized, and it could well be 
that a concentrated study of each of these speeches might lead 
to a discovery of certain principles governing the use of this device. 
For one thing, it is apparent, even to the casual observer, that 
the practice is intimately related to the Athenian's passionate 
interest in written and spoken rhetoric, and the speeches seem 
to conform closely to the then prevailing rhetorical theories.
A variant of the public address technique is used by 
Euripides in such plays as Medea. In the latter play, perhaps in 
an attempt to gain greater verisimilitude— Euripides has been 
accused of this— the playwright allows us to examine the hidden 
thoughts of Medea through a series of short, off-stage soliloquies 
which the audience overhears. This technique of the overheard
10
soliloquy seems to mark the extent of the Greek experimentation 
with the then existing conventions, though it is possible that in 
such a play as Medea. Euripides may well be striking out in a 
new direction, a direction which would have to wait some twenty- 
four centuries before it was again to be single-mlndedly followed.
When, after the demise of ancient drama, the Western theatre 
was reborn on the altars of medieval churches, it was inevitable 
that its forms and conventions would be influenced, as was the 
classic drama, by the philosophic and aesthetic climate of its 
age, and thus it is not surprising to discover medieval playwrights 
surrendering to that overwhelming need of the Middle Ages to thicken 
all symbolism to the point of personification. Developing con­
currently with the tendency toward personification was a whole 
body of dramatic literature which completely rejected the external 
world and concentrated on the struggles within the soul of man.
The medieval playwright, at least in the moralities, not only 
was interested in revealing internal psychic processes, he was, 
above all, concerned with dramatizing them through conventions 
heavily dependent upon the uses of personification. Accordingly, 
in such plays as Everyman the human soul became a battle ground on 
which the various aspects of human personality waged a constant 
war. Each of these aspects were abstracted and universalized into 
a living entity. Thus, Man talked to and argued with his own 
Knowledge, in essence, what the medieval playwright did was to 
attempt to reveal inner conflict by compartmentalizing the human 
personality, and, for the most part, broadly dividing it into those
11
parts which recognized the beauty of doing good and those parts which 
hungered after evil* Just how extensive this division and sub­
division became can be seen in The Castle of Perseverance where 
man's intelligence becomes the good and the bad angels, and where 
man's basic drives are first dichotomized into virtues and sins, 
and then subdivided into seven of each type. All sixteen of these 
personifications walk the stage along with man, and in addition to 
such abstractions as World, Confession, Penance, Death, and Truth.
Together with heavy use of personification as a means of 
rendering thought, there was also in the medieval drama, as in 
the classical drama, some use of the soliloquy, but it was not 
until the advent of the English Renaissance that the full potential 
of the soliloquy and its sister device, the aside, was realized.
In addition to these two conventions, the Elizabethan dramatists 
also brought to full bloom a device found wherever dramatic 
poetry is practiced— imagery. Of these three means of presenting 
unspoken thought— the aside, the soliloquy, and imagery— the latter 
is probably the least dramatic and is most appealing when it is most 
subtle. Unfortunately, it is just at this point that it loses 
its effectiveness in the theatre. Consequently, despite the preva­
lence of a latter-day intellectual game, that of picking to pieces 
the uses of imagery by Shakespeare and other Elizabethans, we must 
be extremely careful not to attribute to imagery more weight than 
it can carry. In poetry and closet drama it may reign supreme, 
but in any work intended for the theatre, imagery must be counted
12
as less important and less effective than the aside, the soliloquy, 
or even the stage setting as a means of conveying ideas, especially 
when those ideas remain as unexpressed motives. With this reser­
vation, it is still possible to say that imagery often functioned 
as an invaluable vehicle for rendering unspoken thoughts in Eliza­
bethan drama. For instance, in Henry V, where the imagery through­
out is fairly obvious, the various changes in Henry's underlying 
mood can be noted by the changes in the figures of his speech.
Thus, as he begins his conversation with Princess Katharine, his 
images, since he still views her as something akin to a prize 
of war, are for the most part warlike.
If I could win a lady at leap-frog, or vaulting into 
my saddle with my armour on my back, under the correction 
of bragging be it spoken, I should quickly leap into a 
wife.
When, however, the princess has not responded to his warlike
advances, when she has refused to be impressed by his soldierly
attributes, and when, in fine, Harry has come to realize that he
must meet her on more courtly terms, the King's imagery becomes what
for Henry can only be described as most unmanly.
No, Kate? I will tell thee in French, which I am sure 
will hang upon my tongue like a newly married wife about 
her husband's neck, hardly to be shook off.
But even such obvious imagistic changes as are found above
are likely to go unnoticed in the theatre, so that modern interest
in Shakespearian imagery notwithstanding, it was truly in the aside
and especially in the soliloquy that Elizabethan dramatists achieved
consummate conventional forms. As Ellis-Fermor says:
13
But at Its finest, as at the height of the 
Elizabethan period, the soliloquy, by Its rapid and 
profound revelation of thought and passion, serves 
the very ends of drama. It reveals what we could not 
otherwise divine of the depths of the speaker's mind, 
compressing Into some twenty lines of vivid illumi­
nation what might else have taken the better part of an 
act to convey.^
The aside served, to a lesser degree, much the same function 
as the soliloquy, with the added advantage of allowing the character 
to discover to the audience his secret thoughts while he was 
surrounded by other characters who, during the aside, became 
conveniently deaf. Hie richness of psychological texture and 
humor to be obtained by an effective use of the aside may be seen 
in the famous dialogue between the Jew of Malta and Lodowlck, a 
suitor of his daughter.
An interesting feature of the Elizabethan aside and soliloquy 
is that while they were obviously directed at the audience, they 
still were not formal public speeches. That is, they remained, for 
the most part, within the framework of the action taking place on 
the stage. There were, however, numerous exceptions to this 
practice. Richard III, for instance, can hardly be telling himself 
he is a villain. He is obviously, in his opening speech, addressing 
the audience in direct public speech; as in the opening speech of 
Oedipus, Richard is functioning much more as an orator than as a 
character in the play. This aspect of the aside and the soliloquy 
became more and more popular as the Renaissance exchanged its
5Ibidi, p. 105.
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romantic tendencies for more neo-classic ones. By the time of the 
triumph of Restoration comedy in England, the twin conventions of 
the aside and the soliloquy were fast assuming the shape of direct 
public address to the audience, the shape which they had originally 
taken in the Greek drama.
With the change in the formal direction of the two devices 
came also a change in their uses. Throughout the late 18th- and 
19ch-centuries, the aside and the soliloquy tended increasingly to 
function as a means of conveying exposition and as a way of preparing 
for plot complications, rather than as vehicles for presenting hidden 
moods and motives. This transformation in function held true through­
out the 19th-century and by the third quarter of that era, the two 
devices remained in English and continental drama only as methods 
which allowed lazy or inept playwrights to handle situations which 
would have taken some skill to dramatize effectively. In short, 
during the 19th-century, the aside and the soliloquy served only to 
provide the playwright with a line of retreat into the narrative.
Historically, from 5th-century Athens to 19th-century Europe, 
the basic approach to unspoken thought, regardless of the conventions 
used, was much the same. No matter who the character, be he Claudius, 
Oedipus, Everyman, or Hamlet, the audience understood that the play­
wright expected his viewers to see beyond the thoughts of the 
individual characters to the play as a whole action. The audience 
realized that back of the insight of a given character lay matters 
which may be unperceived by the individual, but which are perfectly 
apparent to the audience, and these were meant to be so. Over the
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whole of the dramatic action lay the shadow of great and absolute 
verities of which only the audience and the playwright were aware.
In accordance with this approach, the playwright was granted the 
ability to select at will the hidden thoughts of as many characters 
as he wished. This license was granted with special generosity to 
the Elizabethan playwright. Thus that artist was able to create 
an intensely dramatic scene in which each character revealed, and 
acted on, his own Insight, while the audience saw and understood 
both individual viewpoints and the greater universe which lay beyond.
An example of such a scene is the chapel scene of Hamlet.
As this scene opens, we learn from Claudius's soliloquy that 
he cannot bring himself to pray, though outwardly he appears to be 
doing so. Thus, Claudius, if killed now, is a prime candidate for 
hell. However, we immediately learn from Hamlet's soliloquy that 
the Prince's insight has failed him, for Hamlet believes the King 
to be praying. And so Claudius is saved. The drama in the scene 
lies in the irony revealed by juxtaposing the silent thoughts of 
each character. As far as external action goes, the scene is static 
enough to satisfy the most fervent wishes of Maeterlinck. The most 
important point to be made about the scene, however, is not that the 
audience is allowed to perceive the thoughts of both characters but 
that the audience is aware throughout that it is to comprehend the 
revealed thought only in terms of the greater action of the scene and 
the total action of the play. From the drama of the Greeks to the 
last quarter of the 19th-century, the dominant attitude toward the 
rendering of thought and concealed motives was the attitude exemplified 
in the above scene, the attitude which may best be described as
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absolute. That is, the individual's motives were always placed 
against the background of great moral and ethical values. But as 
far back as the Greek playwright Euripides, there were Indications 
that another, subtly but significantly different approach was 
possible.
H. D. F. Kitto in his Greek Tragedy has suggested that, in 
such works as Medea, Euripides was not writing classical tragedy at 
all, but was composing what in modem idiom would be called a 
psychological drama.® Medea, for instance, is not to be viewed 
as a character, but as a particular state of mind and soul. She 
might even be considered a personification, much as the sin of envy 
was personified in the medieval morality play. It is difficult 
to argue with Kitto on this point, for when his premise is granted, 
many of the puzzles of the play resolve themselves. The daus ex 
machina at the end, for example, becomes not mere trickery, but a 
meaningful necessity, for if Medea is the passion of jealousy, she 
truly belongs to the total universe and to the gods, and cannot 
suffer herself to be destroyed by man. More important than this, 
however, is the solution which Kitto's theory provides for the problem 
of Jason. It is a common complaint, even among students in a fresh­
man play reading course, that it hardly seems possible that such a 
sanguine woman as Medea could have committed so many horrible deeds
^H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1954), p. 197 f.
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In the past and contemplated such unnatural murder In the present 
solely for the love of such a spineless, colorless man as Jason.
And, Indeed, It does seem improbable if we approach Medea In the 
traditional manner, but if we accept Kitto*s suggestion and follow 
it to its conclusion, we find that the Jason puzzle no longer exists. 
For Jason exists only in Medea's mind, and Medea is naught but 
ruthless jealousy, made shocking by human suffering but not limited 
by human logic.
To explain, Euripides was actually writing, perhaps for the 
first time in literary history, a truly modern psychological work, 
and he was using as his basic technical device a convention which 
we have earlier referred to as first-person subjective point of view. 
In Medea we have a play which does not immediately allow the audience 
to see the characters interacting against the backdrop of a larger 
action; we have in Medea a play which permits the audience only to 
see the characters against the background of Medea's passion. That 
is, we see Jason only from Medea's point of view. Considering the 
state of her mind, it is little wonder that the hated man appears 
as stupid and insipid.
This method of rendering soul states, this filling of the 
stage with a single viewpoint, which, as it were, lays a psychic smoke 
screen between the objective action and the audience, was from time 
to time to be tinkered with in the centuries of literary effort which 
followed the wGrk of Euripides, but it was not again to be whole­
heartedly pursued until late in the 19th-century. There may be some 
validity in arguing that the medieval moralities were, after a
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fashion, examples of the use of this method, and, of course, there is 
some affinity between the two. There may even have been, though it 
would be difficult to prove, some attempt on the part of the medieval 
playwright to employ variations of point of view, but it could 
hardly have been serious or extended effort, for the important 
point in the moralities is that the audience be able to comprehend 
the actions of man in relation to the actions of the absolute laws 
of Qod and church. In other words, the audience was expected to 
understand the actions of the individual from the viewpoint of the 
great moral laws, not to understand the laws from the viewpoint of 
the individual.
A basic change in artistic philosophy was ultimately to 
reverse this situation, but the approach of the medieval playwright, 
as has been noted earlier, was to continue as the prevailing 
attitude toward the individual ego throughout the 16th, 17th, 18th, 
and most of the 19th-centuries. There are, of course, numerous 
isolated examples of a more modem approach to point of view.
There is, for instance, the exciting banquet scene in Macbeth, 
which is only to be understood as a direct rendering, for that 
scene at least, of the point of view of a single individual—  
Macbeth— to the exclusion of all others. But the scene once over, 
the action returns to a more universal objectivity, and the scene 
becomes, in the totality of the drama, a sort of dramatized soliloquy, 
an involved variation of the same technique earlier applied in the 
"Is this a dagger" speech.
Samuel Richardson, the first English novelist, is another
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example of those men who serve as forerunners to the modem Interest 
In subjective points of view. Casting about for a means to tell 
his stories, Richardson hit upon the epistolary method, an approach 
which forced him to present his narrative from a point of reference 
quite close to the viewpoints of the characters themselves. Richard­
son's technique so appealed to Coleridge that according to Leon Edel 
the great romantic poet was moved to comment that Richardson demon­
strated "the morbid consciousness of every thought and feeling in 
the whole flux and reflux of the mind, in short its self-involution 
and dream-like continuity."^ From our present vantage point, it 
hardly seems that Richardson's technique quite accomplished what 
Coleridge thinks it did, but we must make allowances for the extrava­
gance of Romantic criticism.
What Coleridge did recognize was that Richardson's method was 
a new direction, and a very important one. But its importance aside, 
it was in advance of the time when a shift in philosophy would prompt 
widespread exploitation of his new method. The age of Richardson 
was the Age of Reason, and Reason was more interested in the final 
forms and results of thought than in the processes by which the final 
forms were reached. Because of this, the age was interested, as no 
other has been, in the general not the particular. Racine's uni­
versalized men and women were more esteemed than Shakespeare's some­
what more individualized people. The ideal of all, in science as in
^Leon Edel, The Psychological Novel: 1900-1950 (New York:
J. B. Lipplncott, 1955), p. 39.
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literature, was not analysis but synthesis, and, thus, the novelists 
and playwrights, in the main, tended away from investigations of 
idiosyncrasies. Like Moliere, they were interested in extracting 
the essence of a character, his dominant trait, that universal 
quality which he shared with all men, or at the very least with 
all men of his type.
As the Age of Reason gave way to the onslaughts of the 
Romantic Revolution, the playwright, while he continued to use the 
soliloquy frequently and the aside excessively, veered more and more 
in the direction of melodrama, and consequently shunned— -indeed, 
abhorred— -any extensive treatment of psychic depths. The fervor 
of the steadily growing romantic philosophy and the popularization 
and vulgarization of the theatre gave additional impetus to the 
melodrama as the chief dramatic mode. The triumph of romantic 
realism and the piece bien faite was approaching, and what need 
had a dramatist of intrigue with thought or motivation? In the 
melodrama then, the aside and soliloquy became monologues in the 
true sense, direct public addresses to the audience which provided 
rapid exposition or preparation for plot complications.
As the drama after the Age of Reason drifted more and more 
into melodrama, the novel steadily gained respect as a literary 
form, but though the novel soon became one of the chief literary 
media of the Age of Romanticism, its practitioners stubbornly 
refused to relinquish the tradition of the omniscient author, the 
author who through the grace of neoclassic dispensation was able to 
see all and tell all. Moreover, the novelists had good reason for
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their stand. Theirs was a new genre, freed from the temporal and 
spatial restrictions of the stage, flexible enough to allow the 
omniscient author an almost unlimited choice of approaches and 
subjects. Even after the Romantic Movement had completely elimi­
nated the philosophic demand for omniscience on the part of the 
narrator, the 19th-century novelists continued to feel no need 
to consider a new convention. Why should they? The had not yet 
completely realized the full potential of the old.
It is true that there were some steps taken in the direction 
suggested by Richardson. There was even some dalliance with the 
presentation of entire stories through the first-person, such a 
presentation as is found in David Copperfield. But the first- 
person as Dickens and others presented it was more objective than 
subjective. As Percy Lubbock observes: "David offers a pair of
eyes and a memory, nothing further is demanded of him."** In other 
words, David's vision is a univeral vision. It might belong to 
anyone. Moreover, behind that vision, and never very far away, was 
the more omniscient perception of Dickens himself. In short, the 
essential address was still that of the omniscient author, but 
little circumscribed by the first-person technique, But such flirt­
ing with first-person objective as we find in David Copperfield and 
kindred works must be considered more as an attempt to add variety 
to a slightly stale approach than as an indication that a new
®Percy Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction (New York: The Viking
Press, 1957), p. 130.
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development was at hand. Any really significantly different method 
of narration, either in the novel or in the drama, had to wait 
until a drastic philosophic change had occurred, and that change 
was long in coming.
Universally held beliefs yield slowly, if ever, to changes.
The Romantic Movement had succeeded in overthrowing reason and in 
establishing passion as a key to human activity. This revolution 
had seriously weakened the foundations of a Western philosophy 
which had remained relatively intact since the late Middle Ages, a 
philosophy based on Aristotelian ideals of synthesis, a philosophy 
which had reached its latest apogee in Augustan England and Baroque 
France. But however weakened its foundations, its superstructure 
stood for more than a century. If great passion must be more 
highly esteemed than clear reasoning, so be it. But even great 
passion must be synthesized into its ideal counterpart, its "ideal 
grace." Thus, Thackeray may be free to scratch about in the hidden 
comers of Becky's soul, but he is also equally free, as the author, 
to comment on her relation to more ideal standards. Not only is 
Thackeray free to do this, but as Lubbock says, he takes a "positively 
willful pleasure" in doing so. There are even times when Thackeray 
will "boast of his own independence, insisting in so many words on 
his freedom to say what he pleases about his men and women and to make 
them behave as he will."^
9lbid., pp. 87-88.
23
But even as Thackeray wrote there were forces forming which 
were ultimately to make a complete shambles of the philosophy of 
absolutism upon which Thackeray rested his argument for the free 
manipulation of his men and women. These forces, many of which had 
been created and all of which had been incubated by the Romantic 
Revolution, were, in the last quarter of the 19th-century, to cause 
a complete transformation in the thinking of Western Culture. They 
were forces which would find their culmination and finest expression 
in a new generation of artists and philosophers, in such men as 
Ibsen, Zola, Flaubert, Strindberg, Freud, Nietzsche, and Henry and 
William James. These were the men who saw a new vision of the world, 
and it was they who gave a new direction and impetus to the dying 
romanticism of the 19th-century.
Different as these men were from one another, they all had 
a consnon romantic heritage and from it they fashioned a new and 
distinctly modern philosophy. To ferret out and discover the origins 
of those concepts which formed the bases for their new philosophy 
would be an intriguing study, but one which is certainly too vast to 
be attempted herein. It is more to the point at hand to recognize 
that by the final quarter of the 19th-century a significant mutation 
in romantic thought was observable. Out of such things as the 
increasing scientific interest in energy systems; out of the 
evolutionary theories of the natural sciences; out of the general 
scientific concern with the "how?" instead of the "why?"; out of 
the Positivism of Comte and the Individualism of John Stuart Mill, 
out of these concepts and the trends which produced them, the
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artists and philosophers of the late 19th-century built a new, 
modern world view.*®
As the 19th-century drew toward its final quarter, the 
romantic mind felt it had earned a right to be a bit smug. In 
no small measure it had aided the creation and growth of modern 
democracy. It had succeeded in freeing the arts from the oft- 
times pointless restraints of neoclassicism. It had even, albiet 
not always with good grace, seen the Industrial revolution through 
to its accomplishment, and it now had the pleasure of watching 
the new sciences show man the way to "progress" and to God's 
kingdom on earth. It was a time to be pleased. It was even a time to 
be sentimental. Despite certain signs to the contrary, it was even 
a time to cry out that God was in his heaven and all was right with 
the world. But such a declaration might indicate a trifle too much
I
protestation. The sentimentality of the time might well be an attempt 
to gloss over a deeper unrest. Both suppositions appear to be 
true. For the preachment about the well-being of the world and the 
sentimental approach to the individual seem to have been futile 
efforts to avoid the truth of the matter: romanticism had passed
its first rush; it had worn itself out, become decadent. The indi­
vidual man, having gained steadily in importance as a social entity 
through the breakdown of absolute standards, demanded the increased
*^For a discussion of the late 19th-century shift towards 
relativistic values see Wilhelm Windelhand, A History of Philosophy; 
Renaissance. Enlightenment, Modem II (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
Harper & Brothers, 1958).
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respect possible to one who could be regarded both as a social and 
a scientific phenomenon* He wished to be analyzed along with the 
other natural forces and energies. In its decadence the age had 
grown morose and turned in upon Itself..
This was the atmosphere in which such men as Neitzsche and 
Zola wrote and thought. It was in this climate of strong intro­
spection that they were prompted to develop their sacred reverence 
for the individual into what has been called the "cult of the ego."** 
Essentially this meant that truth as they saw it was an irrational, 
subjective phenomenon. Truth was in Nietzschean terms, Dionysian 
not Apollonian. In other words, the Individual ego did not exist 
in the world; the world existed in and for the ego. Stated in terms 
of the arts, the cult of the ego invites the following comparison with 
more classical standards: Classicism's genius lay in the artist's
ability to make the subject serve the object; modern romanticism's 
genius lies in the artist's subordination of the object to the 
subject.
This passionate interest in the worth and value of the indi­
vidual soul went hand in hand with yet another important tenet of 
late 19th-century thought— the belief in a relative moral standard.
The absolute morality of an earlier day, which throughout the century 
had been steadily losing in importance, was now entirely discarded by 
many intellectuals, and in its place was set a sliding yardstick
^Laurence LeSage, "Jean Glraudoux, Surrealism and the 
German Romantic Ideal," Illinois Studies in Language and Literature. 
XXXVI, No. 3 (1952),
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of values which changed with each new individual and each new set of 
circumstances.
With the triumph of individualism and relativism, with the 
exchange of universal values for pragmatic and utilitarian ones, 
with the total retreat from absolutism to empiricism causing, among 
other things, the change to a more scientifically and individually 
centered psychology, it is not strange to note that the writers of the 
late 19th-century, particularly the novelists, became more and more 
interested in the "how?" and less and less interested in the "why?" 
This new quasi-scientiflc Interest in individuals as energy systems 
called forth in the first instance the laboratory objectivity of 
Zola's third-person objective approach. But it was not long before 
the restrictions of this objectivity became oppressive to those who 
felt that it afforded them little opportunity to handle what had 
become for them the chief problem of the novelist— that of describ­
ing as completely as possible the flux and reflux, the "Newtonian 
psyche," as it were, of the individual ego in a relative world.
To solve this problem, the novelist must discover some 
means of presenting the pure and untouched center of the ego. This 
approach is especially necessary if the underlying philosophy is 
relativism. If an absolute morality is no longer to be held in 
high regard, then we must, in order to comprehend individual moral 
decisions, understand them as the individual understands them. To 
do this, we must see the world from the same posture as he sees the 
world. In fine, we must locate ourselves within the individual, and, 
by placing ourselves there, we automatically force ourselves into 
seeing and feeling only from his point of view, not from our own or
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from that of an omniscient author. We may, of course, catch some 
knowledge of the greater action in which the Individual operates, 
but we can see only that aspect of the greater action that the 
private viewpoint allows* As Frederick J. Hoffman observes, "the 
control which a point of view exercises upon the probabilities of
12action immensely and splendidly qualifies our awareness of them*"
It is true, of course, that once away from close Identification 
with the viewpoint of the central consciousness of the story, our 
own conclusions about the action may be different, more intelligent 
even, but on the surface, at least, we can have no more knowledge of 
the whole action than that possessed by the character whose insight 
we are sharing.
This then is the new method, the new structural approach 
through first-person subjective point of view* Ihe reader or 
listener is no longer permitted to catch up the total action in 
the same fashion that he could in the Hamlet-Claudius scene* How much 
he is able to see beyond the Individual point of view of a given 
character, how much he is able to judge for himself will depend 
upon the sensitivity of his Intelligence and the extent to which 
the author has lent himself to the ideals of relativism* In the 
main, the reader's Interest is usually deliberately turned from 
universal moral issues and becomes fixed instead on the motions of 
the individual soul. More often than not, there is little effort
^Frederick J. Hoffman, The Modern Novel in America (Chicago: 
Gateway Editions, Inc., 1956), p. 5.
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made to relate the individual to any fixed points of reference, for 
the author seeks a response rising more from the reader's empathy 
than from his intellectual sympathy.
The new method, found in tentative experiments throughout the 
history of Western literature from the plays of Euripides to the 
novels of Flaubert, was firmly established as the most important 
structural concern of the modem novel by the American author Henry 
James. As Hoffman remarks, "The greatest contribution of James to 
modem fiction is his discussion and use of what he has variously 
called the 'large lucid reflector* and the 'central consciousness.'
Thus the range of the novel's donnee is seen in terms of the
13character who provides its point of view." ^ James himself 
described his method in terms of his novel Roderick Hudson as the 
location of the "centre of Interest throughout Roderick...in 
Roland Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the very drama of 
that consciousness."*^ Percy Lubbock describes the Jamesian 
technique in terms more reminiscent of the science of modem 
physics when he says: "we watch the thought itself, the hidden
thing, as it twists to and fro in his brain— >watch it without any 
other aid to understanding but such as its own manner of bearing 
may supply."*3
*3Ibid., p. 4-5.
*^Henry James, The Art of the Novel. Critical Prefaces by 
Henry James (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 16.
*3Lubbock, op. cit.. p. 157.
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As Lubbock suggests, James was attempting to tell the "how?" 
not the "why?" of his characters, and yet ingrained beliefs die so 
hard that his famous brother William, a most militant relativist, 
despaired of understanding Henry's later work and complained that 
in Wings of the Dove Henry had violated the first precept of story­
telling, that is to tell it. But how could Henry himself tell the 
story? According to both his and William's philosophy, the story 
was relative to the viewpoints of the characters caught within the 
action of the tale. It was not one story, but many. Select one 
character, the story was a melodrama; select another, the tale was 
a bitter tragedy.
As James began to experiment with his new convention, he 
found more and more variety inherent in it. At first, as in 
Portrait of a Lady, he limited himself merely to placing emphasis 
on Isabel through empathic narration. He described his technique 
in Portrait as the placing of the "centre of the subject in the 
young woman's own consciousness."
Stick to that— for the centre; put the heaviest weight 
into that scale, which will so largely be the scale of 
her relation to herself, and this relation needn't 
fear to be too limited. Place meanwhile in the other 
scale the lighter weight...press least hard, in short, 
on the consciousness of your heroine's satellites, 
especially the male; make it an interest contributive 
only to the greater one.'’®
James, oj>. cit., p. 51.
As can be seen, what James was deliberately striving for was that 
flux, reflux, and self-involution of his heroine's mind which 
Coleridge claimed Richardson had achieved. But James was going 
about his task with infinite caution. While placing the heaviest 
weight into Isabel's scale, he was reserving for himself the right 
to warn his reader each time he came to load that scale. He still 
narrated to some extent, omnisciently; we are notified about what 
Isabel thought; we rarely see the thought itself without authorial 
comment.
Presently James was to become bolder. In Portrait we know 
what Warburton and Ralph are like, not because Isabel tells us, but 
because James does. In The Turn of the Screw we have a total study 
in point of view. We know nothing about the characters except that 
which we are able to glean from the limited perception of the 
Governess. In fact, so rigorously does James hold himself to the 
viewpoint of the Governess, that a violent critical controversy is 
still being waged about what actually took place in the action of the 
novel.^
Always an experimenter, James was not content to remain within 
the bounds of such works as The Turn of the Screw and What Masie Knew. 
He began to flirt with a number of complications and complexities 
indigenous to his method. In Wings of the Dove, for instance, he 
presented not one but multiple points of view, chief among which were
^For an interesting comparison of critical opinion on Turn of 
the Screw see Schorer, o£. cit., pp. 563-606.
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those of Milly Theale and Merton Densher. Each point of view served 
as a reflector of the others, and all served as reflectors of the 
Joint action shared by every character. As to the author, Janies 
stood aloof and above, never Intruding. This technique certainly 
has Its points of similarity to the multiple soliloquizing of the 
Elizabethans, the difference again being one of a shift in emphasis 
caused by a change In underlying philosophy. Elizabethan characters 
were seen in relation to the whole action. Jamesian action was seen 
only in relation to the characters. James's combination of inter­
acting points of view allowed him to gain the same irony in Wings as 
Shakespeare had obtained in Othello by playing the point of view of 
Iago against that of Othello, but James's method also allowed him 
to gain the further end of' using action as a means of access to 
character, as a means of making a relativistic statement.
As has been pointed out earlier, James's experiments with 
first-person point of view came at the end of a long Romantic Move­
ment. As the 19th-century drew to a close, the romantic mind, as 
might be expected after almost a century of focus on human indi­
viduality and passion, became more and more morbid and began to
involute excessively. The time was, as Leon Edel terms it, a time
18of inward turning, and James's work was but one milestone in that 
process of self-involution. The modern literary convention of point 
of view may, perhaps, have remained where James found it, had it not
18Edel, op. cit., p. 41 f.
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been for the growth of two other literary phenomena— Freudian 
psychology and the Symbolist movement. James, of course, was not 
directly related to either, but his work is a significant example of 
the trends which produced the two movements— specifically, a relativis- 
tic philosophy and an interest in the workings of the mind operating 
in no larger sphere of action than the mind itself.
James, as he used point of view, was to give almost equal 
weight to external and internal action. Perhaps the major reason 
for this split in emphasis was James's own philosophy, best embodied 
in his favorite work— consciousness. In short, James was still 
enough of a traditional moralist to remain throughout his life a 
champion of human awareness. He was most interested in the human 
mind from the time the thought took phrasable shape until the time 
it reacted to external pressures, and, of course, the reverse of 
that process. He lacked both the philosophic need and desire to 
pursue the mind's involutions any deeper than the level of intelli­
gent awareness. As Hoffman tells us, "James's concern with fiction 
was preeminently a moral concern; he Insisted upon the highest 
degree of cultivation and sophistication in the characters who were 
the central consciousnesses of his novels. A crisis had therefore 
to be a moral crisis; and the decision taken by his character was 
therefore not forced upon him but arrived at after a careful and 
often attenuated moral concern over it."19
l^Hoffman. op. cit., p. 9.
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Moreover, bad James's philosophic posture been slightly differ­
ent, it is doubtful that he would have proceeded much farther in the 
development of his method. He lacked the knowledge and he lacked 
the tools. The one was to come with Freudian psychology; the 
other, the tools, were to be provided principally by the Symbolists, 
who ultimately came to seek a new and only partially conscious 
means of presenting human thought. Essentially, human thinking, 
as seem by the Symbolists, was a nonorderly process. So inextricably 
united was it, in each of its phases, with external and remembered 
experiences, that it could only roughly be approximated in language 
and then only by a series of loosely related concrete instances. An 
artist was henceforth to walk as Ezra Pound later said "in fear of 
abstraction"; and he was to use what T. S. Eliot was later to call 
"the objective correlative," some sort of concretion which "captured 
an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time." In 
short, the artist was to recognize the essential Irrationality (or 
more precisely nonlogicality) of the human mind and he was to 
capture and represent this’ by telling his tales, writing his poems, 
making his statements in symbols. The symbolists were, in fact, 
taking the first of modernism's steps towards the type of artistic 
and poetic freedom which Jacques Maritain describes as a three­
fold process of freedom from "nature and the forms of nature," 
freedom from and "transformation of rational language," and,
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finally, freedom to enter the "regions of obscurity.
This is not to say that Henry James did not use symbols, for 
he used them lavishly, but withal he employed them as writers of 
all ages have used them. They were important, but they were not 
the core of his work, and when he did use them, they were not the 
final end of his work. There is no denying that the dove symbol 
is made to labor long and hard in Wings of the Dove, but behind it 
lay the conscious thinking of Milly, Kate and Densher; behind it 
lay some manner of orderly thought process, some manner of abstraction 
in the minds of each of the characters who were in any way caught up 
in the symbol. That the dove symbol became a way of making state­
ments in the novel is true, but it is not the only nor the most 
important way. Always there was the consciousness; there was, for 
instance, Densher consciously working out the meaning, for him, of 
Milly's death and sacrifice, proceeding in his mind through many 
of the abstractions of which the Symbolists were to walk in dread. 
James may not have been a profound philosopher, but it is unfair 
to say of him as does T. S. Eliot that he had a mind so fine no 
idea ever violated it. Eliot's evaluation notwithstanding, we may
^Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry 
(New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 53 f. For a thorough
discussion of the Symbolist Movement see Arthur Symons, The Sym­
bolist Movement in Literature (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company,
1919). A later treatment of this same matter is found in Andrew 
Lehmann's The Symbolist Aesthetic in France (Oxford: George
Blackwell, 1950).
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say that with James, as with any other presymbolist writer, the 
symbols used issued from the idea, the abstraction, were a partial 
manifestation of it, and were ultimately encompassed by it. In 
symbolist literature, the symbol is the abstraction; it exists 
as greater than the abstraction, and it is the end towards which 
the abstraction irresistibly moves.
Despite their oversimplification and the narrowness of their 
approach, the Symbolists had hold of not a little truth, and they 
had not long to wait in order to find their beliefs "scientifically" 
justified by the students of the new psychology. As early as 1890, 
William James recognized that beneath any orderly thought process 
lay a strata of less orderly thought— ‘awarenesses which bubbled 
up from some deep well of human perception or memory and which, in 
their original form, had no resemblance to what is called reason.
They came up, unbidden, from the sub-and' unconscious, and if they 
were not acted upon in some way by the organizing Intelligence, 
returned to whence they had come. This phenomenon William James 
named the "stream of consciousness," Implying by the very metaphor 
he selected that the thought was in constant flux, uncontrollable, 
and organizable only by labored effort. In other words, the 
phenomenon which William James identified as the stream of conscious­
ness is an "apparently unorganized succession of items connected on 
the grounds of association." In short it is "the sequence of idea
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and image in the mind."21 This aspect of the mind was, of course, 
recognized by the Elizabethans in such renderings of the flow 
of thought as those found in the mad scenes of Ophelia or Lady 
Macbeth. But the phenomenon was conventionally used chiefly to 
portraymadness, or states of mind bordering on insanity. When 
a sane character thought, he thought in coordinated phrases as does 
Macbeth or Brutus. It was not until the late 19th-century that 
the divine state of madness and its corresponding stream of thought 
became the possession of every little humdrum merchant who wandered 
the streets.
Before the century had turned, Freud was to study the 
attitudes of some hysterical individuals, and, consciously or not, 
compound his theories with that of the stream of consciousness and 
those of the Symbolists, and come up with a new proposition concern­
ing human behavior, a proposition based upon the symbolic mani­
festations of human desires as discovered in the symbolism occurring 
in the waking, and particularly in the sleeping, dreams of men and
9 9
women. ‘ Within a short time, Jung was to expand this theory into 
a broad, transcendental philosophy. With Jung, symbols acquired a
^Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry 
(New York: Henry Holt, 1950), p. 487.
^Though Freud has several times stated and restated his theory 
of dream interpretation, perhaps his most lucid explanation, at least 
for the uninitiated layman as the present writer is, is Part II of 
Freud's A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York: Washington 
Square Press, 1960), pp. 87-252.
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metaphysical nature. They were not the sole possession of the
Individual. They were shared by all through the universal uncon- 
23scious.
The result of all this was by 1913, a year before Henry 
James's death, point of view as a structural convention was once 
more applied by Proust to the autobiographical novel, one of the 
forms which had earlier served as a forerunner to the Jamesian 
method. This time, however, there was a marked difference. As has 
been observed earlier, the first-person as used, for example, by 
Dickens in David Copperfield was simply a variation on the omni­
scient author, or more precisely, on the third-person objective. 
Copperfield could tell the story because the interest was fastened 
on the external action. We are more interested in the story David 
tells than in his point of view of it. In Proust's work a different 
dog is loose. We are there watching the very motion of a mind, 
the external action is only incidental; indeed it is entirely 
dependent upon the quirks of direction taken by the mind of the 
central character, the author himself. As Irene Cornwell says of 
A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu:
Whether or not Temps perdu is a memoir or a novel 
Proust himself was not able to decide. Certain it is 
that if a novel requires composing, with an introduction, 
a climax, and an unravelling of plot, the work does not 
meet the specifications. There is no definite con-
23For an introduction to the concept of the universal 
unconscious see C. 6. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 
(New York: Meridian Books, 1956),
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struction in the Temps perdu, which has no plot, no 
action, but which emphasizes absolutely every trait, 
quality idea, and motive.2^
The essentional formlessness of Temps perdu is probably the result
of Proust's philosophy which regarded thought as an "aesthetic,
rather than a logical process."
For Proust, as for Bergson, the external world bad 
no existence of its own, is but a projection of our 
feelings and states of consciousness, and in final 
analysis Proust's consciousness is not essentially more 
real than the universe. Developing the theory of multiple 
personality to the extreme limit of plausibility, he 
conceives of consciousness as never two minutes alike, 
to such an extent that we cannot think of a self, but 
only of an infinite number of selves, each in succes­
sion increasingly different from the first of the 
series. The only link between these is m e m o r y .25
In other words, what we have in Remembrance of Things Past
is an artistic rendering of the newly discovered logic, crytallized
through the wedding of psychology and symbolism, the logic of free
memory-prompted and essentially uncontrolled association. Relativism
as practiced by Henry James had reduced traditional action to a
secondary position. Free association, as practiced by Proust,
went a step farther and subordinated traditional space and time,
for what intrigues Proust is neither events nor their normal
sequence. He and his reader dispense with traditional action and
set out to study the author's mind in the very act of dredging the
stream of consciousness for impressions which can be considered by
2^Irene Cornwell, Ed., Contemporary French Fiction (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1940), p. 379.
25Ibld.. p. 375.
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the organizing intelligence. That isy Proust is presenting a unique 
aspect of his point of view, an aspect which shows him in the act 
of raising the constituents of his stream of consciousness up to 
the level of the Jamesian consciousness, that is, to the level at 
which those constituents coordinate in some way with external 
stimuli, which in turn act upon the subconscious to call up other 
impressions long hidden. Proust's work, then, is a classic study 
in modern psychic flux.
If this technique could work autobiographlcally, it could 
also work when applied to other people. Thus, it is not surprising 
that within a decade after the appearance of Proust's first efforts, 
James Joyce had published Ulysses, a novel which experimented with 
the presentation of the points of view of several characters as seen 
through their respective streams of consciousness. Only enough 
external action— walking, for the most part—  is provided in Ulysses 
to stimulate the memory of the characters or to give their thought 
streams sufficient opportunity to react on various levels of 
awareness. The Night Town section even makes an attempt to 
penetrate into that shadowy psychic area where only pure images 
exist. In brief, in Ulysses Joyce not only tries to extend the 
Proustian method to psyches alien to his own, but also pretends as 
well to the study of the very actions of the metaconscious personality 
as it leads its own life submerged below the stream of consciousness.
By 1925, the new technique was sufficiently established to be 
exploited in a number of ways by a diversity of novelists. Not all 
of them were willing, or able, or philosophically desirous of
AO
following Joyce as he quested through the thorny ways of Ulysses Into 
the labyrinth of Finnegin's Wake. Most of them were able journeymen 
In their craft who accepted the convention of point of view as an 
accomplished fact of the novel form. Some like Faulkner and Gide 
were true innovators, using with genius the various possibilities 
of point-of-view techniques. Almost all, however, journeyman or 
genius, were to grasp the fact that the future forte of the serious 
modern novelist would, in the main, be introspection not intrigue.
In like manner, almost all were to become, if not profound, at least 
facile users of symbolic logic and of the symbol as an independent 
device or, more often, as a contributory technique in a point-of- 
view study.
Gide and Faulkner have been mentioned above as a pair of 
contemporary masters in the uses of point of view because they 
serve as examples of the inherent diversity of the approach as 
applied to the novel. Faulkner, for instance, in his masterpiece,
The Sound and the Fury, utilizes the streams of consciousness of three 
different individuals— an idiot; a tormented, neurotic boy; and a 
petty and miserly small town merchant— to throw light first upon 
one another, then upon a fourth person— the sister of all three—  
and finally upon a family and a whole civilization. Faulkner, 
however, pushes beyond simple presentation of various streams of 
consciousness. In order to make his final statement, the author 
gathers all special insights once more to himself and concludes 
the novel with a final section narrated omnisciently. Faulkner's 
method of combining point of view with omniscience is, of course,
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a perfect reflection of his concern with both the value of the 
individual and the ultimate triumph of the great and universal 
moral issues. Concerning Faulkner's use of point of view, Hoffman 
has said: "Though there is every possible difference between his
work and that of Henry James, no novelist since James has developed 
so skillfully a genuinely effective management of point of view.... 
In many ways, this novel (Hie Sound and the Fury) is a more honest 
and more efficient use of the so-called 'stream of consciousness' 
technique than Joyce's notorious Ulysses." °
Unlike Faulkner, Gide, in a novel like The Counterfeiters, 
prefers to remain within the older, more Jamesian tradition, and to 
approach his situation not through a series of conflicting or con­
trasting streams of consciousness, but through several different 
layers of intellectual awarenes?, all of them remaining on or close 
to the James level of consciousness. Simplifying Gide*8 novel 
greatly, we may, for our purposes, present a scheme of it in terms 
of concentric^ circles. First, at the center, there is the point 
of view of a youth taking cognizance of the action. This viewpoint 
is encircled, and thus slightly altered and heightened, by the point 
of view of the central character, Edouard, a character whose sensi­
tivity and intelligence amply qualifies him as a "large lucid 
reflector" in the full Jamesian sense. Edouard's awareness is, 
in turn, encompassed by that of the author acting as third-person 
narrator, and, finally, the whole of the novel is embraced by the
^Hoffman, o£. cit.. p. 176.
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author acting as omniscient commentator not only on the novel and the 
characters in it, but also on his cvn relation to them as well. In 
fact, almost the whole history of the techniques of the modem 
novelist is interwoven into this one short work. There is even 
one section— *that of the visit from the angel— in which Gide attempts 
some sort of symbolic approximation of the stream and substream of 
consciousness.
James, Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Gide are but five examples, 
albeit outstanding, of the diverse approaches to the issue of point 
of view in the modem novel. It would be possible, of course, to 
go on adding examples of the different modem solutions to the problem 
of point of view. Instead of Faulkner or Gide, it would, for 
instance, be possible to cite works by Virginia Woolf, or Conrad 
Aiken, or F. Scott Fitzgerald, or even Thomas Mann. But to do 
this would be attempting more than is intended in this chapter, for 
the intention herein is to do no more than to glance at the postures 
of one or two representative modem novelists as they addressed the 
question of point of view.
Actually, the aim of this chapter has been twofold: first,
there has been an attempt to establish in general terms the conti­
nuity and importance of the problem of revealing unspoken thought in 
a literary form; and, second, there has been an attempt to study in 
more detail the question of hidden thought in relation to the modem 
shift from an absolute to a relativistic world view. That is, the 
ultimate purpose of this chapter has been especially to seek out 
the problem of point of view at that time when it ceased to be one
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of rendering any unexpressed thought and became one of establishing 
a particular point of view solely for its own innate values.
A brief review of the material covered by this chapter will 
indicate that although the discussion of unspoken thought began 
with Greek tragedy, that is with drama, the focus was gradually 
shifted to the novel as we came to discuss the modem period and 
its concept of point of view. Such a shift in interest would 
indicate that the modem problem of point of view was a structural 
manifestation of the novel alone, and there are those who would 
argue that such is actually the case. G. M. Forster, for instance, 
in his very influential work, Aspects of the Novel, states that
27"the problem of point of view certainly is peculiar to the novel." ' 
Whether Forster is correct or not there is no denying that while 
critics of the novel have been very much alive to the uses of point 
of view in the novel, and while they have contributed a number of 
fine studies of the problem, studies ranging from Lubbock's The 
Craft of Fiction to Edel's The Psychological Novel.^8 the critics of 
the drama have all but ignored the question of point of view in the 
drama. Some men have taken note of the place of first-person
^E. M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, Harvest Books Edition, 1954), p. 79 f.
^®Lubbock and Edel have been previously cited. It would be 
difficult to present a total list of the various critical studies which 
have been concerned in some manner with point of view, but to cite 
some of the more important ones: Joseph Warren Beach's The Twentieth-
Century Novel (New York: Century Co., 1932); M. J. Friedman's Stream
Of Consciousness. a Study in Literary Technique (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1955); Robert Humphrey's Stream of Consciousness 
in the Modem Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).
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subjective in dramatic method, men like Gassner, Nicoll, and Alan 
Downer, but none of them, with the exception of Downer,^ have been 
willing to consider it as central an issue to modern drama as it 
is to modem fiction. Just why there has been a lack of recognition 
of the place of the central consciousness in drama is difficult to 
say. It may well be that the critics of the drama have simply 
accepted such pronouncements as Forster's, and instead of seeking 
a broad structural base which might embrace the whole question of 
method in modem drama, they have busied themselves with classifying 
modem plays into realistic or expresslonlstlc, symbolic or grotesque. 
Perhaps this approach has been taken because the critics of drama 
have meekly followed the lead of the leading literary critics of the 
day, and, as Joseph Wood Krutch has observed, drama in general is held 
in very low esteem, so low that such men as Edel seem to feel that in 
such point-of-view studies as Strange Interlude the playwright is not 
making an original statement but merely imitating the novelist James 
Joyce.30 Moreover, Edel is prone to believe that even in this 
imitation O'Neill succeeds only in "employing merely the time- 
honored 'asides' of the old plays or a series of soliloquies."^ What­
ever the reason, whether it is the result of the attitude of the
^^Alan S. Downer, The Art of the Play; an Anthology of Nine 
Plays (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955)
30Joseph Wood Krutch, Modernism in Modem Drama; a Definition 
and an Estimate (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), p.l.
3*Edel, o£. cit., p. 85.
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critics of the novel or whether it is the result of their lack of 
perception, the students of modern drama have failed to seek out 
and study in detail the presence of point of view in modern drama.
Such failure on the part of the dramatic critics might consti­
tute a serious oversight, for even on a priori grounds there is every 
reason to suspect that point of view as an important structural 
element plays as significant a role in the drama as in the novel. To 
begin with, it is hard to discover an adequate foundation for the 
contentions of such critics as Edel and Forster. It hardly seems 
logical to view the novel as so totally unique an art form that 
it alone is able to encompass the significance of the device of 
point of view. Reason lies with the contention that it is more 
usual for the arts of a given period to be viewed as parallel 
expressions of a common philosophy of the times, a condition which 
would normally force the arts into similar, if not nearly identical, 
structural patterns. This certainly seems to be the case in the 
modern period, where artists have been particularly concerned with 
expressing a highly romanticized, essentially subjective and 
irrational relativlstic philosophy. In order to present their 
world view, more than one of the modem arts have been concerned in 
some measure with the issue of point of view. In modem painting, 
for instance, there are the abstract landscapes of Kandinsky and 
the symbolic fantasies of Paul Klee. The former can only be under­
stood as the chromatic translation of the artist's stream of con­
sciousness and the latter can be equated to that same world of
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Junglan Imagery that Joyce unearthed in the Night Town section of 
Ulysses. Or we may take as additional proof Helen Gardner's 
definition of Cubism as "a succession of points of view such as 
front, profile, and hack, known to the mind but not seen by the eye
simultaneously."32
With such an interest in point of view evidenced by the 
visual arts, it would be surprising to discover that drama, a form 
which draws its strength from both the visual and literary arts, 
would have ignored the question entirely. And, indeed, such is 
not the case. In fact, the contrary is closer to the truth. Edel's 
accusation of O'Neill notwithstanding, there is every indication 
that the playwright's interest in point of view was awakened just 
as early as that of the novelist, and there is some reason to 
contend that dramatic experiments with the presentation of intensely 
subjective and highly individualized viewpoints may have predated 
some of the more important innovations in the novel.
The above listed concepts form part of the matter of this 
study, for it is the concern of this investigation to establish to 
some extent the scope and nature of the convention of point of view 
in modem dramaturgy. In order to do this, eight plays by eight 
representative playwrights have been selected to stand as evidence 
that point of view is as important to the modem dramatist as it is 
to the novelist, and that the dramatist's solutions are not merely
•^Helen Gardner, Art Through the Ages (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and Company, 1948), p. 743.
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unsuccessful imitations but are just as successful, varied, and 
interesting as are those of the writers of fiction. To support the 
above contentions, it is the plan of the thesis to establish briefly 
the trends in modern drama which led up to the contemporary experi­
ments with point of view. These trends once established, attention 
will be turned to the individual plays. In the case of each play­
wright studied, the attempt will be first to demonstrate that as a 
modern subjective relativist he was forced into selecting subjective 
point of view as his approach. Once this has been accomplished, 
attention will be turned to his play and the work will be carefully 
analyzed in terms of the uses and meanings of point of view in the 
dramatic illusion.
As can be seen from the above outline, it is not the intention 
of this study to survey the whole field of modem drama, but rather 
to sample judiciously a few plays by playwrights generally recognized 
as representative, in one way or another, of the trends of modem 
drama. By taking such an approach, it is hoped that this investi­
gation will not only reveal the nature and offer a detail examination 
of some of the solutions to the problem of point of view in drama, 
but also that as the study progresses it will suggest the presence of 
certain trends that will clearly support the proposition that the 
attack and resolution of the structural issue of viewpoint became 
one of the major activities of an important group of dramatists and 
that it touched, to some extent, the efforts of all but the most 
confirmed dramatic reactionaries.
CHAPTER TWO
THE TWO DIRECTIONS OF MODERN DRAMA 
THE EXTERNAL AND THE PAN-PSYCHIC DRAMA
It is difficult to say whether the honor of developing modern 
realism should go to Norway or to France. Traditionally, the study of 
realism begins with Ibsen, but this precedent cannot obscure the fact 
that the well-made play, as developed by Scribe, was pointed from the 
first in the direction of modern realism. Moreover, the best of 
Scribe's successors, Augier and Dumas, fils, continued the realistic 
evolution by adding, within their own narrow sphere, a certain honesty 
to the treatment of social themes. In this same tradition, Zola ap­
peared, urging a naturalistic treatment of life on stage. Then too 
French practices were not limited to France; their influences were 
wide-spread. As Carpenter points out, the two great English realists 
before the advent of Shaw--Jones and Pinero--owed more to France than 
to Ibsen.* But despite its importance, early French realism was a
1-Bruce Carpenter, The Way of the Drama; A Study of Dramatic 
Forms and Moods (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1929), p. 151.
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thin brew, and there is no denying that the dramatic philosophy of 19- 
century France forced her playwrights into a literary cul-de-sac. The 
leading critic, the reigning dictator of the French stage, Francois 
Sarcey, articulated the ideal of all when he argued that a play was 
but a machine for holding the attention of the audience for two hours 
and then sending it home in good humor.^
It is not difficult to realize that a drama with such a philos­
ophy dooms itself to superficiality and sterility. Thus, although 
realism may have developed first in France, the contributions of the • 
Gallic genius were restricted to the well-made play form and to a few 
broad hints at the possibilities of the social theme. Briefly, in 
terms of modern realism, French efforts were early and secondary.
Norway's contribution, on the other hand, was late and primary, 
for between 1869 and 1872, Ibsen seriously turned his genius to the 
well-made play and the social thesis. He lifted the twin concepts of 
realism and the social theme from the squirrel cage of French drama, 
stripped them of the unhappy accumlations of almost a century of 
existence, and presented his refined versions to an awe-struck world. 
The difference in degree between the work of Ibsen and that of the
^Francis Fergusson, "James's Idea of Dramatic Form," Kenyon 
Review. V (Autumn, 1943), 495 f.
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French school was so great that his stunned contemporaries soon her­
alded him as the creator of a new dramatic mode. For many years he was 
considered the St. George of the modern theatre. But viewing him from 
the advantage of three quarters of a century, Ibsen appears much more 
clearly as the savior rather than the destroyer of the well-made 
dragon. It is no secret that Ibsen was strongly influenced by the 
French playwrights, and most modern critics will agree with HacGowan 
and Melnitz that Ibsen was the "master architect of the truly well-made 
p l a y . W h a t  the master architect did was to take a rather shop-worn 
and mechanical form and freshen it and give it life by emphasizing its 
better features while playing down it more obvious faults. Thus it was 
that Ibsen added vigor to the French play by reconciling its charac­
ters with a more recognizable middle-class scale and by treating 
social problems that were more directly related to the mercantile soci­
ety of the day rather than following the practice of casting about for 
his theses in the shadowy demi-monde so dear to the heart of the Gallic 
romantic. In keeping with his tendency to establish a more truly func­
tional relationship between drama and society, Ibsen also attempted to 
eliminate the often very shabbily forced happy ending and the unneces-
3jCenneth MacGowan and William Melnitz, The Living Stage (New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p.355.
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sarily rigid assignment of precise tasks to each of the five formal 
acts. Each of these changes was probably necessary, but they were 
modifications of, not departures from, the piece bien faite. They may 
have been striking reforms, but they were more obvious than profound.
It was in his sweeping introduction of an entirely new approach to the 
total dramatic illusion that Ibsen made his truly significant change 
in the well-made play.
To Ibsen, the French dramatist's excessive use of the aside and 
the soliloquy, not as devices for investigating hidden thought, but 
simply as supports for faltering dramatic imagination, were particular­
ly offensive structural crudities. And when considering the following 
three examples, we cannot but agree with him:
GEORGE. In a word, I have seen and admired you.
DORA. (Aside) He has a strange was of showing it.
European, I suppose.
LADY TRAVERS. Is my son here?
BARNEY. No, my lady.
LADY TRAVERS. (Aside) So much the better. (Aloud) Is 
the lady of the house in?
WINTERBOURNE. So you are at this moment. We can dream 
that we are in that happy place.
DAISY. (Aside) He can do with me what he will.
(Aloud) I'll tell them to keep you a seat. ^
^The first example is taken from Dion Bouciault's The Octoroon. 
1859; the second from Steele MacKaye's Hazel Kirke. 1880; the third 
from Henry James's adaptation of his own Daisy Miller.
So much did Ibsen dislike such practices as the above, that he reformed 
them not by returning them to an earlier and better tradition, but by 
ultimately eliminating the two devices entirely. In fact, as early as 
the writing of The League of Youth, Ibsen boasts that he has accom­
plished " the feat of doing without a single monologue, without a 
single aside."5 This is indeed a feat, and it is this accomplishment, 
more than any other, which created modern stage realism! For in elim­
inating asides and soliloquies, Ibsen limited himself to the study of 
character only through the external word or action. In other words, 
without recourse to the aside and the soliloquy, Ibsen had no other 
choice but to make his statements solely through the agency of the sur­
face elements of human experience, that is, through the elements of 
objective reality. To write plays without employing the two most pro­
minent conventions of Western drama is undoubtably difficult, but it 
is not necessarily praiseworthy. In doing what he did, Ibsen gained a 
certain kind of verisimilitude, but he did not come any closer to 
reality, per se. What he did do was to create Ibsenism, a highly con­
ventionalized mode of drama which replaced the omniscient author with 
that of the third-person objective narrator, which in turn had the 
effect of an illusion of complete surface reality.
•’William Archer, trans., Eleven Plays of Henrik Ibsen (New York: 
Mo d e m  Library, Random House), p. xi.
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Despite Ibsen's feat, there is nothing inherently weak in the 
aside and the soliloquy. In the hands of a Moliere or a Shakespeare 
they become the most dramatic of conventions. There did, however, 
exist in Ibsen*8 time a considerable abuse of these conventions, but 
this could have been corrected. Reformation, however, was not Ibsen's 
intention, for as long as the aside and the soliloquy remained in the 
drama, their presence belied the relativistic statement which Ibsen was 
attempting to make. Consequently, Ibsen elected to reject rather than 
rescue the two techniques. In short, Ibsen relinquished entirely the 
previously omniscient approach of the dramatist and substituted in its 
stead a new, totally objective one. Before Ibsen, the dramatist could 
never, perhaps, lay claim to the narrative flexibility of the novelist, 
but in his own much more direct and immediate medium he had his share 
of freedom. Ibsen altered this, and, after the acceptence of his prob­
lem play, playwrights in the classic Ibsenian tradition CQuld report 
only; never, unless very obliquely, comment. Nor could they directly 
reveal the inner reality, the hidden thoughts of their characters.
Out of Ibsen's new third-person objectivity grew his so highly 
admired presentation of exposition, which was in reality the exchanging 
of one convention for another. Ibsen's new method of exposition, by 
seemingly natural conversation between major characters, was, in great 
measure, a reworking of the approach found in many Elizabethan plays.
After all, the major expository load In Hamlet, for Instance, is 
shouldered by Hamlet and Horatio. What made Ibsen's exposition suf­
ficiently different, however, was his need to bring it into line with 
his new objective point of view, that is, to reveal all information 
only through dialogue or action. Today, his so-called realism in ex­
position— as, for example, in the long conversations between Nora and 
Mrs Linde--often seems as stiff and as stylized to us as do the inane 
dialogues between the older drama's ever-present butler and maid. Much 
like the older drama, Iben's exposition-conversatlons are often tedious 
and dpll, and, more frequently than not, they contain things which 
people just don't say to one another, or facts whibh they must surely 
have revealed long ago. Too often these conversations begin rather 
clumsily, as, for instance, when Tesman says to Aunt Julia in Hedda 
Gabler;
And now look here— suppose we sit comfortably on the sofa
and have a little chat till Hedda comes.
The little chat continues: into a long one, long enough to cover 
most of the background of the play, and much is stated that would 
either have been said long ago— the condition of Aunt Rina's illness—  
or never have been said at all— Teaman's luck in capturing Hedda and 
in having eliminated his rivals. All this is not to say that the play­
wright cannot be granted some license, or that Ibsen's handling of ex-
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position is extremely poor, but only to establish that it is every bit 
as unrealistic and stylized as any other method previously employed by 
playwrights. As pure verisimilitude it has its gauche elements, and 
as an attempt at rendering life, it comes no closer to the total phe­
nomenon than do the aside and the soliloquy. All are artistic conven­
tions .
When Ibsen early in his career stated that the illusion he 
wished to create was that of reality and that he desired to depict 
human beings and therefore would not have them speak the language of 
the gods,^ he did not go on to qualify his definition of reality. If 
he had, he most certainly would have been forced to concede that under 
given circumstances some human beings could very well speak the lan­
guage of the gods. What Ibsen most likely meant was that he was seek­
ing to produce an illusion of a particular kind of reality and a par­
ticular kind of human being. He wished to depict the surface, the 
readily perceptible, reality of middle-class Europeans of the late 19th 
century. At least this is what he accomplished in such plays as Ghosts 
and Pillars of Society, and it is no mean accomplishment. Nor can it 
be said that there is anything inherently wrong with the goal Ibsen set
£
°Raymond Williams, Drama From Ibsen to Ellot(London: Chatto &
Windus, 1952), p. 157.
56
for himself. It does however have Its limitations, not the least 
among which is the loss of the principal dramatic means of rendering 
hidden thoughts and moods; and it does have its dangers. Among the 
latter, the most difficult to avoid is that of Inadvertently creating 
a social history rather than a play, with the resultant loss of dra­
matic appeal to all but a very few in a very limited time and culture 
range.
Ibsen managed to some extent to overcome these limitations and 
dangers because he was a great playwright. Those who followed Ibsen- 
ism did not always fare so well. The names of men like Brieux and 
Galsworthy, good journeymen playwrights, are rapidly fading as their 
so carefully recorded realism becomes, with time, less and less immed­
iate. Presently they will be understood and appreciated only by the 
historian. Scores of less talented playwrights have even disappeared 
from the historian's view.
But the form which Ibsen utilized, despite its obvious pitfalls, 
has continued to be the most popular approach of the modern theatre.
It repeats itself endlessly through dozens of Broadway, Paris, and West 
End seasons. It is the basic form for the great bulk of modern plays 
and into its mould are cast such commercial successes as Stalag 17 and 
The Seven Year Itch. That basic form is the well-made play. The 
asides have been eliminated and so has much of the wit, but the essen­
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tial ingredients are as present today as they were in Le Mariage 
d'Olympe or A 0011*8 House. Shake the bloom from the average Broadway 
hit, Tea and Sympathy, for instance, make some allowances for changes 
in social custom--in the 19th-century a woman who offered herself in 
sexual sacrifice to save a teen-age boy from homosexuality simply 
could not command sympathy— and there you have the old French thesis 
play with its "big curtains," its love triangle, its contrived misun­
derstandings, its staunch friends, its good women., and its pretentions, 
all decked out in the straight-jacket of Ibsenidn third-person objec­
tivity.
It is an old story, and one that does not need retelling here, 
of how Ibsenltes everywhere created new methods of staging and acting 
which provided productions reflecting and paralleling the objectivity 
of Ibsen's scripts. Antoine, Brahm and Grien brought "free theatres" 
to France, Germany and England respectively, and in Russia Danchenko 
and Stanislavsky established the famed Moscow Art Theatre. It was the 
latter group, more than any other, which popularized the primary con­
vention of the objective production--the convention of the "fourth 
wall." Ibsen had suggested the exclusion of the audience as a partici­
pant when he eliminated the aside and the soliloquy; Stanislavsky made 
this exclusion more definite when he placed chairs, facing upstage,
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along the plane of the proscenium arch.
With the establishment of the "fourth wall," the audience real­
ized that it was no longer part of the total theatrical experience, 
except in its role of mute and carefully concealed observer, crouching 
silent and hidden in the dark auditorium like a natural scientist 
studying the habits of beasts in their native surroundings. It was 
this concept of the audience as a silent, and, indeed, unnecessary ob­
server, that became one of the major tenets of Stanislavsky's early 
artistic philosophy. As Bakshy has said:
There will be no difficulty in recognizing the basic prin­
ciple which lay at the foundation of all the experiments 
of the Art Theatre, tacitly admitted as the natural and 
only artistic form of theatre. This principle was repre­
sentation. The object of the theatre was understood not 
to present a play through the medium of the stage, but to 
represent it as a separate entity existing side by side 
with the observing audience....Of the two elements of the 
theatre, the stage and the audience, the second operated 
merely as some superfluous attachment making itself felt 
only through the necessity of providing for it the huge 
window of the stage through which it could get a glimpse 
of the world enacted.?
Such a philosophy was only possible after the appearance of the 
objective play, and after the disappearance of the most direct means 
of communication with the audience— the aside and the sbliloquy. Once
^Alexander Bakshy, The Path of the Modern Russian Stage (London: 
Cecil Palmer and Hayward, 1916), p. 47 f.
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Ibsen had objectified the play, however, it was only a matter of time 
before someone would perform a similar service for the production.
The third-person script and the third-person production were absolute­
ly necessary to one another, and the existence of the one predicated 
the existence of the other. In prodf of this, the "fourth wall" has 
continued, like the Ibsenian version of the well-made play, to be 
the most popular mode of stage presentation. It influences contempor­
ary practices in directing, scenery, and lighting, and it forms the 
basic precept of the "method school" of acting.
The tendency towards the exclusion of the audience was intensi­
fied by the practices and polemics of Naturalism, an artistic movement 
which began with Zola in France and soon spread throughout Europe.
Its quasi-scientific ideal was not to present an "illusion of reality," 
but to present reality itself, the so-called "slice of life." The 
dramatist was to become so completely an objective recorder that he 
was to become, as it were, a case historian, forfieting any right to 
interpret or exercise selectivity. He was to study "feelings, ideas, 
virtues, and vices...objectively, physiologically* and functionally in 
the theatre, just as sugar and vitriol are analyzed in the laboratory."®
^Barrett H. Clark and George Freedley, A History of Modern 
Drama (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1947), p. 242-
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While Naturalism in its extreme form never quite carried the 
stage, it had a significant influence on the works of many modern 
realists. Its effects are especially apparent in the plays of the 
Russians, particularly those of Checkov. In addition, Naturalism, 
with its total emphasis on understatement, caused a number of play­
wrights to abandon, for a time, some of the more striking features of 
Ibsenism. Playwrights like Galsworthy and Hauptmann, for instance, 
suppressed the plot and did away with the "big curtain." But while 
Naturalism helped further to loosen the formal act structure and, in 
some instances, to increase the poverty of modern dramatic prose, its 
general effects were, for the most part, short lived, and the well- 
made play as Ibsen made it survives today as relatively intact. The 
chief and lasting effect of Naturalism was the great stress it laid 
upon objective surface realism, especially upon the treatment of sordid 
details. In this respect it out-Ibsened Ibsen and encouraged and 
strengthened the use of the objective viewpoint.
In short, we may say that modern realism is one important di­
rection of contemporary drama. It was fashioned from French matter by 
a Norwegian playwright, and its most distinctive feature is an objec­
tivity of viewpoint, which was achieved by the elimination of the 
aside and the soliloquy. However, it is not, as many believe, anything 
resembling a total break with the piece bien faite. As Martin Lamm
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has commented:
so far as Ibsen surpassed the Frenchmen, he also nat­
urally learned, as he says In a letter to Brandes In 1896, 
to avoid their grossest errors and misconceptions. But 
this should not be taken to mean that he disregarded 
their technique. In stating a problem, working out a plot, 
drawing a character, or writing dialogue Ibsen was devel­
oping the techniques of the French drama.®
This is not to say that modern realism did not conceive of
itself as making a completely new direction, for its whole focus was,
in fact, on the rejection of the past. As Raymond Williams points out
in his discussion of the "newness" of A Doll's House:
The play does not go any deeper than the usual mechanisms 
of intrigue; it does not undercut the assumptions of ro­
mantic drama, with its mechanical versions of experience; 
it merely provides a reversal within the romantic frame­
work. It is not a new positive dramatic standard; it is 
simply anti-romantic, a negative within the same frame­
work of experience.10
This negative attitude towards the past, this attempt to reject it, is
labeled by Joseph Wood Krutch as "modernism." As already mentioned ih
Chapter One, modernism is that change in late 19th-century philosophic
^Martin Lamm, Modern Drama (New York: Philosophical Library,
1953), p. 113.
10Raymond Williams, o£. cit., p. 66.
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posture which attempted to establish a difference between the past and 
the present principally by rejecting all vestiges of the older abso­
lute values and by placing in their stead a new subjectively based 
relativism. In discussing An Enemy of the People, Krutch noted this 
phenomenon, and he said, "at last we have reached something that, for 
the first time, might actually justify talk about a chasm separating 
the past from the future."
A new world which had come to accept an all-inclusive rela­
tivity actually would not be merely different from, it 
would be genuinely discontinuous with an old one in which, 
on the whole, it was assumed that some unchanging princi­
ples were eternally established.^
What is so intriguing about this whole business is that while 
modernism and modern realism proclaims aloud its break with the abso­
lutism of the past, it is, essentially, an extension of the romanti­
cist thinking of the 19th-century, and in so many ways it continues to 
perpetuate the dramatic mode which rested its argument on an older 
absolutism. In searching for a new, anti-absolute and anti- universal 
form, the realists introduced a new structural approach, a third- 
person objectivity which gained for their plays a quality of surface- 
reality. In doing what they did, they eliminated a gross misuse of 
omniscience by the premodern playwrights, but they also limited them-
H-Krutch, oj>. cit., p. 12.
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selves tremendously in that they excluded from possible direct con­
sideration any of those subjective areas of human activity on which a 
relatlvlstlc creed must ultimately be based. By accepting objectivity, 
realism had henceforth no recourse but to depict surface elements of 
human experience.
The achievement of third-person objectivity was, however, a sig­
nificant and critical step, both for the realists and for another im­
portant group of modem dramatists. For the realists, surface objec­
tivity was the method by which they retained the virtues of the piece 
bien faite while they corrected many of its vices. For a second group 
of playwrights, ttje objective perspective served as an irritant which 
prompted them to invent various means of circumventing the obstacles 
it posed. The activity of the latter group of dramatists forms the 
second direction of modern drama, the direction which will be the 
ultimate concern of this study, the move toward nonobjectivity.
It is difficult to state unequivocally that modern drama would 
not have developed a corpus of nonobjective writing if it were not for 
the existence of the objective playwright, but we may say that it is 
likely that modem subjective forms would have been considerably 
different. Undoubtedly, the move toward objectivity was a crucial one 
and served, at least negatively, if not positively, to hasten the 
development of contemporary subjective forms.
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Alan Downer, at least, seems to feel that this .Is true. As he 
points out, realism " involves the concept of point of view for the 
first time in drama." We may take issue with this sweeping pronounce­
ment, but we must admit the truth of his observation that:
Once the idea of point of view becomes established, once it 
becomes a tool, the playwright will experiment with its 
possibilities. The objectivity of the scientist, however 
highly touted as an ideal by Ibsen, Zola, and Chekhov, 
places unnatural restrictions on the creative a r t i s t . ^
What the development of an objective as opposed to an omniscient
point of view did was to make cleaf to those playwrights operating in
a more subjective tradition the major outlines of their own structural
problem and to emphasize for them the inadequacy of the old well-made
play omniscience as a probable method of solution. They were thus
forced to begin not with a return to the older approach, whose weakness
as a relativistic tool Ibsen had amply demonstrated, but with the newer
realistic form as a basis for experimentation. Therefore, instead of
rejecting the objective point of view, they were to develop it,
carrying it into the realms of total subjectivity and relativity. In
short, Ibsen created modern realism by a concerted effort to do away
with the principle omniscient devices of the older drama. Actually, he
begged the question of their inherent weakness, and ignored rather than
^■^Alan Downer, oj>. cit., p. 315.
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reformed che aside and the soliloquy. A second, more or less anti- 
realistic, school of modern drama fashioned its forms by taking realism 
as a base and actually developing and extending that very aspect of it 
which seemed least flexible, the concept of point of view.
This second direction of modern drama has been described above 
as "subjective" and more or less antirealistic. Now while these terms 
serve well in general discussion, they are somewhat misleading when an 
attempt is made to study the movement in more detail. They have three 
major shortcomings: first, they are too vague to suggest the diverse 
and often contradictory practices which they embrace. Second, they 
bring to mind an antithesis with realism, rather than a development out 
of realism and out of a common background shared with realism; and, 
third, they encourage those who accept the realism-antirealism dichot­
omy to follow this division'cto its logical conclusion and elaborate a 
realism-romanticlsm dichotomy. Wholehearted acceptance of the latter 
two connotations can be confusing and may lead to unfortunate critical 
errors. Thus, it seems imperative, before going any further, to settle 
upon a pair of terms which will suggest that the two directions of 
modern drama without rigidly establishing any categories or fixing any 
sharp lines of division. None of the terms in current critical use 
seem fitted for these requirements.
The first popular term which comes to mind is neo-Romanticism,
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but this raises more problems than It solves. It Is true that the 
subjective writers were principally romantics, but neo-Roraanticism 
seems to indicate that realism was not romantic. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth. As has been demonstrated earlier, Ibsen was 
following closely the lead of the popular Franch romantics, and even 
when his work was compounded with that of the more radical Naturalism, 
the result still remained within the romantic tradition. Zola might 
have been crying out for a break with the "patent-leather" palaver of 
his day, but in doing so he was, in a sense, calling for a return to 
an earlier tradition, such a tradition as was reflected in the poems 
of Robert Burns or outlined by Wordsworth in the Preface to the 
Lyrical Ballads as the choosing of "incidents and situations from 
common life" and the describing of these incidents "throughout, as far 
as possible, in a selection of language really used by men." Zola 
might have scorned Wordsworth's additional purpose of throwing over 
men and language a certain "coloring of the imagination," but he did 
retain a most essential element of Romanticism— the emphasis on the 
Individual common man and on his basic emotions. In fact, in many 
ways, Zola18 Naturalism is merely Romanticism transplanted from the 
avenues to the back alleys.
Perhaps it would be stretching a point to attempt to place 
either modern realism or Naturalism within the escapist school of 19th- 
century stage romanticism, but this is unnecessary, for the former's
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emphasis on the bourgeois and the letter's interest in the lower 
classes clearly demonstrate their essential romantic tendencies. Con­
sequently, since both directions of modern drama share a common roman­
tic background, the term neo-Romanticism suggests a dichotomy which 
simply does not exist.
The phrase "drama of the individual" comes closer to being apt, 
but the difficulty with the expression as used by Nicoll is that it 
can apply equally well to both directions of modern play writing.
Hedda Gabler. for instance, granting that it is a transitional play 
between the two directions, still serves to demonstrate that the 
realists could and did concentrate solely on the individual.
The Nietzschean terms Apollonian and Dionysian also have their 
limitations in this regard. They are useful to a degree when con­
trasting Romanticism with Classicism, but when applied to two equally 
romantic phenomena, they are rather confusing. There might be a 
certain divine madness in the works of many of the nonrealists, but 
structurally speaking The Weavers is even more formless, and hence 
even more Dionysian, than The Spook Sonata. Another aspect of this 
same difficulty arises when the terms Realistic and Non-Realistic are 
utilized. While it is true that a certain semblence of reality is 
found in the works of Ibsen and the Ibsenites, the Non-Realists cannot 
be denied their point when they argue with Edschmidt that "apparent
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reality is after all not essentially real, that observed reality is 
not the essence of the object.
Actually, it seems best to discard most of the popular critical 
terms and to search out new ones which relate directly to the major 
difference between the two schools. Since the basis of (he difference 
seems to be the objective viewpoint, it would seem that the most apt 
term for those dramatists who took their cue from the social dramas of 
Ibsen would be writers of the "external or objective drama." Objec­
tivism and Bcternalism correspond closely enough with the terms Nat­
uralism and Realism in the broad sense, but they have the advantage 
over the latter two terms in that they suggest method without implying 
judgment.
With Objectivism as one label, the immediate temptation is to 
select Subjectivism as an opposing term. But this, unfortunately, 
forces the two schools into a qualitative-quantitative relationship 
which is far from correct. Moreover, by itself, Subjectivism lays far 
too much stress on the difference between the two schools and far too 
little on the development of the one out of the other. More Important, 
Sujectivi8m implies again the old romantic-realistic dichotomy.
Despite all this, Subjectivism does come close to connoting the major
*3carl Enoch William Leonard Dahlstrom, Strindberg's Dramatic 
Expressionism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), p. 28.
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area of difference between the two types of dramaturgy, and, therefore, 
it seems best to select some term which would Incorporate its meaning 
while playing down its unhappy connotations. The most suitable 
generalization seems to be one invented by the playwright Andrievev, 
"pan-psychic drama."
As has been stated earlier, the external and pan-psychic dramas 
are interrelated rather than parallel but opposing forces. The roots 
of both lie in the total Romantic Revolution, and both are children of 
the modem sciences and the general philosophic shift from absolutism 
to relativism. Both can probably be traced back to the Storm and 
Stress Movement in Germany and to the somewhat later romantic triumph 
which Victor Hugo helped to bring about on the French stage.
Moreover both grew out of a need of the late 19th-century play­
wrights to reject the decadence of mid-19th-century theatre. After 
Hugo, the subsequent history of 19th-century drama had not been the 
exciting story of a contest between romantic freedom and classical 
restraint, but the sad tale of the gradual degeneration of romantic 
drama into unstageable closet dramas on the one hand and shallow melo­
dramas on the other. What at the beginning of the century had been a 
vigorous if phrenetic movement had been transformed by victory into a 
smug and decaying institution.
It was this condition that Ibsen set out to remedy; his manner
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of reform has already been discussed. It was chiefly structural--that 
of introducing an objective viewpoint into the dramatic illusion— and 
it was carried into acceptance with the aid of Zola's naturalistic 
theories, which appeared concurrently with Ibsen's early realistic 
efforts. It must be remembered, however, that the drama of externals 
was basically romantic. The emphasis on emotion rather than reason 
was very much in evidence. As Zola said of his dramatization of 
Therese Raquin. his aim was to study the wife and her lover in order 
"to see nothing but the beast, to throw them into violent drama and 
note scrupulously the sensations and acts of these creatures.
Now while many playwrights were following Ibsen and Zola in 
noting scrupulously the sensations and acts of man, just as many more 
were active in interpreting unscrupulously those same acts and sen­
sations. The intriguing thing about each group was that while they 
seemingly differed so greatly in approach and ideals, they were much 
more compatible than a casual perusal would indicate. The fact that 
the writers of the pan-psychic drama were, like Hauptmann and Strind­
berg, to begin their careers as externalistic playwrights testifies to 
the closeness of the two schools. Also, the interest of the external­
ists in private and primitive emotions was the same interest which
l ^ M a c G o w a n  and Melnltz, oj>. cit., p. 359.
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brought the pan-psychic playwright to a presentation of the total 
"soul-complex." Moreover, both schools laid claim to the support of 
19th-century science. Externalism, as the earlier development, tended 
as a whole to follow Naturalism in looking towards the already highly 
developed physical sciences, and the externalists cultivated an 
individual-centered, materialistic and pessimistic, philosophy based 
upon popular Darwinism. Pan-psychism, as the slightly younger school, 
began with this philosophy as a base, but soon turned to the discov­
eries of the new psychology, and, as might be expected, formulated a 
modern mysticism based upon the more profound secrets of the private 
ego. In point of fact, the pan-psychic playwrights and the students 
of the new psychology might well have been mutually indebted, for as 
Lionel Trilling points out, " psychoanalysis is one of the culminations 
of the Romanticist literature of the nineteenth c e n t u r y . T o  support 
his contention, Trilling quotes Freud's protest when hailed as the 
discoverer of the unconscious: " The poets and the philosophers before 
me discovered the unconscious....What I discovered was the scientific 
method by which the unconscious may be studied.
■^Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), p. 33.
16Ibid., p. 31.
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But whatever its relation to science, and despite its close 
kinship with Externalism, the pan-psychic drama has a separate 
literary history, the beginnings of which are burled in the "fate 
dramas" of young Germany, and early examples of its later symbolic 
tendencies may be found in the works of the French playwright de 
Musset. It was not, however, until the late 19th-century that Pan- 
psychism began to take its modem form. Chief among those who may be 
called its major forerunners is Richard Wagner, whose theories of the 
music drama were elaborated in support of his claim to the writing of 
modern Greek tragedies. But whatever Wagner's stated theories and 
aims, his purpose was much more to artistically render "the logic of 
human passions" than to recreate classical tragedy. As Baudelaire 
said of Tristan and Isolde, it is Greek tragedy "at the bottom of a 
cave, magnificent it is true, but lit by fires which are not those of 
P h o e b u s . i n  like manner, Francis Fergusson observes that Tristan 
"owes its significance partly to the fact that it is the most perfect 
instance of drama as 'the expression of emotion': the doctrine that
identifies action with passion."18
^Francis Fergusson, The Idea of a Theatre (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1949), p. 85.
18Ibid., p. 94.
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Whether Trlatan is a "most perfect" anything is doubtful, but . 
the opera did serve, along with the other works of Wagner, to foster 
the development of the theatre of the private and essentially irration­
al ego, the theatre growing out of the "cult of the ego." Moreover, 
Tristan inspired the man who was to give an early and articulate phi­
losophy to the total modern theatrical movement--Fredrick Nietzsche.
In his Birth of Tragedy, written under the spell of Tristan. 
Nietzsche inquires into the nature of art and arrives at the following 
decision: art in essence is the combination of two elements--the
Apollonian and the Dionysian. The one is the form creating element, 
the other the passionate, the Inspiring element. Of the two, Nietzsche 
gives the greater importance to the Dionysian, the divine madness. It 
is vital and basic; the Apollonian is always at its service. To 
Nietzsche, the Dionysian is "the eternal and original artistic force," 
the Apollonian is only a means of presenting this force.
If we could conceive of an incarnation of dissonance— and 
what else is man?— then, that it might live, this dissonance 
would need a glorious illusion to cover its features with 
a veil of beauty. This id the true function of Apollo...
Nietzsche's emphasis on the Dionysian and his concept of man as
an incarnation of dissonance is strongly reminiscent of the "beast" in
l^Fredrick Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche. Clifton P.
Fadiman and others, trans., (New York: Modern Library, Random House,
Inc., 1927), p. 1087.
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the people of Zola/ and such a similarity testifies to the joint 
philosophy shared by both. Actually, the point of division between 
the followers of Zola and the more Nietzschean pan-psychics is found 
in the fact that while both saw action in terms of passion, the pan- 
psychic playwrights were to believe with Nietzsche that the truest and 
most important human passions sprang from the deep and irrational sub­
ject and that this truth could be rendered but poorly by approaching 
it through the object. Thus, we should not look to surface phenom­
ena, but behind them.
After Nietzsche, then, the structural problem of the more intro­
spective drama was not whether man was to be presented as essentially 
Dionysian, nor whether the emphasis should be placed on the relative 
position of the individual subject as opposed to the more universal 
object, the problem was the selection of a method by which the play­
wright could gain access to those areas of human individuation and 
dissonance which hide behind the surface phenomena. As a solution to 
this problem in ego-centered relativity, the omniscient melodrama of 
the old piece bien faite was obviously useless, but while the strict 
objectivity of the new Ibsenlsm seemed equally binding, it proved, 
nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, to be a happy development, for it 
carried within itself the seeds of expansion and development.
Strangely enough, among the first of the dramatists who experi-
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merited with breaking down and refashioning the objective point of view 
was the man most responsible for its initial adoption. Ibsen, after 
laboring so assiduously to create complete dramatic objectivity, 
apparently realized the restrictions which externalistic technique 
imposed upon a relativistic thinker, and he searched for conventions 
which would provide him with more freedom. Obviously the monologue 
and the aside, the two conventions which he held in such high contempt, 
would not be among the devices considered. But in the period when he 
did use these conventions— i.e., the period of his early romantic 
plays in verse--Ibsen also flirted with a device which had since 
become extremely popular in late 19th-century prose and poetry— the 
symbol as a communicative agent. Thus it was that, never quite fully 
developed in Brand and Peer Gynt, never often rising above the level 
of allegory, symbolism of a much deeper and more complicated nature 
was to reappear in Ibsen's 1884 work, The Wild Duck. Of course, 
throughout his middle period the symbol as a dramatic force never quite 
disappeared from Ibsen's plays, for it is evident in all his work from 
Pillars of Society to Ghosts, but its function remained minor and its 
development relativily crude as long as Ibsen was wrestling with the 
problem of creating an illusion of reality. Once some sort of 
armistice had been achieved with external reality, however, he turned 
to address the difficulty of reopening those areas of psychic activity
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which externality had sealed off. As Ibsen came face to face with the
problem of gaining access to the inner being, it is probable that he
was already armed with a growing awareness of the increasing importance
of the symbol in contemporary literature. Possibly he felt that it was
high time that the dramatist experimented with a device already granted
such a significant place in the other literary arts. At any rate, in
1884 Ibsen wrote to his publisher:
This new play occupies in a way a place by Itself in my 
dramatic production; the method diverges in various 
aspects from my former practice. However, I will make no
further pronouncements on that score....At the same time,
I hope that The Wild Duck perhaps may induce some of our 
younger playwrights to venture out in a new direction, 
and I would consider this desirable.^
There is no need here to develop in detail the increasingly 
symbolic trend of Ibsen's later work, the trend which began with The 
Wild Duck and ended only with When We Dead Awaken. The more important 
point is that this trend demonstrated that Ibsen himself had turned 
away from pure Externalism, had joined forces with the pan-psychic 
playwrights, and had abandoned Ibsenism to the Ibsenites. Perhaps this 
had been his bent from the beginning, perhaps the externalistic plays 
were only a step in the total process, a step which developed into a
long digression, so long that it took him most of a creative lifetime
^Op.F.D. Tennant, Ibsen's Dramatic Technique (Cambridge: Bowes
& Bowes, 1948), p. 56.
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to return to the point* But no matter whether Ibsen came to his new
method by accident or personality, there is no denying that The Wild
Duck signals the entrance of the most important figure of modern drama
into the school of Pan-psychism. Tennant justifies this observation
in his remarks on The Wild Duck:
Ibsen here breaks with his problem play-writing and 
occupies himself exclusively with human psychology. The 
break marks a new departure in his technique of charac­
terization, abandoning moral for psychological motivation.21
*
Ibsen did not, however, despair all at once and forever of the
fecundity of the external drama. After all, the better portion of his
creative life had been spent in perfecting it. As might be expected,
he attempted at first to work within the restrictions of surface-
realism, while using the symbol as a means of rendering the external
illusion more transluscent. As Northam indicates, when Ibsen "found
himself" he realized that surface-realism "could be manipulated so
delicately that the illusion of reality remained while the depths of
the personality were explored."
Thereafter, each play was a struggle to reconcile the two 
kinds of reality, a struggle that became harder as Ibsen's 
insight into human nature grew deeper. Perhaps the
2lIbid., p. 56.
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tension was highest and the reconciliation most tri­
umphant in Hedda G a b l e r .22
As Northam says, Hedda Gabler probably furnishes the best 
example of Ibsen's new "psychological method." Although the super­
ficial outlines of Externalism are maintained, the breakdown of 
objectivity is everywhere apparent. The entire progress of the action 
can be. traced on two levels--that of the external action and that of 
the symbolic action. Moreover, it seems evident that the major state­
ment of the play is much more closely related to the symbolic action. 
In the best third-person tradition, Hedda explicitly states certain of 
her motives. To Brack, for instance, she says that she acts the way 
she does "because I'm bored I tell you." To Mrs. Elvsted she explains 
that "I want for once in my life to mould a human destiny"; to Lovborg 
she confesses that she was interested in him because a young girl, 
when it was possible, "should be glad to have a peep, now and then, 
into a world which she is forbidden to know anything about." These 
overtly stated motives are part truth, but mostly excuse. They mask 
the more significant motives found only in the symbolism, found in 
such things as General Gabler's pistols with their suggestions of 
power and masculinity, of destruction and the death wish, of martial
22John Northam, Ibsen's Dramatic Method; A Study of the Prose 
Dramas (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1952), p. 219
and sexual romance. Or again, Hedda's motives can be traced to the 
constant application of the cock and satyr images to Brack and Lovborg, 
or to Hedda's identification of her child with Lovborg's manuscript and 
Mrs. Elvsted's hair with that young lady's power over Lovborg. The 
play is shot through with these and other recurrent symbols which vary 
both in meaning and importance according to their relation to a given 
situation in the play. In addition, it is interesting to note that 
most of them, like Hedda's vision of Lovborg with "vine leaves in his 
hair," testify to the interest which Ibsen shared with Nietzsche in the 
Dionysian aspects of human nature.
But even more interesting than the appearance of symbolism in
Hedda Gabler is the particular manner in which it is used. One would
suppose that the symbol, like the monologue, would be.used to unlock 
the psychic processes of more than one character, and, indeed, it did 
function in this manner in The Wild Duck. But by the time Hedda was 
written, Ibsen had long ago fallen into line with the more extreme 
doctrines of the new relativism, the new and total emphasis on the 
subject. He was, in fact, doing much the same thing in Hedda that
Henry James had done in Portrait of a Lady. He was retaining the gen­
eral framework of the third-person narrator, but by extremely close 
and sympathetic narration, he was placing the "weight" into Hedda's 
scale, "into her relation with herself," and he was proportionately
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removing the weight from the scales of her satellites. Thus, the 
really important element of the play, the symbolism, relates primarily 
to Hedda in the sense that it either originates with her or refers to 
her. It is this aspect of Ibsen’s use of symbolism which gives such 
depth to Hedda, and its use only in terms of her makes the other 
characters seem flat and stereotyped. Brack, Mrs* Elvsted, Lovborg, 
and Tesman are purposely allowed to remained unrealized because the 
emphasis is not on the total situation, but only on Hedda's relation 
to it, and Ibsen's special use of symbolism points to this fact.
Raymond Williams recognizes Ibsen's special approach to Hedda 
when he says that the play is not satisfying because it is like "a 
powerful dramatization of a novel."23 in an attempt to put his finger 
on Ibsen's new and disturbing method, he assigns it to the category of 
"savage farce," a special classification which T.S. Eliot has manu­
factured for The Jew of Malta and Volpone. Williams seems to have 
missed the point. Hedda is not farce at all, though it has caused 
many an audience to laugh at the wrong places because directors and 
actors have mistaken it for pure Externalism and have played Hedda's 
satellites as fully realized, surface-realism characters. The result­
ing overstatements cannot help but be funny. And, of course, when
^^Williams, oj>. cit.. p. 83 f.
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these characters become funny, they also become, In their way, sym­
pathetic. Consequently, many an audience leaves the theatre feeling 
that Hedda got what she deserved. This is rather unfortunate, for the 
play is not about morals, but about the psychological constitution of 
a particular Victorian woman. If the audience is to understand the 
play at all, they must be patient and sympathetic with Hedda alone. 
Thus, the play should be presented so that all characters and situa­
tions, and above all, all symbols point toward achieving this sympathy 
and patience.
What some critics fail to comprehand is thatrlbsen is moving 
behind external reality in not one but two ways, first, through 
symbols, but more importantly through a change in point of view. 
Unfortunately, he is not totally successful in either attempt. His 
failure can probably be traced to his reluctance to drop completely 
the objectivity which he had labored so hard to establish. This am­
biguous posture was to become more marked in the plays of his declin? 
ing years, but his tendency was always more and more toward symbolism, 
more and more toward the pan-psychic drama.
To sum up, Ibsen'8 plays from The Wild Duck onwards move first 
in the direction of opening the inner thoughts of all characters, and 
then in the direction of concentrating on the psychic flux of a single
82
character. In this final phase, the plays seriously undercut third- 
person objectivity and in doing so project the major structural prob­
lem of the pan-psychic school, the presentation of a first-person 
subjective point of view. Therefore, we may say that Ibsen serves as 
a pivotal figure in modern drama. On the one hand, he perfected and 
popularized a dramatic structure which had as its cornerstone an 
objectivity of viewpoint. But on the other hand, once he realized the 
subjective basis of his relativism, his interest passed from a study 
of what people actually did to a study of what actually made them do 
what they did. It was to comment on the latter phenomenon that Ibsen 
sought for new structural devices. The ones which he ultimately set­
tled upon--symbolism and through symbolism a presentation of a more 
personalized point of view— he passed on to the pan-psychic playwrights 
for further development.
Nor can we say that the subjective playwrights were ones to 
look a gift horse in the mouth. They took what they received from 
Ibsen and went immediately to work. Ibsen's wish that The Wild Duck 
•'may perhaps induce some of our younger playwrights to venture out in
r
a new direction" was, within ten years, more than gratified. One such 
group of younger playwrights were the symbolists, who, though they 
claimed direct lineage from Villiers de L'lsle Adam, could not help 
but regard Ibsen as a pioneer and master. Led by Maeterlinck and
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Claudel, the symbolists were highly influential throughout the nine­
ties, and, as their name implies, the most distinguishing feature of 
their work was symbolism. Unfortunately, what began as legitimate 
interest in a new technique soon became an overwhelming passion. 
Ultimately, the symbolists came to regard the symbol as an end rather 
than as a means and began to pursue it too often for its own sake.
They ended by losing sight entirely of the function of the symbol in
Ibsen's work, and their own plays tended to become little better than 
"grown-up fairy tales." Thus, for one group of younger playwrights, 
the "new direction" which began so vigorously with The Wild Duck was 
to end rather limply with The Blue Bird.
But the symbolists were only one minor group, and Ibsen's 
influence did not stop with them. His introduction of symbolism into
such plays as Hedda Gabler secured for the device a respectable if
minor function in the works of latter day externalists like G.B. Shaw, 
and made the symbol an important element in the dramas of such eclectic 
playwrights as Chekhov and Hauptmann. Nor was Ibsen's influence con­
fined only to playwrights. However strongly Edel may believe that 
O'Neill was influenced by Joyce, William Tindall is equally strong in 
his feeling that Joyce found in The Master Builder one of his great
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examples for Finnegan1s Wake.^
But among all the writers of pan-psychic literature who follow­
ed Ibsen's example, perhaps the most important of the dramatists was 
his younger contemporary August Strindberg. Strindberg seems to have 
finally recognized what Ibsen only vaguely apprehended, that the major 
problem of modern pan-psychic drama was the projection of the total 
dramatic illusion through some aspect of the first-person subjective 
point of view. He was probably greatly aided in this recognition by 
the increasing popularity of Freudian psychology, but his experiments 
with mysterious mental processes in such externalist plays as The 
Father and Miss Julia certainly demonstrate that he owed no primary 
debt to the science of psychoanalysis. However, the question of what 
Strindberg owed to psychology, or even what psychology might have owed 
to Strindberg, is beside the point} obviously they were both products 
of the total Zeitgeist. The more germane matter is that since Strind­
berg was the first to take up the problem uncompromisingly, any 
detailed study of point of view in modern drama must begin with the 
Swedish playwright. Once Strindberg had joined issue with the problem 
of dramatizing the subjective perspective, however, it was not long
24william York Tindall, The Literary Symbol (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 133.
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be£ore a considerable group of playwrights from many nations followed 
his lead in exploring and exploiting it, and a lengthy period of 
structural experimentation began, experimentation which has continued 
to the present day.
The remainder of this study will be devoted to a detailed inves­
tigation of this experimentation as found in eight examples of aspects 
of point of view in modern drama. Beginning with Strindberg, the 
playwrights studied will include Evreinov, Kaiser, Pirandello, O'Neill, 
Giraudoux, Miller, and Anouilh. Their works have been selected for 
various reasons, the most important being that each of the works 
represents a different aspect of the problem of point of view. Only 
a little less important is the fact that each work is considered a 
modem play of some merit, and thus each will serve to keep this study 
within the mainstream of modern drama, while at the same time each will 
stand as evidence for the contention that the issue of point of view 
is perhaps one of the most significant structural questions in modern 
dramatic literature. Moreover the eight dramatists represent an inter­
national group, and, therefore, prove that interest in the new method 
was not limited by geography or culture. Finally, the playwrights 
fall into a rough chronological pattern, thus serving as examples of 
the approximate growth of the problem and of the direction it took as 
it evolved within the total contemporary framework.
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There is no doubt that it would have been possible to select 
other plays and other playwrights. German Expressionism, for example, 
teems with point-of-view studies, and Kaiser's play could have been 
replaced by one of Toller's or any other of a large number of expres­
sionists. The same is true of American drama, which, in such works 
as Rice's Adding Machine and Kaufman and Connelly's Beggar on Horse­
back. offered interesting if somewhat clumsy examples of the manipu­
lation of subjective point of view. In the cases mentioned above, 
however, the playwrights are either inferior to the dramatists chosen 
for study, or else represent a later or less original solution to the 
problem. In short, the eight playwrights to be studied are among the 
writers considered as the leading dramatists of our times, and their 
works, therefore, seem to stand as the best examples of the possibil­
ities and difficulties of point of view as a structural element.
In fine, then, the eight playwrights presented in this study 
are the end products of a century and a half of romanticist thinking. 
They stand as individual manifestations of the pan-psychic tendencies 
of modem drama, tendencies so widespread as to touch even the work of 
such part-time and reactionary playwrights as T.S. Eliot and W.B. 
Yeats. The germs of these tendencies are buried somewhere in the 
drama of high Romance which dominated the early 19th-century stage, 
but their uniquely modern character can first be seen taking shape
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during the last quarter of the 19th-century. At that time two more or 
less distinct currents developed in drama, Externalism and Pan- 
Psychism. Had it not been for Ibsen, it is difficult to say what the 
ultimate relationship of these two forces may have been. Ibsen's 
work, however, forced a schism between the two and set for each its 
separate goals.
It must be kept in mind, however, that no matter how diamet­
rically opposed the two directions might appear to the casual observer, 
they are, in essence, of the closest kinship. They both share the 
common background of subjectively based, irrational relativism, and 
the more subjective direction is, in truth, the child of the more 
objective. This relationship is best demonstrated by Ibsen, who is a 
key figure in both movements. First, by rescuing the well-made play 
from the decadence of the French theatre and by imposing on it a new 
third-person objectivity, he set the pattern for the 20th-century 
externalists. Then, by becoming restive under the restrictions of his 
surface-realism method and by attempting to pierce the hard shell of 
objectivity through symbolism and a new attitude toward individualized 
point of view, he created the goals for the latter day pan-psychic 
playwrights. It only remained for his younger contemporary, August 
Strindberg, to make those goals clearer by completely rejecting the 
third-person objective point of view.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DREAM AND THE MONODRAMA 
STRINDBERG AND EVREINOV STATE THE PROBLEM
I
Strindberg: The Dream Play
Just before the turn of the century, a particularly interesting 
vogue gained popularity among European artists and intellectuals.
At that time it became fashionable— indeed, it became almost manda­
tory— to go quite mad. The names of those artists and thinkers 
who were victims of some sort of mental disorder would make a 
rather long list and would include such well known figures as 
Nietzsche, Van Gogh and Henrik Ibsen. Always sensitive to the 
intellectual currents of his times, August Strindberg, not surpris­
ingly, was to be counted among those who most passionately embraced 
the new fashion. Strindberg referred to his own mental collapse, 
which followed close upon the heels of that of his friend Fredrick 
Nietzsche, as his "inferno" period, a rather lengthy time during 
which he harrowed the Swedenborgian hell, practiced alchemy, and 
engaged in certain types of black magic. Somehow, without extensive 
medical treatmentj he managed to regain sufficient control to marry 
for a third time, establish his own theatre, and resume his writing. 
But much had happened to him during the long hiatus, and the work
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which he produced after the "inferno" was often of a strangely 
different quality. While it is true that he continued to write 
naturalistic plays up until the very end, his attitude and tech­
niques even in these externalistic dramas were different enough to 
justify the contention that from 1897 until his death Strindberg's 
chief concern was developing the pan-psychic drama. But this 
proposition need not be argued from the externalistic plays, for 
its main support comes from Strindberg's experiments in a unique 
and surprisingly contemporary dramatic form— the dream play. These 
experiments include the To Damascus series, The Ghost Sonata, and, 
of course, The Dream Play itself.
That Strindberg should ultimately settle upon the dream as 
a dramatic form seems, in retrospect, something less than unusual. 
Considering the man and the times, it seems, in fact, almost 
inevitable. Strindberg, a moody and introspective boy, was the 
unwanted child of an extremely large family. The son of a poverty- 
stricken aristocrat and a woman of the lower classes, Strindberg 
contained within himself a mlcrocosmic reflection of the larger 
struggle between the upper and lower classes which was then being 
waged in Europe. He was to spend much of his adult life attempting 
to reconcile this personal conflict. As if this problem were not 
enough, the sensitive boy was soon aware that he was rejected by 
both mother and father, and that, after his mother's death, he was
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openly hated by his stepmother.^
Strindberg's problems at home drove the boy to seek solace 
In Pietism, a popular Lutheran sect with strong Puritanical and 
Calvinistic leanings. Like the New England Puritans, the Pietists 
held as their basic precept the doctrine of election, with its 
correspondent emphasis on retraint, prayer, and soul-searching.
The effect such a religion might have on an already introverted 
boy can easily be imagined. Thus, it is safe to say that before 
he left home to attend the university, Strindberg's intensely 
personal world view had already been established. What was basic 
in the boy was to remain basic in the man, and it is now a truism 
to say that Strindberg's work is always highly autobiographical.
To support this contention, it is necessary only to note 
that every precept of Strindberg's philosophy can be traced to one 
or another of his childhood experiences. His ambivalent attitude 
towards women, for Instance, was probably rooted in his constant 
longing for a mother love he never received, and in his later 
inability to reconcile this longing with the mature sexual demands 
made by his wives. Or again, the strict teachings of Pietism and 
the conflict of loyalties caused by the differing origins of his 
mother and father were probably responsible for his continuing
*For those who set store in such things, Strindberg's unhappy 
relationship with his mother has caused him to be considered a 
classic example of the Oedipus Complex. For a thorough discussion 
of this and other matters in Strindberg's life see V. J. McGill, 
August Strindberg. The Bedeviled Viking (London: Noel Douglas,
1930).
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iconoclasm, which was consistent only in being always present in 
some form* Moreover, Pietism was in all likelihood the activity 
which prepared his soul for his later Swedenborgian ecstasies and 
for his ultimate conversion to a Christianity which was a compromise 
between the teachings of Swedenborg and those of Roman Catholicism. 
All in all, Strindberg's background and personality certainly 
equipped him to be a pan-psychic playwright of note, and, if the 
times were right, perhaps a truly important Innovator. As it so 
happens, the times could not have been more auspicious. All 
Strindberg had to do was to be alive to their signs, and this 
he certainly was.
As Otto Heller notes in his essay on Strindberg, the play­
wright was aware of every new intellectual current, and, at one 
time or another, supported each of them:
He reversed his judgment with a temerity and swift­
ness that greatly offended the feeling and perplexed the 
intelligence of his followers for the time being and 
justified the question whether Strindberg had any 
principles at all. In politics he was by quick turns 
Anarchist and Socialist, Radical and Conservative,
Republican and Aristocrat, Communist and Egoist; in 
religion, Pietist, Protestant, Deist, Atheist, Occultist 
and Roman Catholic.
With such an erratic intellectual pattern, it is not strange 
that when Strindberg came to playwrighting, he first tried his hand 
at the historical romances then in vogue, and, when the fashion
^Otto Heller, Prophets of Dissent (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1918), p. 78.
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changed, abandoned these for the new Extemalism. In the latter mode 
he became a master. But even as Strindberg was producing his 
naturalistic masterpieces, Henrik Ibsen, the playwright whom 
Strindberg refused to recognize as master, was quietly moving 
beyond the frontiers of objectivity. However much Strindberg 
may have believed that Ibsen found Hedda's prototypes in The 
Father and Miss Julia. It was ultimately the younger man who was to 
be beholden to the older. Three years before the appearance of 
The Father. Ibsen had already presented a new subjectivity In The 
Wild Duck, and by the nineties Ibsen had almost broken through the 
barrier of objectivity in such plays as Hedda Gabler. Had it not 
been for Strindberg's passionate disagreement with Ibsen over the 
"woman problem" it is very possible that Strindberg would have 
realized and acknowledged his debt. After all, the Swedish play­
wright could hardly have found fault with the subject-focused 
conclusions of Ibsen's relativism, for the homage which Strindberg 
paid to Nietzsche and Swedenborg was obviously based on his early 
and continuing reverence for Buckle, author of History of Civilization 
in England, whose total view was naturalistic determinism, but whose 
basic premise was that all truth was relative to the individual, 
to his situation and presuppositions.^
Thus, even while Strindberg was damning Ibsen as the "Nor­
wegian blue stocking," he was preparing to follow him by becoming 
a convert to Buckle's relativism. As if Buckle's beliefs were
^McGill, o£. cit., p. 105.
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not enough, Strindberg also fell under the Influence of Nietzsche 
and carried on a lengthy correspondence with that philosopher.4 
Nietzsche's amorality and his stress on the Individual ego must 
surely have heightened Strindberg's growing annoyance with the 
objectivity of Externallsm, for McGill records that in 1892, in 
a famous drinking resort in Berlin, Strindberg made a vehement 
attack on Naturalism which, in its violence, surprised and hurt 
his friend, the poet Dehmel.^ Why Strindberg did not follow the 
lead of Ibsen at this time is an open conjecture. Happily he did 
not, for if he had, it is probable that he would have given his 
allegiance to the symbolists, whose work he admired sufficiently 
to write Swanwhite in direct imitation of Maeterlinck. Had 
Strindberg committed himself wholeheartedly to the symbolists 
at this time, it is likely that he would have been lost to us 
but as a writer of fairy tales.
Strindberg's "symbolist period" was to come, however, and when 
it did, he was to see what Maeterlinck was blind to, and he was to 
take the decisive step into complete subjectivity. Before he was 
equipped to do this, however, one more philosophic Ingredient was 
necessary. The times had already conspired that he should be aware 
of the relativism of Buckle, the ego-cult of Nietzsche, and the new
^For more information on the Nietzsche-Strindberg corres­
pondence see Herman Scheffauer, "A Correspondence Between Nietzsche 
and Strindberg," North American Review. 198 (1913), 197-205.
^McGill, oj>. cit., p. 9.
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techniques of Ibsen as popularized by the symbolists. He had now 
only to descend into his "inferno" and be converted to the mysticism 
of Swedenborg. When he emerged from this final trial, he was 
ready to write the drama, not about himself, but of himself.
Thus Strindberg, before the turn of the century, was prepared 
to tell the truth. This truth was the truth in the Buckl6an 
sense, the world as seen from Strindberg's point of view. It 
was also the truth in the Nietzschean sense, the truth of the 
Individual will, in its Dionysian as well as its Apollonian 
form, transcending and reshaping the world. It was, finally, the 
truth in the Swedenborgian sense, the truth of the inner not the 
outer existence of man. To tell this special kind of truth, 
Strindberg needed a new structural method. The objectivity of 
Externallsm might, if properly manipulated, very well have met 
the demands of Buckle and Nietzsche, but its very nature was the 
antithesis of Swedenborgianism. There was, of course, the symbolism 
of Maeterlinck, but a symbol is not total structural solution, 
except in the metaphorical sense that all structural solutions 
are ultimately symbolic. Moreover, the symbolist playwrights 
had tended more and more towards the fairy tale, thus reducing 
their symbolism to the function of anti-realism as opposed to 
lnner-reali8m. Whether realistic or fanciful, their basic structure 
still postulated either the objective or omniscient approach.
Thus The Blue Bird may be fantasy, but within the fantastic frame­
work, its method of presentation is still that of Externallsm. 
Strindberg then could make use of various superficial techniques
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of the symbolists, but he had to search out a fundamentally 
different overall approach through which to present his new 
trlfold philosophy.
Ihat new method, consciously or not, followed the lead of 
Ibsen's experiments with point of view in his post-Hedda Gabler 
period, but it took Ibsen's techniques one step farther. Strindberg 
completely discarded any pretense of objectivity and established 
instead a first-person subjective point of view. Now while this 
step was prompted by a need to represent the inner reality according 
to Swedenborg, its immediate inspiration was, in all likelihood, 
the experiences which Strindberg had undergone during his mental 
collapse. Throughout this time hallucinations were frequent 
occurrence in the life of the playwright. He was attacked by 
electric currents; he saw white hands lifted in prayer. The man 
with whom he shared a room turned out to be the Doppelg&iger of the 
American faith healer, Francis Schlotter. At another time a 
Roman knight appeared to him and offered him the formula for 
transforming iron into gold.6 These and other waking dreams 
probably suggested to Strindberg the fragility of the relationship 
between the subject and the object, between the inner and the 
outer reality. He no doubt realized how much the stability of the 
latter depends upon state of will of the former, upon whims of its
^For a full account of this period see Strindberg's auto­
biographical work, Inferno. Claude Field, Trans. (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1913).
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ordering consciousness. Or, inversely, he recognized how quickly 
the apparent order of outer reality can be disturbed by the refusal 
of the metaconsclous to allow the consciousness to admit that 
order's existence. When a decision had to be made between the two, 
Strindberg, true to the dictates of Swedenborg, came to place 
his trust in inner reality, even, and especially, when it disagreed 
with the outer. As his experiences had shown him, this disagreement 
often took the form of a waking dream; hence, it is little wonder 
that when Strindberg cast about for a new structural approach, 
he finally came to select the individual dream as an artistic 
form.
His first experiments with the new convention were in the 
To Damascus trilogy, written between 1897 and 1904. At first 
his technique is inconsistent, for like Ibsen before him Strindberg 
was reluctant to relinquish entirely the extemallstic form. This 
reluctance, however, is not apparent in his two most consummate 
experiments with his new dream structure— The Ghost Sonata and The 
Dream Play. These two plays, the latter written in 1901-02 and 
the former in 1907, still stand as two of the most striking and 
original literary works of the early 20th-century. While both 
were written after the publication of Freud's theory of dream 
interpretation, there is no evidence to indicate that Strindberg 
had ever read Freud. What he had read were the more important 
signs of his time, and, moreover, he had read and acted on them 
sometime before the celebrated subjective experiments of Proust 
and James Joyce. Just what Strindberg read in those signs and just
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how he translated what he read Into a dramatic statement can best 
be discovered by a detailed analysis of his new method. Since 
The Dream Play is the earliest and the best complete example of the 
new technique, it has been selected to serve as a basis for this 
analysis.
It must be granted at the outset that The Dream Play is not new 
in its dreaminess, for dream works in the Maeterlinck tradition were 
then quite popular in Europe. They had, for that matter, always 
been popular. As Strindberg correctly observed, The Tempest is a 
dream play. But prior dream plays, like The Tempest, had been 
fairy tales. That is, though their atmosphere was fantastical, 
their psychology, no matter how naive, conformed to the psychology 
of accepted reality. Moreover, even the elements of fantasy were 
standardized. We expect Ariels and Calibans to appear, even 
demand that they do. The same is true of such elements as enchanted 
islands, handsome princes, and lovely princesses. It is the received 
dream world of high romance and conforms to certain universal 
principles. In a play like The Tempest, once we know it for fantasy, 
the emphasis is on the dream, and its pleasant divergences from 
reality. The audience has dreamed this same dream many times, 
and what they expect to see is not a new dream but a new variation 
of the old one. Both the audience and the playwright agree that 
the world depicted is a familiar but alien one whose charm derives 
from everyone'8 awareness that it is an Improbable one.
Strindberg's Dream Play differs from this concept in that the 
emphasis is on the dreamer, and the world presented is reality, a
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world actually occurring for the dreamer, and the fact that It is a 
world possible only for the dreamer does not at all detract from 
Its reality. What the audience Is Invited to do is to share this 
world with the dreamer by dreaming along with him, by forgetting, 
for the moment all other worlds. As Strindberg says in the preface 
to The Dream Play:
The characters are split, double and multiply, they 
evaporate, crystallise, scatter and converge. But a 
single consciousness holds sway over them all— that of 
the dreamer. For him there are no secrets, no incon­
gruities, no scruples, no law. He neither condemns nor 
aquits, only relates...^
In other words, what happens in The Tempest may be referred to 
the audience*8 sense of external reality, and the divergences between 
universal dream and universal reality may be duly noted and enjoyed. 
What happens in The Dream Play may be referred only to the dreamer. 
The audience is prohibited from considering the points of diver­
gence from objective reality because the focus is not on commonly 
shared experiences but on the uniqueness of the dreamer's vision. 
Briefly, the audience sees Shakespeare's world through their own 
eyes; Strindberg's world they see only through the eyes of the 
dreamer. Shakespeare injects fantasy into the universal object; 
Strindberg begins with externality and quickly passes into the 
variations it produces in the private ego.
...on a slight groundwork of reality, imagination spins 
and weaves new patterns made up of memories, experiences,
^Elizabeth Sprigge, Trans., August Strindberg. Six Plays of 
Strindberg (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956),
p. 193.
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unfettered fancies, absurdities and improvisations.
Strindberg demands that his audience forget all concepts of 
fantasy and reality, of morals and actions, of human relationships 
on and off the stage, and observe instead the flux and counterflux 
of a single mind as it reacts to an unknown stimulus from the outer 
world. In short, we have in The Dream Play the workings of a mind 
observed in no larger sphere of action than the mind itself. It 
is on this basis that one must accept or reject the play.
Moreover, by an unfortunate accident, the mind happens to 
be the mind of August Strindberg, a mind not yet fully recovered 
from a severe mental illness, a mind fascinated by all manner of 
Eastern and Western mysticism, and, consequently, a mind that 
could hardly hope to call forth the empathlc response which is the 
very sina quo non of an understanding of the dream form. Realizing 
this, Strindberg has made certain concessions. After the play 
was completed, he added the prologue in which Indra's Daughter 
descends from heaven in order to experience first hand the life of 
man. By thus casting over the play an aura of Eastern mystery, 
Strindberg greatly tempered its distortions. In addition, the 
playwright added a short preface which he had printed in the program 
for the first production of The Dream Play. Along with the other 
ideas already cited, the preface stresses the dreaming as opposed 
to the waking quality of the play. This is sop to the simple- 
minded. That the play is nightmarish there is no doubt, but 
despite the implication of the preface, there is evidence in the 
play itself that the events are part of a waking dream. More to the
point, the playwright implies that there is no basic difference 
between the two, as the following scene between the Poet and Indra's 
Daughter indicates.
POET. I seem to have UVed through this before.
DAUGHTER. I too.
POET. Perhaps I dreamt it.
DAUGHTER. Or made a poem of it.
POET. Or made a poem.
DAUGHTER. You know then what poetry is.
POET. I know what dreaming is.
DAUGHTER. I feel that once before, somewhere else, we
said these words.
POET. Then soon you will know what reality is.
DAUGHTER. Or dreaming.
POET. Or poetry.
On the basis of this conversation, the play may be considered 
a dream, a memory, a bit of external reality, or a poem, or even a 
dream within a dream. The label is unimportant; call it by the more 
modern name of stream of consciousness, it still remains that the 
playwright is recording the play of mysterious images on the stage 
of his consciousness, images that have been called up from some meta- 
conscious level of human existence. For centuries, the traditional 
procedure— broken only here or there by such painters as Hieronymus 
van Bosch— had been for the artist to so arrange and translate 
these images into the common tongue that a universally stated analogue 
to them existed in a painting, poem, or play. In other words, the 
assumption had been that these spectres from the preconsclous were 
essentially incoherent, and that in order to make them communicable, 
it was necessary to bring to bear on them the ordering logic of the 
consciousness. As Nietzsche puts it, the Dionysian needs the logic 
of the Apollonian. In The Dream Play. Strindberg directly challenges
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this assumption. To him the Dionysian Is meaningful In and of 
Itself. As he says in the preface to The Dream Play.
In this dream play, as in his former dream play 
To Damascus, the Author has sought to reproduce the 
disconnected but apparently logical form of a dream.
Thus, before the play begins, Strindberg anounces that he 
is studying a new form of logic, the basic logic of the individual out 
of which all universal inference ultimately grows. This rationale 
of the individual is best reflected in the "dream work," and therefore 
the meaning of the play will be found in Strindberg's comments on and 
presentation of the "apparently logical form of a dream." In other 
words, the meaning of Strindberg's dream will be found in the assump­
tions upon which it rests and in its own form of coherence, its 
own structural patterns. What then, first of all; are the assumptions 
of dream logic?
To begin with, as Strindberg says, "time and space do not 
exist." Just how original this notion was in 1901 is difficult for 
us now to realize, for we have had the advantage of seeing an Albert 
Einstein scientifically explode our traditional concepts of space 
and time. Indeed, some of us are even now somewhat astounded at the 
idea, although every "stream of consciousness" novelist from Proust 
onward has toyed with and worried the notion to death. In The Dream
Play Strindberg pauses to take up the concept in some detail.
OFFICER. Then how long shall I have to stay here?
SCHOOL MASTER. How long? Here? You believe that time 
and space exist? Assuming that time does exist,
you ought to be able to say what time is. What
is time?
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OFFICER. Time...I can't say, although I know what It Is.
Ergo, I may know what twice two is without being able 
to say it. Can you yourself say what time is?
SCHOOL MASTER. Certainly I can.
OFFICER. Tell us then!
SCHOOL MASTER. Time?...Let me se. While we speak time flies.
Consequently, time is something which flies while I 
am speaking.
BOY. (rising) You're speaking now, sir, and while you're 
speaking, I fly. Consequently, I'm time, (he 
flies)
SCHOOL MASTER. That is also quite correct according to the 
laws of logic, although it is absurd.
OFFICER. Then logic is absurd.
SCHOOL MASTER. It really looks like it. But if logic is
absurd the whole world is absurd....
As the scene above suggests, when time and space cease to 
exist, so also does popular logic whose casual foundations rest on 
spatial-temporal reality. Having discarded the received time-space 
sequence, the Officer and the School Master are justified in playing 
Alice in Wonderland with rationality.
OFFICER. Yes, that's so, one must mature...Twice two—
is two, and this I will demonstrate by analogy, the 
highest form of proof. Listen! Once one is one,
therefore twice two is two. For that which
applies to the one must apply to the other.
SCHOOL MASTER. The proof is perfectly in accord with the laws 
of logic, but the answer is wrong.
OFFICER. What is in accord with the laws of logic
cannot be wrong. Let us put it to the test. One 
goes into one once, therefore two goes into two 
twice.
If time, space, and popular ideals of logic do not exist, 
then there is little reason to assume that probability and possibility 
exist either. As Strindberg tells us, "Anything can happen; every­
thing is possible and probable." Thus in one sweep, the entire 
structural assumptions of all previous dramatic literature are cast 
aside. And yet, Strindberg promises us that on the basis of this new
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assumptions he will present us with a drama of "apparent logic," a new 
logic which will give the key to the whole meaning of the "inner life" 
of the ego.
This strange new Strindbergian logic is symbolized in The 
Dream Play by the secret hidden behind the door with the clover leaf 
design, and one of the major concerns of the play is the unlocking 
of that door. When near the end, the door is finally unlocked, the 
secret turns out to be nothing. This has two meanings. To the 
Dean of Theology, the secret is nothing because out of nothing God 
created heaven and earth. Now this meaning has been generally 
passed from critic to critic, and pawned off on readers and audience 
as the meaning of the play. What these critics fall to realize is 
that they are the very ones whom Strindberg is satirizing, for they 
have failed to take into account that the statement is made by the 
Dean of Theology who probably represents the accepted not the 
Strindbergian world view. Actually, Indra's Daughter, a few lines 
later, give? us what must be taken as Strindberg's meaning. Earlier 
she has told the Dean of Theology that what he said was true but 
that he has misunderstood. Now she tells the Poet.
DAUGHTER. ...In the dawn of time, before your sun gave
light, Brahma, the divine primal force let himself 
be seduced by Maya, the World Mother, that he 
might propagate. This mingling of the divine 
element and the earthly was the Fall from heaven.
This world, its life and its inhabitants are 
therefore only a mirage, a reflection, a dream 
image.
POET. My dream!
DAUGHTER. A true dream. But, in order to be freed from 
the earthly element, the descendants of Brahma 
sought renunciation and suffering. And so you 
have suffering as the deliverer. But this
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yearning for suffering comes into conflict 
with the longing for joy, for love. Now you 
understand what love is; supreme Joy in the 
greatest suffering, the sweetest is the most 
bitter. Do you understand now what woman 
is? Woman, through whom sin and death entered 
into life.
POET. I understand. And the outcome?
DAUGHTER. What you yourself know. Conflict between
the pain of joy and the joy of pain, between the 
anguish of the penitent and the pleasure of 
the sensual.
POET. And the conflict?
DAUGHTER. The conflict of opposites generates power, as 
fire and water generate the force of steam.
Thus there is nothing behind the door because the world is 
nothing. It is but the reflection of the individual dreamer and 
its substance changes with each dreamer and each dream. Or, again, 
there is nothing behind the door because it is opened at the end of 
the play; had it been opened in the third scene, one could have seen, 
in simultaneous montage, the entire remainder of the play. Hence, 
Strindberg's new basic logic is the dreamer's logic, which is, as 
Indra's Daughter suggests, the logic of opposites. In its pre- 
formal state, the mind proceeds by contraries. In proof that this 
is the basic comment of the play, let us examine its structural 
patterns.
In terms of overall structure, the play may be divided into 
two more or less equal halves. The first half culminates in the 
scene at Foulstrand. The second half begins with the scenes in 
Fairhaven and gradually repeats in reverse most of the happenings 
of part one. This is not to say that there is a formal repetition, 
for that would argue for a rationlistic world. The order of repetition 
is not consistent, and there are individual scenes in both halves that
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have no counterparts. On the whole, however, the repetition of 
contraries is quite obvious.
The play begins and ends with the "growing castle." In the 
first scene it is a prison, a place to escape from. In the last, 
it is a gateway to heaven, a burning bier of deliverance. In this 
same manner, the very short third, fourth, and fifth scenes at the 
opera are balanced by the rather long second to last scene of the 
play which is also set at the opera. For the most part, however, 
the balance is more asymmetrical. Thus, the antipenultimate scene 
finds its counterpart in the grotto scene, scene eight of part one; 
and the graduation scene, a late scene in the first half, is 
reflected in the early second half scene at the grammar school.
What episodes are not completely mirrored are at least brought up 
in part two. Thus, though there is no return to the Lawyer's 
office; there is a reappearance of the Lawyer and much allusion to 
the earlier scene.
In all, the play's special pattern is highly reminisclent of 
music, and we may say that Strindberg was among the first of the 
early modem dramatists to forsake the role of the architect for 
that of the composer. Thus the first half of the play introduces 
the motif of the painful and dreary lot of human existence. This 
theme is built up and varied until it reaches something of a cres­
cendo in the scene of domestic strife between the Lawyer and Indra's 
Daughter. There follows an interlude in Foulstrand itself, which 
serves to summarize what has happened and to introduce the major 
instrument of the second movement, the Poet. The second movement
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takes up the "Joys" of life in Fairhaven, and this portion of the 
play reaches its climax in the lyric ecstacy of the Daughter, who 
in her rapture delivers herself of a prophetic vision of ultimate 
salvation in God. Thereafter, Strindberg returns to the backstage 
alley of the opera and combines the motifs of both parts into a 
larger orchestration which gains steadily in both complexity and 
intensity until Indra's Daughter is consumed in the flames of the 
growing castle as the bud on the roof brusts into a giant flower.
So much for larger patterns. Within this framework of 
thesis and antithesis are found minor themes and situations which 
mirror the overall structure. Without enumerating them all, we 
might indicate one or two that point to the first movement's 
constant variations on the theme of desperate hope. The Officer, 
for Instance, waits throughout his life in the vain hope of seeing 
the woman of his dreams. In like manner, the Lawyer, having failed 
to receive his degree, marries nevertheless, taking this unwise 
step on the basis of a hopeless hope that he will somehow be able 
to support a wife and family. So also does Indra's Daughter— ‘despite 
the disillusioning experience of one marital failure— >elope with the 
Officer who promises to take her to Fairhaven but who loses his 
way and brings them instead to Foulstrand.
In the second movement, these motifs are played in reverse, and 
the theme becomes one of hopeless desperation. Once the object of 
hope has been acquired, it cannot be enjoyed. Edith is invited 
to a dance only to find that no one wishes to dance with her. The 
Officer finds that his degree is not enough; he must return to school
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to mature. The Mediterranean paradise of the Daughter and the Lawyer 
is marred by their awareness of the unhappy lot of those who are 
less fortunate.
DAUGHTER. This is paradise.
1ST COAL HEAVER. This is hell.
2ND COAL HEAVER. A hundred and twenty in the shade.
Ihus the only thing constant about human life is its contra­
dictions. Hope and despair exchange places with one another according 
to the shift in perspective, but in some mixture pain and joy are 
always present. Strindberg's belief in the oneness of these two 
contraries is perhaps most strongly stated in the scene between the 
Officer, his lost love Victoria, and her new husband.
OFFICER. And Victoria whom I loved, for whom I desired
the greatest happiness on earth, she has her happi­
ness now, the greatest happiness she can know, 
while I suffer, suffer, suffer.
VICTORIA. Do you think I can be happy, seeing your suffer­
ing? How can you believe that? Perhaps it comforts 
you to know that I shall be a prisoner here for forty 
days and forty nights. Tell me, does that comfort 
you?
OFFICER. Yes and no. I cannot have pleasure while you 
have pain.
HE. And do you think that my happiness can be built
on your agony?
OFFICER. We are all to be pitied— all of us.
Before dispensing with it completely, one final aspect of 
Strindbergian dream logic must be considered. In teems of larger 
concepts, dream logic is the logic of contradictions, but what of the 
relation of its parts one to the other? Does this involve a cohesive 
process? The answer to this, of course, depends upon our definition 
cohesive. But if we can assume for cohesive such a synonym as 
sequential, we may say that the playwright gives his world of
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contradictions unity by moving from one contrary to another through 
the sequential process popularized by Freudian psychoanalysis under 
the rather confusing label of the "logic of free association." 
Without passing a value judgment on this manner of logic, let us 
observe its operation in the play
Scene one finds the Officer complaining of life's injustices. 
This, by association, brings up the question of injustices suffered 
as a child, and on this note the scene shifts to the Officer's 
childhood home. This is not to say that scene one lays careful 
preparation for scene two in the manner in which this might be 
done in a well-made play. What happens in scene two does not 
in any manner rest architecturally on scene one. The only link 
between the two is a mention by the Officer of injustice. This 
same sort of association is found between scenes two and three. As 
scene two draws to a close, Indra's Daughter is moved to comment, 
"Life is hard. But love conquers everything. Come and see." With 
this invitation the scene shifts to the backstage alley of the opera, 
and the Officer appears as a faithful suitor waiting for his true 
love. As the play progresses, the linking of one episode to another 
through free associations becomes more and more involved. Thus a 
casual mention of some idea or element from an earlier scene is 
enough to recall that scene in whole or in part. The Kyrie of a 
children'8 choir, for instance, is used as a transition into the 
first Grotto scene, while in the much later second Grotto scene 
it reappears as a hymn sung by the sailor's on a doomed ship. By 
the end of the play, the single thin strands of association are so
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thickly webbed that a strong Impression of tangible unity is 
achieved, the same effect of unity that is later to be found in 
Remembrance of Things Past, for it was the same type of associative 
logic, the same special kind of sequential development and cohesion 
used in The Dream Play, that was later to form one of the basic 
problems of Proust's monumental work.
A second means of gaining unity, a means closely related to 
the logic of free association, was that of repetition of key symbols. 
In much the same manner that earlier playwrights had gained unity 
through central character, Strindberg centered his work about major 
symbols. In all likelihood, Strindberg learned this particular 
technique from Maeterlinclq but he took the technique a good many 
steps farther into complexity, and the two major symbols of The Dream 
Play, the growing castle and the forbidden door, stand as much richer 
complexes than do the pale allegories of Maeterlinck. The castle, 
for instance, is first of all a prison, suggesting the solipslstic 
nature of the Individual existence. It is not, however, an ordinary 
prison. Like the bud on its roof and the flowers around it, the 
Castle grows away from the earth, and as it grows, it adds new 
windows, new views of the earth and the heavens. Thus Strindberg 
manages to make an involved religious and intellectual statement with 
his symbol. He adds to the significance of this statement by having 
the Glazier who adds the new windows to the Castle also perform the 
task of opening the forbidden door. The meaning becomes even richer 
when we realize that the Glazier is also the earthly father of Indra's 
Daughter. As a final function of the symbol, the Castle serves as a
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funeral bier for Indra's Daughter, and as it bums, the bud on its 
roof bursts into full bloom, signifying the completion of its 
earthly mission.
The significance of the forbidden door has already been 
discussed, but a second aspect of it will serve as an example of the 
advantages which the dream form offers to one who wishes to obtain 
unity of central symbol. Throughout the play, the door is not only 
discussed but makes an almost continual appearance. First, it is 
the door of the Officer's kitchen cabinet, then the door in the 
backstage alley, then the door to the Lawyer's legal files. Such 
a repetition of the same property in so many different functions 
is only possible within the dream form, which progresses by contra­
dictions and which dismisses time and space and probability in favor 
of the imaginative liberty of free association.
Over the whole work, in all its diverse structural manifesta­
tions, stands the unifying vision of the dreamer, the intensely 
personal outlook of Strindberg himself. There are no characters 
in the play; there is only the action of the dreamer. The forms 
which pass as characters are able to "split, double and multiply, 
evaporate, crystallize, scatter and converge" because they are not 
external characters at all. They are merely different aspects of the. 
same personality, or at best projections of that personality into 
external forms. In short, The Dream Play is a play of introspection, 
and what character is present is revealed not developed. Moreover, 
the character revealed is always that of the dreamer. Thus Indra's 
Daughter is the deepest mystical essence of the soul, which is not
uncommonly represented as female. The Lawyer, the Officer, and the 
Poet are each a separate aspect of the Dreamer's more conscious 
personality, and each attempts his own sort of communion with the 
soul, while at the same time making his own manner of compromise 
with the material problems of the flesh. To each aspect this 
communion and this compromise grows out of his nature, his private 
viewpoint. The Lawyer sees his problems through the eyes of a liberal 
idealist, the Officer through those of a sentimental romantic. All 
three aspects pull against one another, and all three try to capture 
Indra's Daughter, the soul, for himself alone. It is the Poet who 
succeeds best in this struggle because he is the fartherest removed 
from externality. But even he is not totally successful, and he is 
condemned forever to compete with the other two for the Daughter's 
love. It is this passionate desire for ultimate mystical communion 
with the deepest essence of the soul which keeps the three aspects 
from disassociating completely. Thus, the dreamer's personality, 
like all life, is forced to live in continual conflict, a conflict 
which gains its unity from the very inseparability of its contra­
dictions. Such an unfortunate condition is truly a basis for the 
Daughter's constant refrain: "Life is cruel. Men are to be pitied."
To sum up, the dream form was, as Strindberg boasted, a 
completely new dramatic mode which he himself invented. It differed 
from previous dream works in that its elements of fantasy were to 
be considered as significant^ realizable reality, and in that the 
focus was shifted from the world of jointly shared experiences to the 
closed and subjective world of the private ego. The action of the
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dream was the action of the individual interacting within himself, 
and, by this involution of action, viewing reality from his own 
standards not those of the audience* These standards included a 
rejection of space, time and probability, an acceptance of the 
free association of ideas as a cognitive process, an apposition 
of contraries as a general framework for thought, and a reliance on 
the unity provided by the evolving meanings of major symbols. As 
an ultimate goal, the dream form aimed at presenting the action of a 
given soul in reference to itself alone.
It is true, of course, that some sort of stimulus from 
external reality was assumed, and, as Martin Lamm informs us, "a 
good many of the scenes are day dreams Inspired by what Strindberg 
saw from his study window while he was composing the play."** Moreover, 
anyone sufficiently familiar with Strindberg's life can see many of 
Strindberg's own experiences reflected in The Dream Play. But these 
things are unimportant, for Strindberg was studying the reaction, not 
the stimulus. Despite countless autobiographical references, the 
play is not biography in the received sense. It is, as it were, 
pre-autobiographical. It is a study of the soul spewing forth 
those ideas and episodes which will only later be organized 
into a logical autobiography. And thus it is, above all, the first 
truly modern projection of the dramatic Illusion through the sub­
jective viewpoint of the dramatic character himself.
0
°Lamm, o£. cit., p. 145.
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In terms of the latter aspect, the dream method has several 
advantages. By dispensing with space, time, and popular logic, 
it escapes the restraints of objectivity and eliminates the need 
for carefully archltectured intrigue. It permits the use of symbols 
without any regard to the justification of their presence in strange 
contexts, and, above all, it provides the dramatist with unlimited 
opportunities for romantic irony, which can be achieved so rapidly in 
the dream form. Since the dramatist is bound only by the highly 
elastic logic of free association, he may, when he feels the need 
to reinforce his scene or theme through Ironic action or statement, 
simply introduce a character or situation out of nowhere, make his 
point, and then return again to the episode at hand. Thus, a 
pensioner appears just as the Officer is discussing the dreary lot 
of life on a pension, and so too the blind man with his speech of 
doom just as the pleasure ship sets sail.
Against these advantages stand certain disadvantages. The 
easy access to ironical situations may prove too great a temptation, 
and the device may be used so frequently that it becomes emasculated. 
Passionate romantic that he was, Strindberg was guilty of this very 
error. Another disadvantage of the dream foxm is the difficulty of 
creating the proper atmosphere. To establish the play's general 
somnambulistic quality and still maintain a sense of seriousness, 
the playwright must walk a fine line between the grotesque and the 
precious . Moreover, incidental atmospheric distortions must be 
clearly differentiated from the more important symbols. We must, for 
instance, be able to decide quickly whether the disappearance of the
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Officer'8 father through a wall has any special meaning or whether 
it simply exists as part of the total dream framework. Problems 
of this nature are, of course, tied up with and complicated by the 
subject through whom the playwright projects the vision of the dream.
In a play in which all referents are more relative than universal, 
there is a strong possibility that some members of the audience 
will see meanings in every action no matter how inconsequential, 
while others will become so confused that they see nothing but chaos.
To ease this problem, the playwright should attempt to select a 
subject whose mind and, consequently, whose dream will bear certain 
resemblances to the minds and dreams of his audience. Strindberg seems 
little interested in solving this problem, for the subject'he selected 
was himself, a man whose precariously balanced mind made subjective 
communication a veritable impossibility.
Not only does the strange mind of August Strindberg cause 
communication difficulties, it also gives to his dream the harrow­
ing quality of the worst kind of nightmare. This, of course, was 
an accident; nightmarishness is not inherent in the dream structure 
as such. Still the danger is there, and it tended to manifest 
itself in the Expressionist Movement, which, in taking its cue from 
Strindberg, often attempted to pawn off much meaningless and pre­
tentious grotesquery as legitimate theatrical subject matter.
But the greatest disadvantage of the dream method lay in none 
of these things. It lay, instead, in the dream's overall elusiveness, 
a quality not easily captured in a meaningful artistic structure.
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Without losing the essential fluidity, and, more Important, the 
essential Irrationality of the dream, the playwright must somehow 
fix It in a playable dramatic pattern. To meet this problem, 
Strindberg, like so many other moderns, turned to music for his 
answer. Now there is nothing inherently wrong in borrowing Ideas 
from another art, but there is a grave potential danger, and Strind­
berg seems to have been unable to avoid that danger. Again, like so 
many modems, Strindberg seems to have confused music with his own 
particular art, and instead of adapting music to dramatic needs, he 
adapted drama to the needs of music. He may, perhaps, be excused 
for this, for it was his friend and guide Nietzsche who saw music 
as the basis of all arts, but whether Strindberg is excused or 
not, the- fact of failure remains. Metaphors aside, a cathedral is 
not a frozen hymn and a play is not a sonata. When it tries to be, 
it is likely to have, as does The Dream Play, a strange, monotonous 
quality throughout. Hence, though each scene has a quality which 
is immediate, intense, and, at times, even hysterical, the work as 
a whole seems strangely unpointed, even flat. Together with other 
causes, this flatness is the ultimate result of the forsaking of 
motivations through character and action in favor of motivations 
through rhythm, that is, the basic logic of the play is musical not 
dramatic logic.
Whatever his successes or failures, Strindberg had created a 
new outlook for the modem playwright, and henceforth the pan-psychic 
dramatist was to busy himself with the presentation of some variation 
of the individual as opposed to the universal point of view.
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II
Evrelnov: The Theatre of the Soul
Juat before his death, Strindberg was contemplating a new 
dramatic mode* He planndd to write a "monodrama" in which there 
would be only one character on stage* This actor would carry on 
dialogue with various off-stage voices. Strindberg died before he 
could realize his new form, but within four years of the first pro­
duction of The Dream Play, a young Russian playwright was actually 
discussing and writing a slightly different type of monodrama.
The first theorist and writer of the monodrama was Nicolai 
Evrelnov, a brilliant lawyer who at the age of eighteen had read and 
been deeply Influenced by Nietzsche* In this respect, he was also 
akin to Strindberg. Evrelnov was already on his way to a career 
in the Ministry of Ways and Communications, when he developed an 
interest in the theatre, an interest which was to Increase until it 
led Evrelnov into a theatrical career as a playwright, director, 
dramatic theorist, and the theatrical scholar and historian of the 
first rank. Always an experimenter, Evrelnov even gained some 
repute for his experiments with the nude as a theatrical element. 
Such avant-garde concepts led to his first professional position, 
that of the regieseur of the Konsnlssarzhevskaya Theatre.
It is significant that Evrelnov's immediate predecessor 
at the Kommissarzhevkaya Theatre was Vsevolod Meyerhold, for it was 
Meyerhold's theatrical theories and his attacks on the production 
methods of the externalists of the Moscow Art Theatre that inspired, 
in all likelihood, Evrelnov's unique experiments with the dramatic
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illusion. In Meyerhold's opinion, the theatre had lost its vigor
because its two cooperating halves, the stage and the audience,
had been completely divorced from one another by the "fourth wall"
of the externalists. Meyerhold felt that truly great theatre could
come to the West once more only when a successful method was found
to tear down the "fourth wall." As Freedley and Reeves point out,
what appealed to Meyerhold was the idea of bringing "the spectators
into active participation, making them a vital force in the per- 
9
formance." When Evrelnov replaced Meyerhold as director of the 
Kbmmissarzheskaya Theatre, he continued the search for a solution 
to the problem of reuniting audience and stage. His answer to 
this problem came in 1908, at which time he presented his theory of 
monodrama to the Moscow Literary and Artistic Circle in an article 
entitled An Introduction to the Monodrama.
From its inception in this article, Evrelnov's concept of 
the monodrama was to undergo many changes and elaborations until 
it finally evolved into a theory which embraced all living experiences 
and which required, for its final elucidation, a three volume work,
The Theatre of Oneself, published 1915-17. Even allowing for Russian 
tendencies to wordiness and length, the three volumes indicate that 
the theory is of considerable scope and magnitude; and, indeed, it is. 
In essence, it is based on the proposition that to be human is to be 
theatrical. To Evrelnov, the instict for dramatization is a basic one
®George Freedley and John A. Reeves, A History of the Theatre 
(New York: Crown Publishers, 1941), p. 543.
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and must be Included with such drives as sex and self-preservation.
Aa Sayler explains, Evrelnov. felt that "the satisfaction of this 
instinct is one of the eudynamlc stages, so far as human happiness 
is understood to be one of the needs of the soul."*®
Fundamentally, this theory of the "theatrical instinct" as 
advanced by Evreinov is a restatement of the standard apology for 
drama as an art form. But Evrelnov's theory is this apology and 
something more. To him, not only do we have a basic drive to 
dramatize, but, more Important, this drive is the one which is 
ultimately responsible for the meaning which we attach to our emotions 
and thoughts. According to the final doctrine of the Russian play­
wright, "man is touched to the quick only by what he can dramatize. "** 
In other words, the only emotions we are capable of realizing fully 
and the only thoughts which we can completely understand are those 
which we can dramatize for o u r selves.Thus, in our own way, each 
of us is an actor on the stage of our psyche, just as each of us is 
an actor in the larger theatre of life. Moreover, since each of us 
may play several different roles in life, there is reason to suspect 
that we may also play several different roles in our own soul* In
*®01iver M. Sayler, The Russian Theatre (New York: Brentano's,
1922), p. 227.
U Ibld.. p. 227.
*^For a more recent discussion touching upon something of the 
same matter, see Kenneth Burke's consideration of the "dramatistic" 
function of language in his A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1945).
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Its entirety, Evrelnov's theory of the soul as theatre and the
personality as one or more actors Is an elaboration and extension
of the Individual entity as seen by Strindberg in The Dream Play.
To Evreinov as to Strindberg, the personality may "split, double
and multiply."*^
As previously stated, In terms of the art of the theatre,
Evreinov saw the monodrama as a solution to the Heyerholdian problem
of bridging the gap between the stage and the audience. As Evreinov
says in his Introduction to the Monodrama:
The task of the monodrama is to carry the spectator to 
the very stage so that he will feel he is acting himself.... 
'I' (the acting character) is a bridge from the auditorium 
to the stage.
In terms of specific practice, the monodrama carried the spectator to 
the stage by exploiting his basic theatrical instinct. Once the 
true nature of the drive to theatre is recognized, nothing could 
be more natural than for the playwright to use the art form which 
grows out of. this instinct as a means of studying the instinct 
itself. Thus, the informed playwright will not write plays about 
several characters interacting in a common exterior world, he will 
write the more fundamentally theatrical plays about one character 
acting within himself, performing, so to speak, those very motions by 
which he dramatizes his view of the external world. In brief, the
^Something 0f the same kind of reasoning may lie behind 
Eliot's having Prufrock say to himself: "Let us go then you and I."
^Sayler, oj>. cit.. p. 231.
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playwright will write a monodrama. Evrelnov puts It thus:
The real object of dramatic presentation ought to be 
some living experience, and with this, for the purpose 
of facilitating receptivity, the living experience of 
one soul instead of several. Hence the necessity for 
preferring one 'really acting1 protagonist to several 
'equally acting,'— in other words, the logic of the 
demand for such an hcting character,' in whom as a 
focus should be concentrated the whole drama and 
therefore the living experience of the other acting 
characters....I call monodrama the kind of dramatic 
representation which endeavors with the greatest 
fullness to communicate to the spectator the soul 
state of the acting character, and presents on the 
stage the world surrounding him as he conceives it 
at any moment in his stage experience.15
In other words, Evreinov wishes to develop a drama which
restricts itself to presenting only the point of view of the central
character. A drama of this sort, he feels, would be a truer drama
because it would be a more realistic, more basic drama. Moreover,
it would have the advantage of forcing the spectator to identify
completely with the central character, since a failure to do this
would render the drama incomprehensible to the spectator.
Monodrama forces everyone of the spectators to enter the 
situation of the acting character, to live his life, that 
is to say, to feel as he does and through illusion to 
think as he does.
When the spectator does identify, he will attain "fusion" with the
"main acting character," and, as if happening to find himself on
stage, that is in the very place of the action, he will "lose sight
of the footlights. They will remain behind him, in other words, they
15Ibid.. p. 232.
16Ibld.. p. 235.
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will destroy themselves."*-7
There£oret for Evreinov, the monodrama is the "most perfect 
form of drama" for two reasons: it is the truest expression of the 
basic instinct for self-dramatization, and it is the best solution 
to "one of the most burning problems of contemporary art, the problem 
of chilling and paralyzing the distracting influence of the foot­
lights."
To support his new approach to point of view, Evreinov
calls upon justification from the psychologist who knows "it is
elemental that the world surrounding us, thanks to the sense
impressions, inevitably undergoes changes."
The idea that the object has in it inherently that which 
in reality it borrows from the impressionable subject is 
not some exceptional psychological phenomenon. All our 
sense activity is subject to the processes of the pro­
jection of purely subjective changes upon the outside 
object.*-®
In accordance with this principle, the task of the monodramatist 
is to present the "exterior spectacle in terms of the internal 
spectacle." All action and characters should be seen "through the 
prism of the soul of the acting character." Only through this prism, 
only through the central character's point of view, should we 
"perceive the world surrounding him, the people surrounding him."
Evreinov'8 theory, then, both embraces and extends the 
practices of Strindberg. As The Dream Play testifies, Strindberg
17Ibid.. p. 243. 
X8Ibid.. p. 237.
saw the action of the private ego as sufficient dramatic matter in 
and of itself, and he felt no need to relate the external spectacle 
directly to the internal. Moreover, Strindberg was interested only in 
his own soul, and made no effort to extend his studies to the souls 
of others. Perhaps he was unequipped to do so. Whatever the reason, 
Strindberg's dream was his own. Evreinov differs from Strindberg 
in both instances. First, he assumes an external spectacle on 
which the central character can bring to bear his private viewpoint. 
Second, he does not feel that the monodrama demands that the central 
character be identified with the playwright himself. Consequently, 
in the play under study, The Theatre of the Soul, the central or 
"acting character" is that of a professor.
So much for Evreinov's theory, but what of its practical 
results? The answer to this question can be found by turning to 
The Theatre of the Soul. This interesting little one act play opens 
with a prologue, which, like the prologue to The Dream Play, is 
obviously intended to prepare the audience for the play's departure 
from conventional dramatic modes. A Professor appears and explains 
to the audience that they are going to witness a different kind of 
play, but withal, one which is a "genuinely scientific work, in 
every respect abreast with the latest developments in psycho­
physiology." The play is to be based on the principle that the 
"human soul is not indivisible, but on the contrary is composed 
of several selfs, the natures of which are different." This is a 
principle which the "researches of Wundt, Freud, Theophile Ribot and 
others have proved in the most conclusive way." The Professor then
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goes on to explain that the play will present three of these selves: 
M-l, or the rational self; M-2, or the emotional self; and M-3, the 
psychical or subconscious self. This modern trinity will act out 
one of the many dally dramas of the soul. The total action of this 
thought-drama will need no more than half a second to be accomplished. 
The argument having been presented, the Professor then informs the 
audience that it will soon see a theatrical approximation of the 
human soul, represented as a huge heart with paper streamers for 
nerves and blood vessels and a telephone as a substitute for the 
system of synaptic communication. With this description of the 
setting, the Professor concludes his speech and retires.
In a more explicit fashion, the prologue presents much the 
same concepts that are found in the preface and prologue to The 
Dream Play, with one important difference. Strindberg, a somewhat 
humorless man, presents his ideas of the splitting personality and 
the invalidity for the subject of the ordinary space-time continuum 
with a Byronic earnestness, while from the start it is apparent 
that Evrelnov comes to the matter with a certain amount of play­
fulness. This tongue-in-check attitude of Evreinov'a is continued 
throughout the play, which contains more than its share of precious 
comedy. The use of the telephone as a device for communicating 
messages to the brain is perhaps the best example of Evreinov's sense 
of whimsy, but there are many others. There is, for instance, M-2's 
habit of rubbing the nerves to produce a jangling sound.
Evreinov's sense of humor and Strindberg's lack of same are 
responsible for other noticeable differences between the two plays.
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Thus, The Dream Plav becomes a nightmare, whereas The Theatre of the 
Soul leans In the direction of the harlequinade, a form into which 
Evreinov was to cast several of his best works. Moreover, as might 
be expected, Evreinov'8 comic sense acts as a tempering agent which 
prevents the playwright from indulging in excessive distortion. This 
is important, for it aids the dramatist in keeping open all possible 
avenues of traditional theatrical comment which do not directly 
conflict with the faithful rendering of the point of view of the 
central character. This taking advantage of every opportunity to 
relate the point of view of individual character to the more univer­
sal outlook of the audience must have been important to Evreinov, for 
with his philosophy of complete empathic identification with the 
action on stage, he must have wished at all costs to avoid the 
confusion growing out of willful distortion carried to the point of 
complete obscurity.
In fact, it would not be far from wrong to say that while the 
problem of adjusting the audience to the subjective viewpoint of a 
single individual was of minor importance to Strindberg, it was to 
Evreinov the prime issue of the monodramatic form. The fact that 
the Russian dramatist felt the need to write several volumes of 
theoretical explanation of the monodrama is evidence enough of his 
awareness of the communication difficulties inherent in the new form. 
In terms of The Theatre of the Soul specifically, Evreinov first 
addresses the problem in his very explicit prologue. Apparently not 
satisfied with the adequacy of the prologue, he chose as the external 
reality of his play a situation which his audience was not likely to
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misunderstand, that Is, the standard love triangle so popular in the
comedies and melodramas of the period. Moreover, he was careful not
to disturb the basic Ingredients of that triangle. There Is the
same good mother, the same father with a weakness for drink, the same
"other woman," wild and undomesticated, a cafe dancer at best, but
very possibily a prostitute. To keep the formula intact, Evrelnov
even rounds It off with a suicide, a denouement fthlch was almost a
ritual in the more pretentious thesis plays. Still uncertain about
the audience's ability to follow his new method, Evreinov went to
great pains to clearly delineate each of the various aspects of the
soul. M-l is a carefully groomed man in a frock coat; M-2 an artist
with untidy hair and full, red lips; M-3 a sombre figure in a black
mask who sits sleeping in the foreground. As might be suspected, this
extreme concern with clarity robs the play of any possibility of
subtlety and gives to the whole piece the air of a medieval allegory
19rather than that of a modern psychological study. It is this 
unhappy over explicitness which has caused many critics to agree with 
H. W. L. Dana's observation that in The Theatre of the Soul Evreinov 
"carried his ideal of the monodrama almost to a reductlo ad absurdum."^
*^Una Ellis-Fermor, ojj. cit.. has remarked on this aspect of the 
play, but her observation that this therefore disqualifies it as a 
dramatic work is rash and unfounded. If nothing else, the play is 
effective in the theatre, and this can hardly be said of some of the 
closet dramas, such as Hardy's Dynasts. which that critic holds up as 
important contributions to dramatic literature.
^°Clark and Freedley, o£. cit., p. 443.
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Despite Its crudities, The Theatre of the Soul stands as a 
tribute to the vision of its author* Evreinov was as Important an 
innovator as Strindberg in that he not only presented his version of 
the Strlndbergian dream, but also raised that dream to the level of 
the conscious thoughtand emotion. Among other reasons, he probably 
took this step because it afforded him a good means of studying the 
ramifications of the presence of multiple points of view within a 
single individual, for the play is not a presentation of the central 
character's point of view of a possible affair; it is more exactly a 
statement about the central character's points of view. The 
rational self contemplates adultery with the dancer and she appears 
on stage as a mean and mercenary woman. When the emotional self 
thinks of the dancer, however, she changes into a wild, romantic 
beauty. This same variability is found in the wife, who, in each 
case, appears as the opposite of the dancer. Both the rational self 
and the emotional self maintain that the women as they see them are 
the women as they really exist. This quarrel between M-l and M-2 
constitutes the matter of the play, and the audience has no way 
of telling which is correct. To this argument the subconscious 
self contributes nothing, but when the Professor is finally driven 
to suicide, the subconscious self awakes, yawns, picks up his bag 
and departs from the stage as if from a train.
Since, as the action of the subconscious demonstrates, the play 
is the Strlndbergian dream placed on the level of the organizing con­
sciousness, Evreinov is forced to introduce objective reality, since it 
is with external reality that the conscious self deals. In fact,
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the presentation of the various mutations of the object as the subject 
exercises on it different methods of observation and organization was 
a key feature of Evreinov's method. But in rendering this relation­
ship between the consciousness and external reality, Evreinov had 
to assume the presence of the subconscious, just as Strindberg, in 
presenting the sub- and semi-conscious, had to assume the existence 
of the consciousness and of the reality beyond it. But while Strind­
berg begged the whole question of the importance of the object, 
Evreinov in ranging out as far as the object still was careful to 
place his ultimate stress on the value of the metaconsclous. Conse­
quently, the subconscious self sits always in the foreground of the 
soul. In placing the subconscious where he does, Evreinov suggests 
that the whole tlhlng is, after all, only M-3's dream. In his own, 
less obtrusive way, M-3, the dreamer, "holds sway over all." He 
awakes only with the suicide, and his single comment on the whole 
affair is a weary stretch and a series of yawns.
The Theatre of the Soul is M-3's dream just as life is, in the 
final analysis, nothing except the dreams of each of us. When death 
awakens M-3, he provides the final ironic comment on the meaning of 
it all, a yawn. Thus, whether seen through the subject or the object, 
life is a farce, and so Evreinov presents it. It may be that Evreinov 
is too clumsy in his presentation of psychological subtleties, or that 
he over-sweetens his work with coy humor, but to call his play a 
reductio ad absurdum of his method is to both see the point and to 
misunderstand it. Evreinov was a comedian, and he depended heavily 
on comic exaggeration to make his point. The external world is an
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endless comedy of errors, and this is so,says Evrelnov, because it 
depends for its coherence upon the individual, who compounds the 
farce by being unable to maintain a consistent viewpoint even within 
himself. Played with too much expresslonlstic seriousness, it is 
likely that The Theatre of the Soul might become pretentious and 
absurd, but played for the serio-comic statement it is obviously 
attempting to make, it should be a reasonably effective theatre 
piece.
If The Theatre of the Soul is not the reductio ad absurdum of
an ideal, neither is it, as Bakshy sees it, a fatal contradiction
in terms. According to Bakshy, the shortcoming of the monodrama
lies in the fact that "whilst invoking the spectator's power of
imagination, in which sense it is subjective, it is compelled to
21
base itself mainly on realistic scenic effects." Such a criticism 
leaves one baffled, for it can be leveled against all arts.22 jn 
terms of Evreinov's work in particular, what such a view fails to 
take into consideration is the subjectiflcation of scenic effects 
which Meyerhold had already achieved before the monodrama was postu­
lated. While it is true that it is basic to the art of theatre to 
translate all human experience into tangibles, it is not true that
21
*Bakshy, oj>. cit.. p. 79.
22a 11 arts must objectify nontangible realities. Even music 
must make its statement in terms of sounds, which are, after all, 
objective— i.e., sensible— realities. This problem has been taken up 
and discussed in Chapter One, see page 2 f.
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these tangibles must be realistic. Just as Strindberg when he was 
writing Miss Julia could envision a setting that did not have painted 
pots and pans on the wall, so Evreinov could write a monodrama that 
did not postulate a box set.
The points of Dana and Bakshy are not well taken, but still 
the weaknesses which we have already noted in The Theatre of the Soul, 
do exist. These weaknesses, however, are no more excessive in their 
own sphere than are the humorless distortions and heavy-handed irony 
of The Dream Play. After a journey through the tortured soul of 
Strindberg, the whimsy of Evreinov is rather refreshing. This is not 
to imply a favorable comparison between the two plays, for The Theatre 
of the Soul is a much slighter and far less impressive dramaturgic 
effort.
When placed side by side both plays appear as overstatements, 
a condition which is probably to be expected in any new romantic 
form. Strindberg's work is too diffused, Evreinov's too simplified. 
Strindberg could not avoid the nightmare; Evreinov came dangerdusly 
close to simple fantasy. But the weaknesses of the two playwrights 
aside, they had, by 1912, presented the new structural problem of the 
pan-psychic dramatists. In doing this, Strindberg proved to be the 
better artist, Evreinov the better theorist, but each in his own way 
saw that the pan-psychic playwright must abandon intrigue for a 
concern with the point of view of the individual if he were to success­
fully investigate the human soul. This change in approach to point 
of view also Indicated that it might be necessary to change tradi­
tional concepts of time, space, probability and possibility, formal
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logic and objective reality. All of these things rest ultimately 
on the Individual viewpoint and hence should be altered as that view­
point changes. Just how they were altered would be the clue to the 
meaning of the Individual and of the play. Both playwrights, though 
not in equal degree, realized that a structural approach based upon 
a private subjective viewpoint introduces new problems of communication 
with the audience. Evrelnov's solution to these problems was to 
entice the spectator into the center of the action by striking as 
many notes of similarity with older dramatic approaches as was 
possible without losing total structural integrity. On the other hand, 
Strindberg depended entirely upon the hints offered by a short 
program note and a brief prologue, and was Inclined, for the most 
part, to let the audience seek its own avenues of understanding. All 
in all, both playwrights were presenting what was up until that time 
the most immediate and intense statements of the new relativistic 
world view. Iheir world was a world of unity in conflict, a world 
in which there was a continual disagreement between the subject and 
the-object and between one and another aspect of the same subject.
It was a universe best summed up in the line uttered by the Officer 
in The Dream Play: "What a strange world of contradictionsJ"
To call the two men dramatic eccentrics or to say as does Eric 
Bentley that Evreinov represents "the furthest departure from ortho­
doxy" is to assume that the problem of point of view is an undramatic 
one. To a relativist, it is the very essence of drama, and once stated 
by Evreinov and Strindberg, the issue of the presentation of first- 
person viewpoints becomes one of the major concerns of the giants of
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modern drama. To understand how quickly and surely both Strindberg
and Evreinov had put their fingers on modem trends In methodology,
we need only note the close resemblance between the nightmarishness
Dream Play and the similar scenes which appeared some twenty
years later in the "night town" section of Ulysses. If this is not
enough, it might be interesting to some to compare Evreinov'8 theory
of spectator-acting character identification with these lines, written
some forty years later, about the unique achievement of the modem
psychological novelist:
In the old novels...the omniscient author was nearly 
always present and nearly always addressing an audi­
ence.. ..Perhaps, for the purposes of fiction, we can put 
it another way: in the old novels we are nearly always
seated face to face with the author; it is he who is 
looking out the window and telling us the story of what 
he sees.
This is the way in which Edel describes the omniscient method. Retain­
ing the same figure, he applies it to the modem point-of-view 
novel in the following manner:
In the psychological novel the author is nowhere in 
sight. Suddently we are seated at the window. Some­
where above, behind, below, out beyond the window the 
author is busy being a stage manager and an actor, 
arranging what we shall see. He tries to give us the 
illusion constantly that we are experiencing what is 
happening there; and in the process he asks us to 
look at all sorts of extraneous things, strange 
things, as if we were in one of our own dreams in which 
impossible and implausible events occur; magical 
transformations*, returns of episodes and people out 
of the forgotten past...a veritable mental cinema of 
flashing images often confused and incoherent, often 
sharply focused, so that, as before, we forget our­
selves and have crossed over the window sill and are
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ourselves out there amid the confusion, living all that 
has been arranged for us. From being listeners once 
removed from the scene, we have become actual partlcl* 
pants.
^Edel, oj>. cit., p. 208 f.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE EROSION AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWPOINT 
KAISER AND PIRANDELLO SEE THE EGO AS A PHENOMENON 
ON THE WAY TO DESTRUCTION
I
Kaiser: From M o m  to Midnight
Strindberg's experiments with the dream form and Evreinov's 
and Meyerhold1s relentless attacks on the "fourth wall" were to 
provide the precedents for a number of avant-garde theatrical move- ’ 
ments, chief among which were the Russian and Italian Futurists, the 
French Surrealists, and the German Expressionists. By 1920, that is, 
by the time these movements had gained sufficient vigor and personal­
ity to be separated and distinctly labeled, the European drama was 
in such a state of ferment, borrowing and exchanging of ideas had 
become so free and rapid, that it is almost impossible to untangle 
the maze of influences and counter-influences which the several move­
ments exercised on one another. Nicoll, for instance, feels that 
many of the important attitudes of Expressionism can be traced to the 
early Italian Futurists.^ But Futurism, on the other hand, must 
surely be related to the Constructivism of Meyerhold, since the two
^Allardyce Nicoll, World Drama From Aeschylus to Anouilh 
(London: George G. Harrap & Company, Ltd., 1949), p. 795 f.
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styles so closely resemble each other and since Marinetti, the founder 
of Futurism, preached his gospel in St. Petersburg and Moscow long 
before he came to Italy,^ Constructivism, in turn, is indebted to the 
techniques of the French Symbolists. Which brings the wheel back 
full turn, for Nicoll defines Expressionism as "diametrically
q
opposed...to the subjective Impressionist." Despite this confusion, 
seeking out the origins of the more important modern "ism's" is 
a far less difficult task than is the defining of the essential 
characteristics of each of the movements. Moreover, of all the 
modern schools, German Expressionism— the one which forms the basis 
of our immediate interest in this chapter— is the school which yields 
least easily to close definition.
For example, most critics will agree that, contributory 
influences aside, the mainstream of German Expressionism flows in a 
direct line from Strindberg through Wedekind and Hauptmann to the 
young playwrights of the twenties, but few of these critics will agree 
on just what the mainstream is. Tucker, for example, says that Expres­
sionism is an art form whose "general characteristics are plain 
enough."
It starts by taking its material from real life...but 
it aims to distill the very essence of reality and to 
present it in terms of the universal. Naturally, then,
^Lander MacCllntock, The Age of Pirandello (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1951), p. 135.
^Nicoll, o£. cit., p. 796.
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it is not concerned with phenomena but with ideas 
and springs of conduct.^
Sheldon Cheney, on the other hand, sees in Expressionism a trend
Toward the emotional-crisis play as against the thought 
play,, toward intensity of feeling as against likeness 
to outward life and truth of detail, toward looseness 
of technique as against formulas.^
To Samuel and Ihomas, "the basis of Expressionistic drama is Activis-
tic," that is, it springs from the beliefs of a group of social
reformers known as Activists.
It proclaims an idea, that of the New Man and of a New 
Humanity, which is to be no longer subjected to the 
limitation of State and nation, of society and tradi­
tional laws, and which is to be transformed into a 
community of love, goodness and peace."
If these conflicting definitions of Expressionism are somewhat 
puzzling, one is always "free to seek comfort in the concise defini­
tion given to Carpenter by a German professor, "Expressionism is 
intellectual v o m i t i n g . O r  one may prefer Mbrdecai Gorelik's 
theatre-oriented conception of the movement as an art form which 
finds its basis in the desire to do away with the picture frame 
stage in favor of the open platform.** It is possible, of course,
^Marion Tucker, Twenty-five Modern Plays. Rev. Edition (New 
York: Harper Broa, 1948), p. 575.
^Sheldon Cheney, The Art Theatre (New York: Alfred A, Knop£,
1917), p. 175.
^Richard Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas, Expressionism in German 
Life. Literature, and the Theatre (Cambridge: W. Hoffer and Sons, Ltd.,
1939), p. 13 f.
^Carpenter, o£. cit.. p. 196.
**Mordecai Gorelik, New Theatres for Old (Binghamton, New York: 
Samuel French, 1947), p. 248.
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to go on endlessly presenting conflicting definitions of Expres­
sionism, and it is equally impossible to state flatly that any one 
of these concepts is more correct than the other, for all have their 
element of truth. The best one can do is to seek out a study which 
seems to be more thorough and more comprehensive than the others.
Such a study is Dahlstrom's carefully presented work, Strindberg's 
Dramatic Expressionism.
In his investigation of the general features of Expressionism, 
Dahlstrom lists seven important features of the movement. First and 
foremost, there was a concern with Ausstrahlungen des Ich, or the 
radiation, expansion and unfolding of the ego. Dahlstrom feels that 
this concept can be partly "explained by the phrase 'stream of 
consciousness' which is current in our English terminology.Along 
with an interest in the radiation of the ego, the expressionist was 
also interested in the unconscious, in artistic intuition, and in 
the inner experience of man. "For the expressionist objective 
experience is merely the stimulus for inner experience."10 Expres- 
sionistic philosophy also included the concept of Welt als Elnheit: 
all things as one.
The expressionist is an idealistic monistJ Soul and 
body, material and immaterial, subject and object, 
these are the anti-poles for the concept of reality 
but are not endowed with separate existence; they are 
antithesis from which reality must be wrested.H
^Dahlstrom, oj>. cit.. p. 49. 
10Ibid., p. 52. 
n Ibid., p. 53.
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In addition to the above Ideas, the expressionist was Interested in the
relationship between the mind and the soul, between Seele and Geist,
"Seele feels the chaos; whereas Gelst thinks the cosmos* Seele tends
toward dynamic, formless feeling; Geist. on the other hand, is an
12ordering element." As might be suspected from the emphasis on
intuition, on the unconscious, and on the inner experience, there is
to be found in Expressionism a great deal more concern with Seele
than with Geist. In summing up the movement, Dahlstrom notes that
to the list of its major characteristics must also be added a tendency
to imitate musical form, a general sense of the importance and worth
of man, and a certain primitive, Christian religiosity.
Summing up, then, German Expressionism was a striking, if
not very homogeneous, school which can, in general, be included within
the modern pan-psychic movement. Critics have found it difficult to
give an exact rendering of the tendencies of the movement, probably
because of the diverse influences which shaped it, but also because
critics have been unable to isolate it in historical and artistic
terms. To some authorities, Expressionism is limited to Germany
in the period from 1910 to 1925; to others Expressionism is a term
13to be applied to any divergence from Naturalism. J Just where the 
exact truth lies is unimportant to this study. What is more to the 
point here is that as one might suspect any modern movement which
12Ibid, p. 54.
^William Harlan Shaw, German Expressionism: 1915-1920. The
Plays of Georg Kaiser (Unpublished-Ph.D. Dissertation, 1956, Louisi­
ana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana), p. 7.
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placed great importance on such matters as inner experience, the 
antithesis between inner and outer reality, the role of the uncon­
scious and of artistic intuition, and the radiation and unfolding of 
the ego, would also be interested in artistically rendering the point 
of view of the individual man. Such is exactly the case, and Expres­
sionism includes a great number of works that are, in whole or in 
part, point-of-view studies. Toller's Masse-Mensch. for instance, 
contains three "dream scenes" which obviously take place in the 
mind of Sonia Irene L. Probably the most widely known point-of- 
view experiment to come out of the Expresslonistic movement was the 
famous film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, a presentation of the 
world as seen through the eyes of a lunatic and a work which be­
queathed to the commercial cinema many of its standard "horror" 
techniques. In all likelihood, however, the best example of 
expresslonistic experimentation with the point of view came from 
the pen of Georg Kaiser, the playwright whom most critics consider, 
in the phrase of Eric Bentley, "the prince of Expressionism."14
A writer of a large variety of plays in many different modes, 
it was in 1916 that Georg Kaiser, as Nicoll puts it, "startled his 
contemporaries by the boldness of his Von Morgens bis Mlttemacht. 
a drama which has since come to be considered as the very archetype 
of Expressionism. In essence the play is a point-of**view study, but
*^Eric Bentley, The Playwright as Thinker (New York: Reynal
& Hitchcock, 1946), p. 231.
15Nicoll, o£. cit.. p. 797.
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it is so vory different from those of Strindberg or those of Evrelnov 
that it deserves consideration as a special genre. Like so much of 
Kaiser's work, From Morn to Midnight defies criticism. It is a
strange play. At the present time it still occupies a position of
some respect in the total body of modern drama. It is not, however, 
a great play. It may well be that it will be considered a very bad
play by future generations. Only one thing about it seems certain:
From Morn to Midnight will never be considered a mediocre play. 
Freedley and Reeves have called it a "moving d r a m a " G a s s n e r  
has brushed it off as little "more than m a n i c . C h a n d l e r ,  on 
the other hand, sees the play as "one of the best of its kind in 
its simplicity and universality*"*®
Probably the main reason for such widely varying evaluations 
of the play's quality lies in the fact that From Morn to Midnight, 
more than any other single work in his fifty odd play corpus, 
presents a more or less complete statement of Kaiser's total world­
view, a philosophy which in itself has provoked conflicting critical 
conments. William Drake, for instance, feels that "Georg Kaiser is 
exclusively a dramatist of ideas, and a strenuous crusader for these
*®Freedley and Reeves, oj>. cit.. p. 523.
*7John Gassner, Theatre in Our Times (New York: Crown
Publishers, 1954), p. 447.
t
lftFrank W. Ghandler, Modern Continental Playwrights (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1931), p. 417.
140
ideas. Mordecai Gorelik, on the other hand, sees the key to
20Kaiser's plays in "vehemence more than logical thesis." Consider­
ing the general tenets of the movement of which Kaiser was the lead­
ing playwright, it seems likely that Gorelick's position is more 
defendable than is Drake's. After all, a school which stresses the 
life of the unconscious, the ur-ishness of the Seele over the civiliz­
ing influences of the Geist. may certainly be indicted as being at 
the least unintellectual and very probably anti-intellectual. More­
over, the expressionist group as a whole aside, Kaiser's personal 
philosophy is hardly one of a man who would write plays of "the most 
precise intellectual type."21
The follower of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer,22 Kaiser reflects 
the anti-intellectual views of his masters in his own belief that the 
fundamental force of all life is "energy."
Energy is the driving force of the world. Without energy 
there is nothing. Sentiment, pity, romance are only the 
refuge of the weak, who must inevitably go down. The 
unfortunate are hinderances. Go out into the world and 
see what men really are. They are brutal, self-seeking, 
egotistical, heartless, energetic. It is only through 
will-power that injustice and stupidity can be done 
away with.
All living creatures are endowed with energy in some degree, but "man
19
William A. Drake, Contemporary European Writers (New York: 
John Day Co., 1928), p. 96.
2®Gorelik, o£. cit.. p. 248.
2^Clark and Freedley, o£. cit.. p. 102.
22“ Shaw, o£. cit.. p. 34.
^Gorelik, oj>. cit.. p. 250.
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represents the most intensive form of energy."2^ This fact takes on
added importance when we consider Kaiser's commitment to the ideal
that the individual is created "perfect from the beginning,"
He is, so to speak, a finished product from the very 
moment of his birth. The limitations to which he 
finally succumbs are not part of his inner nature, 
but are Imposed on him from without, as a result 
of the distorted forms to which his destiny is 
subjected.
The "distorted forms" of which Kaiser speaks, in other words, 
those ways in which the individual misuses or misappropriates his 
divine energy, are the forms forced on man by a negative and imperfect 
social system. Thus, in Kaiser's view, man is created possessed of 
the mystical power of energy, the power which is "the eternal miracle 
in man,"2*’ but its possession does him little good. The Individual 
is born not only as a vessel for divine energy, but also as a member 
of society, and consequently is doomed to have the potential of his 
energy drained from him by the meaness, indifference, or evilness 
of his social order. By being party to society, the individual 
contracts the malignant disease of the group: the disintegration
of his energy, his personality, his innate perfection. Shaw points 
out that this theory "cleanses the Individual of his guilt in his 
own destiny and puts the responsibility on the imperfect social
2^Drake, op. cit., p. 94.
2^Moses Frucbter, The Social Dialectic in Georg Kaiser's 
Dramatic Works (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1933), p. 7.
2^Drake, oj>. cit., p. 94 f.
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organization which forces him from his perfection."
The tragedy of the man designed by nature to live a 
harmonious life lies in the fact that he is thrown 
off his course. Since he is unable to find himself 
again, he is condemned to slow and relentless dis­
integration of his soul, and to living without hope 
for personal happiness
Kaiser, thus, saw life as a struggle between the perfect 
individual and the imperfect society. The struggle was an unequal 
one "between the world's social system, which is without feelings 
for humanity, and the individual with his feeble cries."28 For 
most men, this struggle could only result in the total destruction 
of their egos. Indeed, for the great majority of people, the 
disintegration of their personality by society is a process of 
which they are only vaguely aware. At infrequent intervals, however, 
there appears an individual who has intuitively grasped the nature 
and extent of the struggle of which he is the protagonist. Perhaps 
he even acts on his knowledge. When this occurs, we have an example 
of the Kalserian hero, the modern New Man. Depending on the purity 
of his remaining energy, on what still survives of his personality, 
the New Man may follow one of three lines: If he is in a relatively
pure state, he may follow the urges of primitive instinct, of 
unadulterated Seele. If his personality has eroded past the redeem­
able point, he may be forced into taking the decadent romantic
^Shaw, o£. cit.. p. 37. 
^Ibid., p. 37.
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solution of escape. If he Is blessed with both a strong Integrity 
of ego and the luck to be born into a society ready for change, he 
may take the best of the three possible courses--social reform.
But despite the possibilities of success in the latter course, it 
also promises the greatest danger if attempted in a society not yet 
amenable to reform. Such a danger is amply demonstrated in Ga t s .29
Considering the complete Kalserlan system, we may say that 
in its practical application it becomes a philosophy of social 
reformation. As such it may even show manifestations of interest in 
immediate political and economic problems, such interest as is found 
in the Gas trilogy or in Gats. It may, on the other hand, deal with 
such domestic questions as whether a wife is justified in infidelity 
if that transgression saves the life of her husband. Just such a 
problem is presented and answered affirmatively in The Woman1s Sacri­
fice. These investigations of what may be considered practical 
problems do not spring from any pretention of rationality on the part 
of the playwright, but they may be responsible for some critics' 
seeing in Kaiser a bent toward "intellectual dramas." These problems, 
that is, are similar enough to the problems presented in such "dramas 
of ideas" as Ibsen's social plays to cause some critics to confuse 
the essential qualities of the two playwrights. Actually, Ibsen's 
problem plays sprang from a somewhat different impulse. The social
2^For a complete discussion of Kaiser's concept of the New Man, 
see William Harlan Shaw's German Expressionism: 1915-1920. The Plays 
of Georg Kaiser, op. cit.
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reform he called for was based on ethics. Kaiser's social reform
is rooted in a religious impulse, and, though.intellectual on the
surface, is prompted by beliefs which are far more mystical than
intellectual. For Kaiser, good social order must, in the long run,
emanate from the private individual. Ultimately, Kaiser felt that
"society is a collective body of individuals, the whole cannot
transcend its units of composition."^ But the individual who would
bring about Kaiser's reform was not, at root, intellectual; he was
the incarnation of sacred energy, a miracle that "has been converted
into the blood out of which he creates, creating even himself.
Hence, beneath Kaiser's intellectual facade lay a basic philosophy
of anti-intellectuallsm, a belief in a perfect society that grew
not out of human reason but out of the primitive, perfect energy of
man. Kaiser put his faith in pure Seele; Geist was only the imperfect
means of presenting this faith. Kaiser's views, then, were Nietzschean
and Dionysian, borrowing of the Apollonian only when necessary. The
playwright's mysticism and his debt to Nietzsche's own anti-
intellectualism can be summed up by the final stage direction of
From Morn to Midnight, a direction which can be only imperfectly
realized on the stage.
The CASHIER has fallen back with arms outstretched 
against the Cross on the back wall. His husky gasp 
is like an ECCE, his heavy sign is like a HOMO* One 
second later all the lamps explode with a loud report.
30Fruchter, 0£. cit.. p. 9. 
3*Drake, o£. cit.. p. 94.
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To put his mysticism into dramatic form, to display some aspect 
of the individual'8 spiritual emaciation at the hands of society, it 
was necessary for Kaiser to take the structural approach suggested 
by Strindberg and Evrelnov. In other words, a perfectly workable 
definition of Kaiser's concept of the New Man would be a man who 
has acquired a viewpoint which differs from that of society in 
general, for only the man with a unique point of view would be able 
to recognize that his personality was in the process of being destroy­
ed by the social system.
With this definition in mind, we may say that Kaiser's sense 
of tragedy is concerned with a particular type of insight, the 
insight of the New Man who recognizes, often simultaneously with the 
acquisition of an individualized view point, that his personality is 
inevitably doomed to destruction by the greater force of society. His 
struggle to retain as long as possible the integrity of his own 
vision provides the tragic conflict of Kaiser's plays. One of two 
catastrophies are possible: the New Man may die as the result of
the struggle or he may wearily succumb to a fusion of his private 
vision with that of the general, de-spirltualized point of view of 
society.
From Morn to Midnight stands as a fine example of Kaiser's 
manipulation of point of view to present his modern tragedy. In the 
opening scene we are offered a portrait of a man, the Cashier of a 
small bank, who exists as little more than an automaton, a gear in the 
social machine. Into the bank comes a mysterious Italian beauty, and 
the Cashier is suddenly prompted by her presence into acquiring an
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individuality, a new and totally different point of view. That is, 
he yields to an impulse, a spark of energy from the Seele, the primi­
tive energy of sexual desire. His instinct, to be sure, is not pure. 
It is sufficiently distorted by the erosions which his personality 
has already undergone to take at face value the implications of the 
bank manager and the executive of the Building Society that the 
lady is an adventurer who is willing to gratify any desire for a 
large enough price. But however distorted the Cashier's sex instinct 
may be, it is still pure and vital enough to jolt him into becoming 
a New Man, a man who sees things differently from his fellows. With 
the acquisition of a private point of view comes also the Cashier's 
realization of the malice which society holds toward him. At once 
the Cashier sets off to escape the doom which the social system 
has in store for him, that is, the destruction of his Newness.
So corrupted has the Cashier's personality become in the 
years before his new vision, that he believes that money can provide 
him with a means of escape. He, therefore, robs the bank and rushes 
off in pursuit of the Italian woman. Upon her rejection of him, 
the Cashier sets off on a wild spending spree which takes him to 
a bicycle race, to a cabaret and, finally, to a Salvation Army Hall. 
There he declares in favor of pure energy, pure Seele. which does not 
even need money. Too late, however, he realizes that he has been 
tricked into a confession by society. Having, in a fit of quasi­
religious fervor, given into the demands of society, the Cashier 
recognizes the futility of his attempt at escape. He bows to the 
inevitability of the destruction in store for him and commits suicide.
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To capture the Cashier's struggle with society, the struggle 
between the personal and the universal point of view, required that 
Kaiser revise somewhat the structural methods of Strindberg and 
Evreinov. The former had been interested exclusively in the inner 
life of a single individual without reference to externality; the 
latter had seen externality only as a reflection of the conflicts 
within the individual. Kaiser, on the contrary, was to see external 
reality existing as a sort of no man's land in a war of viewpoints, 
the one universal and the other individualized. Thus, while Strindberg 
and Evreinov can remain within a consistent framework, while they 
can refer all back to the individual, Kaiser was forced to alternate 
his emphasis between the viewpoint of the group and that of the 
individual. Therefore, scenes one and two of From Morn to Midnight 
may be called "objective," not perhaps in the sense of pure extemal- 
ism, but sufficiently close to traditional objective drama to give 
the audience the impression that they were witnessing sane variation 
of the "fourth wall" theatre. The first hint that the point of view 
will ultimately shift comes with the stage direction which indicates . 
that while the Cashier helps the Italian woman to reclasp her 
bracelet, he "stares at her as if mesmerized."
His spectacles, bright points of light, seem almost to
be swallowed up in the cavity of his wide-open eyes.
The basic objectivity of the first scene is maintained, however, 
through scene two, which brings the Cashier to the hotel room of the 
Italian woman. The audience already knows, before the Cashier's 
entrance, the disappointment which is in store for him. Having
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stolen money In order to elope with her, the Cashier Is shocked to 
find that the Italian beauty Is wealthy, respectable, and totally 
uninterested In him. With this shock comes his complete awakening 
to his new relationship to society.
Now that the New Man is created as a functioning entity, the 
playwright, having in the first two scenes presented society's view­
point, shifts the focus in scene three to the viewpoint of the 
Cashier. In violation of the most sacred precepts of Exteroalism, 
scene three consists of nothing but a very long monologue, disjointed 
and often hardly comprehensible, at times not even rising above the 
level of a shriek issuing from the murky depths of the soul. In fact, 
it would not be unjust to characterize the Cashier's monologue as the 
verbalization of the same sort of images which were objectfied in 
Strindberg's Dream Play. It can hardly be denied that the thought 
sequence of the whole speech is much more closely related to the 
free association of Strindberg than to the highly structured thought 
of a Shakespearian soliloquy.
It is in scene three that the Cashier makes his first overt 
declaration of his new individuality. The monologue begins in this 
manner:
How wonderful a toy is every man! The mechanism runs 
silently in his joints. Suddenly the faculties are 
touched and transformed into gesture. What gave ani­
mation to these hands of mine? A moment ago they were 
straining to heave the masses that the drifting snow 
flakes had strewn. My footprints across the field are 
blotted out. With my own hands I have created nothingness.
In other words, with the yielding to an impulse, the Cashier has become
transformed. He has become a New Man by his act of theft, and his
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former place in society, his old function as part of the social
machine, has been destroyed just as his footprints have disappeared
from the snow. This theme is repeated once again in his comments as
he throws away his soiled shirt cuffs.
Soiled. There they lie. Missing in the wash. The 
mourners will cry through the kitchen: A pair of
cuffs are lost! A catastrophe in the boiler! A 
world in chaos!
The Cashier is exultant at his new discovery of individuality. 
"Today's experience opens the road," he cries. "With one leap I'm 
at the heart of the universe, the focus of unimagined brightness."
But his joy is soon dampened by the vision of a skeleton in a tree, 
the first sign of the doom which awaits his new personality. How­
ever, he refuses at this time to take the omen too seriously. He 
feels that he can still escape. After all, as he says, "with this 
load in my. pocket I'm paying cash— cash down for everything."
Scene four strikes a compromise between the point of view of 
the Cashier and that of society. While it does not have the objective 
quality of scenes one and two, scene four is not as completely sub­
jective as scene three. There is, however, even before the Cashier 
enters the scene a strong sense that the action of the scene reflects 
the Cashier's new awareness of the total lack of personality found
in the members of society. For example, just before the Cashier
enters the following pointless and mechanical dialogue takes place.
WIFE. Today we have mutton chops for dinner.
MOTHER. Have you begun grilling them?
WIFE. Plenty of time. It's not twelve o'clock yet.
DAUGHTER. Not nearly twelve, mamma.
WIFE. No, not nearly twelve.
MOTHER. When he comes, it will be twelve.
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WIFE. He's not due yet.
DAUGHTER. When Father comes, It will be twelve o'clock.
WIFE. Yes.
This Is the basic unit of society, the family as the Cashier 
now sees It with new eyes. A short time after his entrance into the 
family circle, he comments on Its ability to deaden and erode the 
soul.
Comfortable, cozy, contented. Mother-son-grandson under 
one roof. The magic of familiar things— the household
spell. Let it work. Parlour with table and hanging lamp. 
Window with geraniums. Piano, music stool. Hearth- 
home fires burning. Kitchen, daily bread. Chops for 
dinner, fourposter— in-out. The magic of familiar things.
Then, one day— on your back, stiff and white. The table 
pushed back against the wall— cake and wine. In the 
middle a slanting, yellow coffin— screw lid, adjustable 
stand. A band of crepe hangs around the lamp--the piano 
untouched for a year.
This speech is delivered to no one on stage; it is, in fact, 
pure radiation of the ego, a segment of the Cashier's stream of 
consciousness. There is, as it were a direct reeling off of the words 
as they trace themselves across his brain. At this moment, all 
syntactic and rhetorical relationships are dismissed. When, however, 
the Cashier turns to speak to his wife directly, then these same 
ideas are coordinated into something resembling the received speech 
pattern. In other words, the playwright shifts out of the stream of 
consciousness into the stream of communication, that is, from a sub­
jective to an objective point of view.
Warm and cozy this nest of yours; I won't deny its good 
points; but it doesn't stand the final test. No.' The 
answer is clear. This is not a halting place, but a sign­
post; the road leads further on.
The road leads, in fact, to the bicycle races of scene five, 
a scene in which Kaiser again contrasts the point of view of the New
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Han with that of society* The Cashier offers a large prize to the 
winner of the race, and, as the race progresses, the Cashier watches 
the crowd, while the race officials, who represent society, watch 
only the race*
2ND GENTLEMAN* But you must keep your eye on the track, 
and watch the varying course of the race*
CASHIER. Childish this sport* One rider must win
because the others must lose— >Look up, I sayi 
It's there, among the crowd, that the magic 
works, Hie wine ferments in this vast barrel 
of spectators*
What the Cashier sees in the crowd is his first complete vision of the 
tremendous energy inherent in humanity* It is basic, primitive and 
frightening, but above all it is democratic and exhilarating*
2ND GENTLEMAN. The german was leading, but—
CASHIER. Never mind that, if you please* Up there
you have the staggering fact. Watch the supreme 
effort, the last dizzy height of accomplishment*
From stalls to gallery one seething flux, dis­
solving the individual, recreating passion*
Differences melt away, veils of nakedness are 
stripped; passion rulesJ**No restraint, no 
modesty, no motherhood, no childhood— nothing 
but passion* That's the real thing* That's 
worth the search. That justifies the pricei
But even this energy, distorted as it is, is but fleeting*
Even this "unclean but free" passion is quickly subdued and surpressed 
by the entrance of the king* All heads are bowed, all free instincts 
are subjugated by the sudden appearance of the royal presence; not 
even the Cashier's offer of a huge cash prize can buy back the lost 
natural state of the crowd. Disillusioned by this turn of events, and 
not willing to give money to a "society of hunchbacks," the Cashier, 
seeing what the others do not, violently crushes the race official's 
silk hat down upon his shoulders and exists*
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Scene six is s wild bizarre episode which reflects in quality 
the growing desperation of the Cashier, who senses the hopelessness 
of his battle to retain individuality. For his new locale the play­
wright selects a cabaret at which some sort of costume party is in 
progress. In this manner Kaiser is able to present a world distorted 
by the Cashier's point of view while at the same time he retains 
access to the more objective viewpoint of society. The cabaret scene 
presents the Cashier's attempts to buy life's primal energy, love.
Into his private dining room he brings four masked women from the 
costume ball. There is about these woman an aura of hidden and 
mysterious beauty, but when, in return for a sum of money, two of 
the women lift their masks, they turn out to be "monsters." The 
third flees without removing her mask, while the fourth woman is 
discovered to have a wooden leg. The realization that each of these 
women is deformed in some way, that each has a physical manifestation 
of her spiritual corruption, is too much for the Cashier. With the 
grimest of humor, he seizes the champagne cooler and pours its 
contents over the fourth woman's wooden leg, crying out as he does 
so, "I'll water it for youi We'll make the buds sproutJ"
The scene then returns to a more realistic statement; three 
gentlemen appear, and the playwright uses them to contrast the calm 
but evil viewpoint of society with the desperate frenzy of the 
Cashier. To the three gentlemen, the Cashier is the corrupter of 
their girls. "He entices them away, stuffs them with caviare, 
drenches them in champagne, and then insults them." Having pronounced 
their judgment upon the hapless Cashier, the three respectable men
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then quietly steal the money which the Cashier has left as payment for 
his bill. As they leave, they pause a moment to accuse the waiter of 
running a conxnon swindler's den. The scene closes on the wails of the 
waiter who cannot afford to lose the money which the Cashier owed 
him.
The final scene of the play finds the Cashier in a Salvation 
Army Hall. With him is the Salvation Army Lass who has haunted him 
like a conscience throughout the last three scenes of the play.
This scene is projected almost totally through the point of view of 
the Cashier, just as the first scene was an almost totally objective 
statement. Briefly, the scene consists largely of a series of con­
fessions which slowly wear down the Cashier's resistance to convention­
al morality. Finally, whipped into a frenzy of accepted morality by 
what he takes to be the sincere testimony of two professional 
cyclists, two prostitutes, two men who have lost their souls in 
the contentment of their cozy homes, and, lastly, a thief who has 
found peace by going to prison, the Cashier mounts the platform to 
confess his own sin and to receive forgiveness. Irony then follows 
irony as he realizes too late that society has managed to weaken his 
personal vision just long enough to force him into final destruction. 
His stolen money, which the Cashier, taking his cue from the pre- 
ceeding confessions, felt the group would regard as an object to 
be "torn and stamped under foot," is the cause of a riot as each 
member of the audience tries to get as much money as he possibly can. 
The Cashier then turns to the Salvation Army Lass, who had earlier 
stated that she would "stand by him," only to discover that she has
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turned police Informer In order to obtain the reward money* It Is
then that he recognizes his defeat, his destruction by society*
He sees once again the vision of the skeleton, the sign of his
complete destruction*
This morning, among the snowy boughs, I mocked at you*
Now, in that tangled wire, you are welcomed as an old 
friend! I salute you. The road is behind me. The 
last steep curves climb upward— -to you* My forces 
are spent* I've spared myself nothing! I've made the 
path hard where it might have been easy...Why did I 
take the road? Where does it lead me now? From first 
to last you sit there naked as a bone. From morning 
to midnight I run raging in a circle— and now your 
beckoning arm shows me the way— -whither?
The Cashier shoots the answer into his breast* All the lights 
explode at once, and the policeman provides society's final judgment 
on the struggles of the New Man: "There must be a short circuit in
the main."
As a projection of the Cashier's point of view, scene seven 
is one of the most powerful scenes in all expressionistic literature. 
It probably finds its original model in Strindberg's handling of 
the final scene in The Dream Play, but where the latter is forced and 
clumsy, the final scene in From Morn to Midnight has flow, ease and 
a mounting rhythm of intensity. Following Strindberg's example,
Kaiser repeats in the confessions of the various sinners each of the 
previous episodes of the play, just as Strindberg had each of his 
characters reappear before the burning castle* Kaiser, however, shows 
superior artistry, for while Strindberg must simply bring his charac­
ters in, unannounced and unexcused, and parade them across the stage 
after the manner of a role call, Kaiser selects a setting— a Salvation 
Army Hall— which will serve as a logical excuse for confessions.
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Moreover, Kaiser makes no attempt to make those giving "testimony" 
coincide with earlier characters. A similarity of experience 
serves his purpose sufficiently and does not make unnecessary 
demands upon pur credulity.
Because Kaiser holds himself to a single point of view, 
scene seven gains greatly in unity of impression. Throughout the 
interior scenes of the play, the dramatist's approach has been 
inconsistent. In scenes three through six there is a constant 
shifting from the objective to the subjective point of view. This, 
of course, was in keeping with the playwright's theme of the con­
flict between society and the individual. As such, it had more 
than a modicum of justification, but the shifting is confusing, 
especially when it occurs several times within a given scene, as 
in seenes four and five. However, as the play progresses, the shift­
ing becomes less and less frequent, the tendency being to hold more 
and more only to the point of view of the Cashier. This is not done 
because the Cashier is winning his struggle for identity, but, rather, 
because he is losing it. Since the gap between the New Man and 
society is rapidly closing, there is less need for a sharp contrast 
between the universal and the individual post of observation, and 
more need for a concentration on the individual in order to explore 
carefully the desperation attendant upon the final stages of. sur­
render. There is, for example, a need in such a scene as that at the 
bicycle races to have contrasting points of view. There must be, in 
order to demonstrate the contrast between the emancipation of the New
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Man and the subjugation of society, a group who can see only the 
’ races, while the New Man sees only the spectators* Both points of 
view, since they are so complementary, can share almost equal 
emphasis* But when the personality of the New Man has eroded 
past a certain point, when it has reached that stage at which it 
diverges very slightly from that of society in general, that very 
little divergence must be emphasized so that it will not escape 
unnoticed* Consequently, since both the gentleman friends of the 
masked women and the Cashier see the women as corrupted and corrupt­
ing, it is important to emphasize the Cashier's unique view of their 
corruption in order that its differences from that of the three 
representatives of society can be stressed. Therefore, the scene in 
the cabaret is given over in great part exclusively to the viewpoint 
of the Cashier* In short, the scene demonstrates the increasing 
hopelessness of the Cashier's attempt at escape by rendering, in 
reference to himself alone, his desperate struggle to maintain a 
continually diminishing individuation of viewpoint.
Kaiser's problem in the final scene is somewhat simplified. 
Since the purpose of the scene is to dramatize the final defeat 
of the personality, he need not seek contrasts between that personal­
ity and society* In fact, he cannot, for contrasts no longer exist. 
What was in scene three and four a matter of a difference in kind 
becomes in scene seven no more than a slight and continually diminish­
ing difference in degree. In view of this, Kaiser holds, until the 
last few speeches, entirely to the viewpoint of the central character* 
The quality of the scene is the quality of the Cashier's soul, which
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grows ever niore Intensely desperate as he enters more and more Into 
the society which he had left so abruptly. Gradually, the action of 
the scene becomes more formal and rhythmic as the Hew Man loses his 
individuality in the oneness of the group.
The increasing sense of oneness is handled in a masterly way
by Kaiser. At first, the various members of the audience appear as
individuals.
VOICE. Move up closer. Be careful, Bill] Ha, ha]
Move up there]
WORKMAN. What are you after?
OFFICER. I've got a question to ask you all.
OTHERS. Speech— -None of your jaw] Music] The band]
VOICE. Begin]
VOICE. Stop]
But after the third confession, many members of the audience have been 
welded into a more homogenous unit which rises to cry in unison: 
"What's my sin? I want to know my sin] Tell me my sin]" By the time 
the final confession has been delivered, all the members of the 
audience have been built into single universal human machine which 
surges up to roar out: "Nobody's sin] That's nobody's sin] I want
to hear mine] My sin] My sin] frfy sin]" By this time, the Cashier 
can resist no longer. He also rises, shouting as he does so, "My 
sin]"
The growing sense of unity in the audience and the Cashier's 
ultimate identification with them is prompted by the confessions of 
seven sinners, among whom are cyclists, prostitutes, overly smug 
husbands, and, finally, a reformed theif. Each of these recalls an 
incident in the Cashier's day, and each weakens his defenses and 
increases the power of society. The final confession, that of the
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thief, brings the Cashier face to face with his greatest sin against 
the mores of the group. It is too much for him. He loses his 
individuality completely, accepts once more the moral order of the 
group, and is led to the platform to make his confession.
Each of the stages in the Cashier's final defeat is marked 
not only by an increase of unity in the audience and by a sinner's 
confession, but also by a series of duets between the Cashier and 
the Salvation Army Lass, who has come to symbolize the Cashier's old 
sense of moral duty. The duets begin just after the first sinner's 
confession. In the first exchange, the Cashier is firm, though his 
petulance Indicates that all is not well.
SALVATION LASS. Do you hear him?
CASHIER. Let me alone.
After the second confession, the Cashier shows signs of
weakening.
SALVATION LASS. Do you see him?
CASHIER. The cycle races.
SALVATION LASS. What are you muttering about?
CASHIER. That's my affair. My affair.
SALVATION LASS. Are you ready?
CASHIER. Hold your tongue.
Again, the confessions of the prostitutes make apparent the weakness 
of the Cashier's defenses, but he remains stubborn.
SALVATION LASS. Do you hear all?
CASHIER. That's my affair. My affair.
SALVATION LASS. What are you muttering?
CASHIER. The wooden leg.
SALVATION LASS. Are you ready?
CASHIER. Not yet. Not yet.
The end is in sight as the confessions continue.
SALVATION LASS. Do you see him?
CASHIER. My daughters. My wife. Ify mother.
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SALVATION LASS. What do you keep mumbling In your beard?
CASHIER. My affair. My affair.
One more confession, however, and the Cashier succumbs. The crowd 
leaps up as one to call out: "My sin! My sin!" And the Cashier
rises with them.
SALVATION LASS. What are your shouting?
CASHIER. The bank. The money.
SALVATION LASS. Are you ready?
CASHIER. Yes, now I'm ready.
Once the Cashier has begun to commit himself to society's 
position, the scene begins a rapid shift back toward a more objective 
viewpoint. Taking the attitude expressed by the audience in the 
Salvation Army Hall to be sincere, the Cashier confesses his crime 
and throws away his stolen money. The greedy audience riots, but 
still refusing to recognize his defeat, the Cashier turns to the 
Salvation Army Lass for help. But she too is a fraud. Disillusioned, 
the Cashier commits suicide.
Kaiser, then, begins his play as an objective statement. As 
the play moves forward, he shifts from third to first-person— ‘some­
times objective, sometimes subjec'tive— point of view. Throughout 
there is a growing tendency to hew more and more to the subjective 
viewpoint of the Cashier himself. Accordingly, the final scene is 
projected almost entirely through the perception of the central 
character. In terms of the coordination of two points of view, 
Kaiser's skill is nowhere better demonstrated than in his ability to 
present to us from the opening curtain a view of society which the 
Cashier will be able to achieve only in his moments of greatest 
insight. In other words, even though the first two scenes are
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presented objectively, we are seeing in them, in a sense, the world 
as it will ultimately appear through the viewpoint of the Cashier, 
though at the time neither he nor we in the audience may realize 
this fact. Thus, the insidious malice of society, its power to warp 
and distort natural harmony, is displayed to us as early as the 
conversation between the fat officer of the Building Society and the 
manager of the bank.
The larger framework of From Morn to Midnight, that is, the 
form which Kaiser employs to encompass and contain his investigation 
of varying viewpoints, has often been referred to as "station drama." 
In essence, the form bears a marked resemblance to that of the med­
ieval cycle dramas. A series of short scenes are juxtaposed one 
against the other with no regard for sequence, no regard for place, 
and little regard for anything but the grossest concept of time.
Like the medieval cycles, the unity of the play is gained through 
unity of theme, character and conflict. Wherever the Cashier finds 
himself, and he may find himself anywhere from a snow-covered field 
to a cabaret, there is always present his never-ending conflict with 
society. Moreover, at each "station" his position in the struggle 
becomes more and more hopeless. As Kaiser wrings variation after 
variation from his central instrument and theme, his "station drama" 
draws closer and closer to musical form, never, however, quite 
approaching Strindberg's total surrender to purely musical structure.
All in all, Kaiser'8 method of stating his tragic view of the 
8low erosion of the individual ego at war with a malevolent society 
is not at all ineffective. There are, of course, certain weaknesses
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in From Morn to Midnight. The "station drama" framework gives to the 
play a quality of looseness and the frequent inconsistencies of view­
point lend to the work a general air of confusion* This confusion, 
however, is more than counterbalanced by the almost musical develop­
ment of the theme, always present in sharp focus and always gaining 
in richness by continual variation. Kaiser's handling of his theme 
gives to the piece a strong sense of rhythmic unity, a: unity that is 
increased by the emphasis placed on the major instrument, the ever­
present Cashier. This unity, may, like the unity of Strindberg, be 
highly reminiscent of musical form, but it remains as more effective 
than the Strlndbergian method primarily because it stops short of 
crossing the boundary between music and drama. Kaiser's logic is 
always the logic of character and action, not that of sound and 
rhythm alone. Throughout the play the Cashier is clearly, perhaps 
too obviously, motivated by the needs of his own personality, not by 
purely formal considerations.
II
Pirandello: Six Characters in Search of an Author
Just as "the prince of Expressionism" was concerned with the 
destruction of the individual ego, so also was his royal counterpart 
in Italy, Luigi Pirandello, busily pursuing another aspect of the same 
problem. Like Kaiser, Pirandello's art and philosophy were the end 
result of certain avant-garde movements of the times. In Pirandello's 
case these movements were Futurism and the Teatro Grotesco. While 
they were not identical, the basic fact of these two movements was
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the rejection of Exteraalism, which the young Italians felt had 
developed into a new academy whose restrictions were just as point­
less and just as stifling as the older 19th-century traditions.
What was needed was a new, modem drama, a drama that in the words of 
the leading Futurist, F. T. Marinetti, would "return to primitive, 
ln8tlctive, almost prehuman sensory impulses.1,33 The new drama 
should "abolish tradition, artistic and moral, in favor of more 
modem things,"
It proposed, Instead of elaborating the virtues and 
accomplishments of humanity in the past, to sing, 
henceforth, of contemporary life, speed, noise, the 
automobile, the airplane, the smoking factory chimney, 
war and destruction.
In practice, Marinetti's drama was to be a drama of few or no 
words, a drama of the most theatrical theatre. His own plays some­
times made use only of hands and feet, sometimes of all the gross 
and vulgar elements of the circus. Although the aims of Futurists 
like Marinetti were never quite realized on the stage, they did 
serve as an inspiration to a second, slightly younger group of 
playwrights who ultimately became known as the grotteschi. Not quite 
so violently anti-literary as the Futurists, the grotteschi set out 
to study "the secret impulses of the soul,"3^ and any device which 
seemed to promise access to the individual soul was taken up and
33MacClintock, oj>. cit.. p. 134. 
33Ibid.. p. 134.
34Ibid.. p. 137.
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used by the writers of the Teatro Grotesco. Moreover, these young men 
were not restricted In their playwrighting by any philosophic 
devotion to a positive ideal. Essentially, they were just as
nihilistic as the Futurists.
\
The writers of the grotteschi. convinced as they were that 
men are illogical, capricious, that life is meaningless, 
tried to find a formula by which they could put this 
illogicality, caprice, and lack of meaning on the stage.
They felt that new and different technical means were 
necessary and resorted to all kinds of tricks to convey 
their ideas. Their plays were no longer comedy, tragedy, 
or farce, but 'grottesco,' Hnyth,''fable,' 'colored ad­
venture,' 'island night,' 'vision.' They people the 
stage with skeletons, with Pierrots, with ghosts, with 
'the black men from the sulphur pit,' with puppets; 
their plots are often impossible— a man magically gets 
his life to live over; a 'time machine' sets us into the 
future or the past; Death takes a holiday and visits earth; 
a man pretends to die for the pleasure of surviving himself.
By such devices these playwrights tried to dramatize the 
new philosophic nihilism of their epoch.35
The grotteschi. like the Futurists, sprang out of a confused
and unhappy Italy. A nation that had only lately shaken off its
sleepy agricultural economy and had joined the 19th-century movements
toward industrialism and nationalism, Italy had, by the speed at
which it attempted to bring itself abreast of the European industrial
giants, caused much confusion and hardship among its populace. In
addition, hardly had Italy recovered from its own war of independence
when the new nation was suddenly engaged in an even mightier struggle,
a struggle during which Italy was to be devastated, defeated, and
robbed of much of its newly acquired national dignity. Thus, in the
35Ibld.. p. 138.
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quarter century between 1915 and 1940t Italian intellectuals, "more 
profoundly than in France, England, or America," expressed them­
selves in terms of deep pessimism and scepticism* Italy's unfortunate 
condition caused her intellectuals to lose "faith in science, in the 
intellect, and, logically enough, in our very humanity itself."3*’ It 
was to this pessimism and scepticism that both the grotteschi and 
the Futurists attempted to give expression* Neither group was 
totally successful, but they prepared the way for a playwright who 
would be eminently so— Luigi Pirandello*
Pirandello's personal life, as well as the life and thought of 
the times, admirably equipped the dramatist for his role as Italy's 
leading pessimist* The son of a wealthy owner of Sicilian sulphur 
mines, young Luigi was forced into a marriage with a girl whom he had 
never seen. Through this marriage, Stefano Pirandello increased his 
business holdings and Luigi acquired a wife with an extremely handsome 
dowry* At first the young couple enjoyed a few years of happiness*
What with his wife's dowry and the more than ample allowance which 
his father sent to him, Pirandello prospered well in his new home in 
Rome* Unfortunately, it was not long before both his wife's and his 
father's fortunes were wiped out by floods in Sicily* The young couple 
was reduced to poverty, and Pirandello was only too happy to accept a 
position as a teacher in a girls high school* The loss of the family 
fortune was too much for Pirandello's wife, and her mind broke* She
36Ibid., p. 128
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became obsessed with,a belief that her husband was being unfaithful 
to her. Nothing Pirandello could do would convince her to the con­
trary. He went out as little as possible; he turned over his salary
to her, but nothing would avail. Her fits of jealous rage became
more frequent and more violent. There was no longer any doubt that
she was insane. A doctor was consulted and he advised that the best 
hope for cure was to keep her home rather than send her to a sani­
tarium. Thus, Pirandello lived out the better portion of his life 
with a mad woman. He secluded himself from the world and developed 
an infinite patience, always hoping for a cure, always waiting for a 
recovery which never came. "It was in this closed torment that was 
born, at least in germ, the drama of Luigi Pirandello."
He suffered everything in silence, and through his mind 
flashed irrational thoughts while in his heart surged a 
feeling of powerless revolt. When he wrote he gave vent 
to that tormented inner life by envying madmen who could 
shout whatever they wanted, who could reveal their strang­
est thoughts and queerest emotions with impunity. He must 
have written agonizing pages while his wife pounded at 
the door of his studio, accusing him and threatening 
him.37
Granting this sort of personal tragedy, it is easy to understand 
how a writer of Pirandello's ability would be ready, even eager, to 
devote his talent to the Grotesque and Futuristic theatres. And 
what a service Pirandello rendered these two movements. He took 
their generalized and hazy negativism and gave it form, direction 
and popularity. Through Pirandello the Italian theatre and the
37Domenico Vittorini, The Drama of Luigi Pirandello (Phila­
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), p. 22.
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resolve this conflict. Normally, in order to bring the two concepts 
of reality and illusion closer together, we assume some sort of mask, 
or, as is often the case, the mask is forced upon us from outside. In 
either case, the struggle between reality and illusion becomes a 
specific struggle between the face and the mask. In its simplest 
form, this conflict is summed up in the words of Alfredo Canton!, a 
writer whom Pirandello greatly admired; "Smiling in appearance, 
grieving in reality."4*
Pirandello, however, sees the Interaction between the face and 
the mask as oft times far more complicated than is indicated by this 
simple aphorism. In Henry IV. for instance, a young man on the way 
to a costume ball is thrown from his horse and strikes his head upon 
a stone. The blow causes him to lose his sanity and actually to 
believe that he is Henry IV, the king whose costume he is wearing. 
Having once assumed this mask, the man lives out his life as the 
ancient king. He is surrounded by courtiers in proper livery, and 
he discusses only the affairs of Henry IV1s time. He alone possesses 
the secret that his insanity has long ago been cured and that he no 
longer believes himself to be a royal personage. The world, however, 
has passed him by, and his mask seems much more comfortable than his 
face. Just as he is showing signs of wearying of his game, he is 
forced into a murder, and he realizes that what was once a mask, then 
a face, and now a mask again, must in the future continue to be his
41Ibld.. p. 90.
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gloomy pessimism of the modern Italian mind gained world-wide 
recognition.
What exactly was the philosophy which Pirandello made so 
popular? To begin with, it grew out of a basic relativism. As 
MacClintock points out, the very title of one of Pirandello's most 
famous plays, Right You Arei (If You Ihink You Are), "reads like 
a sentence from William James."3® Pirandello's relativism, however, 
was to take a unique turn. While Lamm's statement that Pirandello 
"himself knew that the notion that truth varies with the eye of the 
beholder was as old as philosophy itself,"^ cannot be denied, Lamm 
does not go on to indicate that Pirandello was to take that old notion 
to its most devastatlngly nihilistic conclusion. The Italian play­
wright had had a lifetime to study the various subjective distortions 
which reality, as he knew it, underwent in the deranged mind of his 
wife. It seems little wonder then that his relativism postulated a 
constant interplay, a constant confusion between reality and illusion. 
In Vittorinl's phrase, Pirandello was concerned with the "drama of 
being and seeming."40 On its most basic level, Pirandello's "drama 
of being and seeming" presents a conflict between reality as we wish 
it and reality as it is. Among the more intelligent and complicated 
members of the human community, various solutions are attempted to
^MacClintock, oj>. cit., p. 185.
^Lamm, oj>. cit.. p. 242.
40vittorini, og. cit.. p. 89.
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face for the world.
The consequences of Pirandello's view of humanity as the sum of
the conflict between the face and the mask has led the playwright Into
a conclusion which closely resembles that of Kaiser's, that is, the
human ego, caught and confused by a veritable web of faces and masks,
Is doomed to destruction. The two dramatists, however, disagree
significantly on the process of destruction. To Kaiser, the ego is
a solid entity which is eroded and reduced to nothingness by society;
to Pirandello the ego is never a very certain phenomenon which begins
by dividing, and subdividing and sub-subdividing until it can no longer
distinguish the whole from the parts, the real from the imaginary.
It thus, through weariness and perplexity, dissolves itself of its
own accord. Pirandello's is the process which Joseph Wood Krutch
calls the "dissolution of the ego."^
1 have already remarked on the fact that the tendency 
which Pirandello carries to a logical or illogical 
extreme is not unique to him and that, as a matter 
of fact, this tendency to "dissolve the ego" has been 
sometimes regarded as one highly characteristic of our
times.^3
Krutch sees the dissolving process as occurring in the following 
manner:
The 'I' itself, the thing which perceives appearances 
and becomes the victim of illusions, disintegrates—  
if, at least, one means by the 'I' any continuous, per­
sisting, relatively stable thing. Every 'I' is not 
merely all the things which at various times it seems
^Kurtch, oj>. cit.. p. 84.
43Ibid., p. 83.
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to be or all the things which at various times it 
seems to various people to be* It is all the different 
things which at different times it has been* There are 
'I's' of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, as well as 
what every observer has taken them to be..What, Piran­
dello seems to ask, can a 'self' be except what it is 
being from moment to moment.44
To Pirandello, the ego begins to dissolve the moment it 
assumes a mask* Dlls is not to say that all people assume masks. 
There are those few "good and simple people" who possess "spon­
taneity of live," but these people are but little removed from 
plants and animals*45 The more civilized man must assume a mask*
The taking on of a mask usually occurs after the civilized man suc­
cumbs to an instinct which makes him act against his moral code*
The element that contributes most in building the gloomy 
structure of Pirandello's pessimism is instinct* Man is 
compelled to yield to it even when he is perfectly 
aware of the dire consequences that it will entail*
Pirandello considers instinct an acid which corrodes 
the best that life possesses.46
Once man has succumbed to an instinct, he must recognize it 
henceforth as a part of his real ego, his face* This is ugly, and in 
order to hide his ugliness, he assumes a mask of dignity, a mask 
which hides his instincts* Immediately the confusion begins. To 
him the mask has one meaning, to his friends another. In this 
confusion of masks, the face becomes increasingly elusive* Presently 
its outlines begin to soften; eventually, they disappear completely.
44ibid., p. 82 f.
45vittorini, oj>. cit* * p. 90. 
^Ibid* * p. 32.
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"Over-intellectual people" are particularly susceptible to the malady 
of the "dissolving ego," for they are the ones who, in enlarging the 
boundary and scope of their lives, "fall prey to intellectual compli­
cations and to artificiality."
Their inner life is a place that fears light, since 
terrible shames are hidden there. Since they are 
compelled to go among men and they want to appear 
decent and even heroic, they hide themselves behind 
a fictitious personality that expresses itself with 
exalted gestures and idealistic words.47
Presently the "fictitious personality" becomes confused with
the real. All universal solids disappear, and we are faced with not
one but many personalities, all equally true, all equally false.
With eager earnestness and passionate conviction he 
(Pirandello) points out that we grow up in the belief 
that we are one, a definite individual, with a clear- 
cut contour, with definite qualities, with a personal­
ity. Life proves that we are not, that in reality this 
subjectiveness of man's perceptions create in ua as 
many-faceted persons as are Individuals who look at 
or know us. Closed in his subjectiveness, roan inter­
prets the acts of others according to his own ideas 
of human behavior. The result is an inconsnunicability.48
In fine then, Pirandello sees all truth as relative, with "as
many aspects as there are thinking beings,"49 but this very relativity
of truth forces us to assume masks of our own devising, masks that
will bring us closer to the truth as we wish to see it. Moreover, it
also compels us to take on masks which have been projected by the
47ibid.. p. 91. 
48lbld.. p. 30. 
49lbid.. p. 34.
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truth as seen by other individuals* In this process of masking and 
remasking, what personality we might have had is first splintered 
and then obscured entirely* Ultimately, we are faced with the follow­
ing impasse: truth is relative to the individual, but the individual
is not likely to exist at all* Hence truth is but an illusion, and 
reality consists of nothing but the continuum of illusions* Man and 
the world he lives in are nothingness.
Pirandello has often been referred to, as has Kaiser, as a 
dramatist of ideas, an intellectual playwright* In view of his 
philosophy these labels seem strangely incongruous. Like other 
pan-psychic playwrights, Pirandello's thinking may be involved but 
it is essentially irrational. In fact, it is difficult to disagree 
with Vittorini's judgment in this matter.
It is strange that Pirandello should have been called 
an abstruse and cerebral author* Ultimately, there is 
a strong anti-intellectual trend in his thought*50
As would be expected from his relativism and from his concern
with the face and the mask, Pirandello's primary dramatic problem
was devising some means of presenting and contrasting points of
view. Actually, aside from his early naturalistic plays, almost
all his plays address themselves to the rendering of one or more
viewpoints of a central "reality." His many experiments with point
of view include a great variety of approaches* In Henry IV Pirandello
uses a technique reminiscient of Kaiser* Interestingly enough, the
^®Clark and Freedley, ojj. cit.* p. 366.
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structural pattern Is actually reversed. We enter the play from 
the viewpoint of Henry IV and only gradually do we come to realize 
that the play is not an historical romance. Once the playwright has 
made us aware of the existence of other viewpoints, he proceeds to 
blend and contrast these points of view until the spectator has some 
difficulty in determining which way lies sanity and which madness. 
This is exactly Pirandello's point and his reversal of Kaiser's 
structure emphasizes the previously discussed philosophic difference 
between the two playwrights. To Kaiser there are always two possible 
points of view— that of society and that of the individual. Which­
ever one a given man possesses, he has, at any rate, something 
relatively tangible. To Pirandello there are, in the final analysis, 
no points of view. At best, man can only be aware of his existence 
in the ever-changing present. At worse, he can even lose this 
awareness by thinking too deeply on the matter, for even his immedi­
ate perception as an illusion compounded of a maze of masks and 
faces. Any close consideration of his existence will cause the whole 
complicated edifice of illusions to disintegrate, thus leaving the 
individual ego-less. Pirandello cannot but begin with a given point 
of view and end with nothingness. To reverse this pattern, to use a 
structure like Kaiser's, would argue for man's ability to build a 
solid point of view, a real face for himself.
Another variation of Pirandello's concern with conflicting 
viewpoints which ultimately rest only on illusion is the play Right 
You Are! (If You Think You Are). In this little comedy the opposing
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points of view of a young clerk and his mother-in-law are presented
to a group of townspeople as to a jury* The clerk claims that his
mother-in-law is insane, for she believes that his present wife is
her daughter, while in reality her daughter has died and the clerk's
present wife is his second wife. Hie mother-in-law tells a different
tale. Hie clerk is insane, for he believes that his wife is his
second wife, whereas she is actually his first wife but recently
returned to him after a long illness. Son-in-law, mother-in-law,
and wife are finally brought together in an obligatory scene. When
asked whom she truly is, the wife replies:
The truth? Simply this: I am the daughter of Signora
Flora.•.and the second wife of Signor Ponza...and, for 
myself, I am nobody....I am she whom you believe me to 
be.
Right You Are is a play about points of view, not a rendering of 
points of view. In its general trappings it is, to all extents and 
purposes, an Extemalistlc drama. There is no attempt to directly 
present inner thoughts or "soul states," and all information comes 
to the audience through objective dialogue and action. Only at the 
very end of the play is any sort of symbolism introduced, and when 
the symbol does appear— the veiled figure of the wife— it is direct 
and straight-forward. Throughout the play there is a sense that the 
little mystery will be solved, but the unusual twist waiting at the 
end is as carefully prepared for as any resolution in Ibsen. From 
the beginning, Laudisi, acting as the author's agent, reiterates 
again and again the point of the play: all truth is relative to the
viewer and his viewpoint. When the wife appears in her heavy veils,
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the audience should have little trouble in anticipating what she 
will eventually say.
Perhaps the most famous of Pirandello's experiments with point 
of view is Six Characters in Search of an Author, It is in this piece 
that he first attempts the structural method which was to make him 
famous— -the mixture of a play on stage with life beyond the proscenium. 
In his play-as-life; life-as-play form, Pirandello was to make his 
most perfect statement of his own relativism and to solve to his 
satisfaction the problem of presenting points of view. In all, 
Pirandello was to write three plays which made use of what he called 
the "theatre in the theatre" structure. Six Characters appeared in 
1921, Each in His Own Way in 1924, Tonight We Improvise in 1930, Of 
the trilogy, Six Characters is the first and certainly the most 
striking.
In terms of simple plot, Six Characters has at once one of the 
slightest and the most confusing plots in dramatic literature. A 
group of actors who are rehearsing a play are surprised by the 
appearance of six unusual people who claim to be dramatic characters 
in search of an author to write their story. They persuade the direc­
tor of the company to act as author and they agree to present their 
story for him. The story, in its entirety, never gets told. There 
is, instead, a great deal of discussion of the actual roles of each 
of the characters, and in the process of this discussion, the audience 
gathers enough Information to piece together a lurid tale of adultery 
and incest. It is obvious, however, that the story of the six
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characters Is not the Important point of the play* As Pirandello 
himself said in the preface to Six Characters. he rejected the six 
people not for themselves "but for their drama, which doubtless is 
what interests them above all but which did not interest me,"'** What 
does interest Pirandello is the interplay of viewpoints, the inter­
play of viewpoints between one imaginary character and another, and 
the interplay of viewpoints between the imaginary characters and the 
flesh and blood actors. Thus the story of the six characters serves 
only as a factor which draws out and demonstrates various points of 
view. As the play progresses and the facts of the story are dis­
cussed and argued, the playwright takes advantage of this opportunity 
to compare received reality with a known illusion, the illusion of a 
work of dramatic art. Thus the discussions between character and 
character, between director and character, between director and actor, 
and between actor and fictitious character bring one always closer 
and closer to the ultimate question of the work: who can truly be
said to have an actual point of view, who has a truer reality— the 
fictitious character or the living person?
To present this question and to trace out its many implications, 
Pirandello must first establish the existence of the six characters. 
This he does in Act One in the most ingenious way. When the Director 
scoffs at the Father because he claims to be a living character, the 
Father turns the Director's own profession into a telling argument.
■^Eric Bentley, Ed., Naked Masks: Five Plays by Luigi 
Pirandello (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), p. 368.
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FATHER. I marvel at your Incredulity, gentlemen. Are 
you not accustomed to see the creatures created by 
an author spring to life in yourselves and face 
each other? Just because there is no 'book' which 
contains us, you refuse to believe....
DAUGHTER. Believe me, we are really six most interesting 
characters, sir; side-tracked, however.
FATHER. YesJ That is the wordi In that sense, that is, 
that the author who created us alive no longer wished, 
or was no longer able, materially to put us into a 
work of art. And this was a real crime, sir, because 
he who has had the luck to be b o m  a character can 
even laugh at death. He cannot die. The man, the 
writer, the Instrument of the creation will die, but 
his creation will not. And to live forever, it does 
not need to have extraordinary gifts to be able to 
work wonders. Who was Sancho Panza? Who was Don 
Abbondie? Yet they live etemally-because— live 
germs that they were— they had the fortune to find 
a fecundating matrix, a fantasy which would raise 
and nourish them: make them live forever.
MANAGER. That is quite all right. But what do you want 
here, all of you?
FATHER. We want to live.
MANAGER. For eternity?
FATHER. No, sir, only for a moment...in you.
Persuading the Director that they do exist and that, through 
the medium of the stage it is possible for them "to live," the 
characters begin to tell him their story. Almost at once they have 
difficulty presenting a coherent account, since each begins quarrel­
ing with the other about the true nature of the facts. Confusion 
mounts, and presently it is apparent that there are as many stories 
as there are characters. Tiro points of view— those of the Step- 
Daughter and the Father— are, however, presented more forcefully 
than the others.
The Step-Daughter maintains that all the woes of the family are 
to be charged to the Father. His original sin was the sending of his 
wife to another man, the father of the Step-Daughter. This act of 
the Father's began a chain of events which ultimately reduced the
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Step-Daughter to prostitution. It was while she was pursuing this 
profession that she very nearly committed incest with the Father. 
According to her point of view, the near-incestuous act was the 
Inevitable result of the Father's original rejection of the Mother.
In this manner she disclaims all guilt, and she feels that the 
Father*s incest is a revenge to which she is justly due.
On the other hand, the Father argues that what happened between 
him and the Step-Daughter was an accident. It grew out of an 
unfortunate moral lapse during which he yielded to the Impulses of 
his "miserable flesh." In doing so, he was not to be particularly 
blamed, for he was acting no differently from any other man who 
"knows what unconfessable things pass within the secrecy of his 
own heart."
One gives way to temptation, only to rise from it again, 
afterwards, with a great eagerness to re-establish one's 
dignity....Everybody's in the same case. Some folks 
haven't the courage to say certain things, that's all.
But, argues the Father, this lapse of the flesh had nothing
to do with his relation with the girl or her mother. To begin with,
he did not know that she was his step-daughter. Moreover, it was her
father, not he, who did not provide her with better financial support.
As for her mother, he meant "to do good to" her by sending her away.
She was in love with his secretary, and when the young man was sent
away, she drifted "forlornly about the house like an animal without
a master." Thus, to relieve both him and her, he sent his wife to
her young lover.
When the Daughter takes issue with the Father's view of the
facts, the older man retaliates with these words:
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But don't you see that the whole trouble lies here* In 
words, words* Each of us has In him a whole world of 
things, each man his own special world, and how can we ever 
come to an understanding If I put In the words I utter 
the sense and value of things as I see them; while you 
who listen to me must Inevitably translate them accord­
ing to the conception of things each of you has within 
himself. We think we understand each other, but we 
never really do*
With this argument, the Father sums up the position of the six
characters. Ihey exist because an author has conceived them, but
since he has placed them in no story, given them no definite role,
they have no actual life* As yet they are but creatures of one
another's point of view. Moreover, none of them is actually
pleased with the role which the others expect him to play* This
situation is crystallized in the persons of the Father and the
Step-Daughter* Both feel that they have a certain reality which the
other will not grant them. In addition both resent the mask, the
external reality, which the one wishes the other to wear* As the
Father puts it: "the drama lies all in this— in the conscience that
I have, that each one of us has."
We believe this conscience to be a single thing, but is 
is many sided* There is one for this person, and another 
for that* Diverse consciences* So we have this illusion 
of being one person for all, of having a personality that 
is unique in all our acts. But it isn't true* We per­
ceive then when, tragically perhaps, in something we do, 
we are as it were, suspended, caught up in the air on a 
kind of hook. Then we perceive that all of us was not 
in the act, and that it would be an atrocious injustice 
to judge us by that action alone, as if all our existence 
were summed up in one deed* Now do you understand the 
perfidy of this girl? She surprised me in a place, where 
she ought not to have known me, just as I could not exist 
for her; and now she seeks to attach me to a reality such 
..as I could never suppose I should have to assume for her 
in a shameful and fleeting moment of my life*
179
The Step-Daughter will have none of this philosophizing, 
whereas the Son contemptuously refers to the whole matter as "Litera­
ture] Literature]" But the Father understands the situation better 
than the Son. "Literature indeed] This is life, this is passion]" 
Considering the position of the six characters at this moment, the 
Father is quite right. In their present situation, without the 
support of a story, a form which stands fixed beyond space and time, 
they are no different from the actors and the Director. The charac­
ters are but the baseless fabric of internal and external illusion.
As they now exist, they are, at core, mutable and meaningless. In 
short, they are living. This fact seems to contradict their earlier 
plea for "life," but little reflection is needed to recognize that 
Pirandello is making a cruel pun. For to live as the six characters 
wish to live is to exist not as a human being, but as a fixed and 
immutable ego. What they ask is life in the biblical sense, eternal 
and unchangeable* To have life in a story would be to have, as 
Pirandello sees it, a "raison d'etre." the very thing which "living" 
humans lack.
Every creature of fantasy and art, in order to exist, 
must have his drama, that is, a drama in which he may 
be a character and for which he is a character. This 
drama is the character's raison d'etre, his vital 
function, necessary for his existence.52
In short, every character in a drama has life because he has a fixed
point of view and a fixed world within which to exercise that point of
view. The viewpoint may be simple or complex, but it is, nevertheless,
always rounded and complete.
52Ibld.. p. 368.
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This then is the situation as the first act ends. The six 
characters exist but they do not "live." Until their story is set 
they are no different from any other human being. In the second act, 
the manager allows the Father and the Step-Daughter to act out their 
much discussed scene, thereby giving them "life" and ending forever 
any discussion of the matter. It is during the course of Act Two 
that the differences between art and human life are presented and 
discussed thoroughly. Throughout Act One, the emphasis was on living 
as human's live, on life in space and time, on life with its many 
points of view, its many faces and masks. Act Ttoo begins to weave 
a pattern of contrast between temporal life and the life of art. 
Throughout, the question of reality and illusion is presented through 
the art-life paradox.
To begin with, both the Father and the Daughter find that the 
actors who have their parts are not giving a true rendering of them­
selves. The Father wishes to see in the actors "our temperaments, 
our s o u l s T o  this the Director replies, "your soul, or whatever 
you call it takes shape here. The actors give the body and form to 
it, voice and gesture." In other words, to achieve reality in an 
art form, the character must lose his reality as a human, for his 
soul is no longer the subjective elusive human spirit. It is to be 
henceforth fixed and objectified, not by means of its own chosing, 
but by the factors of the art form.
The Step-Daughter also shares her Step-Father's reservations 
about entering the realm of art. She insists on "truth." She wishes 
the actress to remove her frock.
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MANAGER. GreatJ Just what we want, to make a riot in
the theatre.'
DAUGHTER. But it's the truthi
MANAGER. What does that matter? Acting is our business 
here. Truth up to a certain point, but no further.
But beyond the physical truth, the Step-Daughter wants above all else
not to allow the Father to turn the play into his own "cerebral
drama." She wants to be a character in the scene as she sees it, not
a character in the scene as projected through the Father's point of
view. Passionately she cries out that she wants "to act my part, my
part111 The Director, however, is quick to point out that "there are
other parts than yours." Her part alone may be life, but it is not
art. As the Manager says:
I am aware of the fact that everyone has his own 
interior life which he wants very much to put forward.
But the difficulty lies in this fact: to set out just
as much as is necessary for the stage, taking the other 
characters into consideration, and at the same time 
hint at the unrevealed interior life of each. I am 
willing to admit, my dear young lady, that from your 
point of view it would be a fine idea if each charac­
ter could tell the public all his troubles in a nice 
monologue or a regular one hour lecture.
With this little speech of the Director's, Pirandello manages to say
three things. First he points out the differences between life and
art. Second, he indicates the difficulties attendent upon presenting
points of view in the play form, and, third, he pokes fun at the very
device which he himself has chosen to use. After all, by allowing
the characters to argue with one another about their different views
of the same story, he has given each an opportunity to tell his
troubles in several nice little monologues.
When the playwright feels that, for the time, enough has been
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said about the art-life paradox, he allows the Father and the Step- 
Daughter to act out their much discussed scene. The two are thus 
given a share of life and the act comes to an end.
Act Ihree is a summary and a demonstration. It begins on the 
same note as the previous act ended. The Step-Daughter again opens 
up the problem of art and life by objecting to the place selected for 
the remaining action of the story.
DAUGHTER. I'm not going to talk anymore now. But I must 
tell you this: you can't have the whole action take
place in the garden, as you suggest. It isn't 
possible.
MANAGER. Why not?
DAUGHTER. Because he (indicates the SON) is always shut up 
in his room. And then there's all the part of that 
poor dazed-looking boy there which takes place indoors.
MANAGER. Maybe] On the other hand, you will understand—  
we can't change scenes three or four times in one act.
This argument brings up the matter of dramatic illusion, but at the
very mention of the word, the Father becomes irritated.
FATHER. The illusion] For heaven's sake don't say 
illusion. Please don't use that word, which is 
particularly painful to us.
MANAGER. Why, if you please?
FATHER. It'8 painful, cruel, really cruel; you ought
to understand that.
MANAGER. But why. What ought we to say then? The
illusion, I tell you, sir, which we've got to
create for the audience...
LEADING MAN. With our acting.
MANAGER. The illusion of reality.
Here Pirandello has at last come to the point of his argument; 
all that has gone before has led to the major question of the play: 
Who has the truer reality, the living man or the dramatic character 
within his drama? The Father proceeds to answer the question in the 
following manner.
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A character, sir, may always ask a man who he Is. Because 
a character has really a life of his own, marked with 
his special characteristics; for which reason he is always 
'somebody,' But a man— I'm not speaking of you now— may 
very well be 'nobody',,,If we have no reality beyond 
illusion, you must not count over much on your own 
reality as you feel it today, since, like that of yester­
day, it may prove an illusion to you tomorrow,,,,Our 
reality doesn't change; it can't change! It cannot 
be other than what it is, because it is already fixed
forever. It's terrible. Ours is an immutable reality
which should make you shudder when you approach us if 
you are really conscious of the fact that your reality 
is a mere transitory and fleeting illusion, taking this 
form today and that tomorrow, according to the conditions 
to your will, your sentiments, which in turn are controlled 
by an intellect that shows them to you today in one manner 
and tomorrow,,.who knows'how?
Thus Pirandello completes his study of points of view, in art 
and in reality, and thus he sums up the points made in the first two 
acts. Kie remainder of the third act is perorative demonstration.
Hie characters continue to act out their story. At a certain point
in the tale, the baby daughter is drowned in a paper mache pond and 
the young Step-Son commits suicide with a prop pistol. The actors 
run to him as he falls, some crying that he is really dead, others 
that it is only pretense. At this point, the Father looses a "terrible 
cry: "Pretense? Reality, sir, reality!" As the curtain falls, the
Director provides the final comment, "Prdtense? Reality? To hell 
with it all!"
And so ends Pirandello's first experiment with the "theatre 
in the theatre" structure, a method that is at the same time a very 
old and a very new device, for in a manner of speaking, Pirandello is 
simply giving a new twist to the ancient technique of a play within a 
play. But Pirandello's twist is undeniably different. Prior usuage
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of the convention was usually confined to making the inner play serve 
as additional emphasis for the outer* It may be used to review a prev­
ious reality, as In Hamlet's play to catch the conscience of the King, 
or it may be used to make further comment on an existing reality, 
as in the dumb shows which introduce the acts of C o r b u d u c . 5 3  Piran­
dello, however, was to use it to confound and reject reality. Be­
ginning as an illusion in contrast to the reality of the actors, the 
play of the six characters finally becomes "truer and more real" 
than the actors themselves. Life is then a mutable illusion; 
dramatic illusion is immutable reality.
In yet a second way can Pirandello's new form be considered 
both old and new. Rehearsal comedies were a great favorite with 
the playwrights of the Restoration and Shakespeare gives the form a 
delightful treatment in the Pyramus and Hiisbe episode of Midsummer 
Night's Dream. But, at the risk of oversimplifying somewhat, we 
may say that the humor of previous rehearsal comedies was drawn from 
the actors or the playwright. Pirandello's uniqueness lies in the 
humor being drawn principally from the interaction of actors with 
imaginary characters who refuse not to exist. And, while it is true 
that the previous rehearsal comedies often invited comparisons between 
drama and life, it was usually drama not life that suffered from the 
comparison.
53An interesting discussion of the various ends to which the 
device of the play within the play can be put is found in Robert J. 
Nelson's Play Within a Play (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.)
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Finally, Pirandello's form is both unusual and traditional in 
that it is both a point-of-view study and an Extemalistic drama. 
Throughout the play the objectivity of the third-person narrative 
is rigidly adhered to. There is nowhere in the play any attempt to 
seek out a conventional means of rendering inner or unspoken thought. 
What can't be told in external dialogue or action is just not told. 
There are, however, two important exceptions to traditional Extemalis­
tic technique. These are the two grotesqueries: the six characters
actually exist and a seventh, Madame Pace, is made to come to life 
simply by creating her proper setting. But the author is at great 
pains in the first act to make the existence of the six fictitious 
characters as acceptable as possible to the audience. This, of 
course, is important, since their very living will ultimately become 
the point of the play.
But it must be granted that Pirandello was not so careful in 
preparing for or explaining away the sudden appearance of Madame 
Pace, and he recognized that her appearance represented something of 
a lapse in his dramaturgy. In his preface to Six Characters. he 
offers the following apology.
Madame Pace is b o m  among the six characters and seems 
a miracle, even a trick, realistically portrayed upon
the stage. It is no trick. The birth is real. The
new character is alive not because she was alive already 
but because she is now happily b o m  as is required by
the fact of her being a character— she is obliged to be
as she is. There is a break here, a sudden change in 
the level of reality of the scene, because a character 
can be b o m  in this way only in the poet's fancy and 
not on the boards of the stage. Without anyone's notic­
ing it, I have all of a sudden changed the scene: I
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have gathered It up again into my own fantasy without 
removing it from the spectator's eyes* lhat is, I 
have shown them, Instead of the stage, my own fantasy 
in the act of creating— my own fantasy in the form of this 
same stage*54
How much like Strindberg's concept of the dreamerJ But one wonders 
if Pirandello is actually successful in thus briefly rendering a 
view of his own creative consciousness? In a sense, of course, 
the whole play is a presentation of the author's creative process, 
but only in the most abstractly symbolic sense that all plays are 
the objectification of their creator's fancy*
In using the methods of Externalistlc dramaturgy, Pirandello 
again does so with a new purpose* His ultimate aim is not to 
represent reality but to refute it* This he does by cleverly turn­
ing the principles of objective drama against objective drama 
itself. By becoming ultrarealistic, that is, by setting the scene 
not on the dressed by the undressed stage, by going behind the 
dramatic illusion and presenting the actors preparing to create it, 
he achieves the best possible contrast between life and the dramatic 
art. In addition, he provides himself with the opportunity to discuss 
illusion in the process of being created* Then too, he also tricks 
the audience into accepting the play as the most basic realism, far 
removed from fantasy. Finally, he proceeds to confuse and distort 
the whole realistic-illusionistic continuum by introducing into this 
very naturalistic situation a group of seven characters who are not 
realliat all* Rius, by using the approach of Externallsm, he gains
-^Bentley, Naked Masks* p* 373*
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not only sharp contrasts, but also, ultimately, considerable ambiguity* 
Moreover, he saw to it that his objectivity did not interfere with 
his presentation of various points of view by carefully conserving 
the facts of his internal play until each of the imaginary charac­
ters had had an opportunity to tell the story as it appeared to him* 
This purely objective and yet basically subjective structural pattern 
gained for Pirandello the best possible statement of his philosophical 
paradox*
And here is the universal meaning at first vainly sought in 
the six characters**.without wanting to, without knowing 
it, in the strife of their bedeviled souls, each of them, 
defending himself against the accusations of the others, 
expresses as his own living passion and torment the 
passion and torment which for so many years have been 
the pangs of my spirit: the deceit of mutual under­
standing founded on the empty abstraction of the words, 
the multiple personality of everyone corresponding to 
the possibilities of being to be found in each of us, 
and finally the inherent tragic conflict of life (which 
is always moving and changing) and form (which fixes it, 
immutable). 55
Pirandello's selection of the "theatre in the theatre" form is 
a clear demonstration of his superiority as a playwright, for it is, 
in fact, the only structural organization which would completely state 
his total philosophy* Such purely Externalistlc plays as Right You 
Are can only be plays about point of view* As Raymond Williams 
indicates, Right You Are,is, at best, "an entertaining trick comedy." 
In it, Pirandello "does not create so much an authentically complex 
situation, by which the shallowness of commonplace judgments may be
^Bentley, Naked Masks, p. 367.
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revealed, as a deliberate (and brilliant) theatrical exception.
Once Pirandello had constructed his "theatre in the theatre" pattern, 
however, he had in his possession a tool which enabled him to present 
rather than relate differing viewpoints. Thus, the story in Six 
Characters is not a mystery to be solved, as in Right You Are, or a 
madness to be cured as in Henry IV. but rather the story remains, 
as the Father says, "in us," in the characters. It is still where it 
rightfully belongs, in the points of view of each of the participants. 
Consequently, it can be told only through the differing insights of 
the characters, and appropriate comparisons and contrasts can be made 
as the story unfolds. In addition, since the story does not yet 
exist, the emphasis can be placed not on the factual complications, but 
on the subjective variations of those who tell it. Finally, when 
certain portions of the story do exist in a completed form, the 
playwright is then free to contrast this immutable form, these 
frozen points of view, with the fugitiveness of life and the uncer­
tainty of human perception. In brief, Six Characters is a study in—  
not about— points of view.
A final achievement of Pirandello's new form was the solution 
which it offered to another major and related problem of pan-psychic 
drama, the problem of eliminating the intrusion of the proscenium 
arch. Evreinov had attempted to neutralize the effect of the pros­
cenium arch by using point of view as a device for bringing the 
spectator to the stage. Pirandello attacked the problem from the
■Williams, o£. cit.. p. 192.
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rear. If it were difficult to bring the audience to the stage, why 
not bring the stage to the audience? Ihis is exactly what he did in 
Six Characters. By placing his action on the bare rehearsal stage, he 
eliminated all those theatrical trappings which call attention to 
the difference between the auditorium and the stage. Over and above 
this initial selection of locale, every attempt is made throughout 
the play to make the audience feel that they have merely happened in 
at a rehearsal and that at any time they are free to interrupt the 
proceedings or to leave if they are bored. As the opening stage 
direction states, the audience enters to see a bare stage so that 
"from the beginning they may have the impression of an impromptu 
performance." The curtain is open as the audience walks in, and 
the first act ends without a curtain. It is marked simply by the 
major characters' vacation of the stage in order to arrange a 
scenario. The second act ends in a curtain which a stagehand lowers 
by mistake. Thus, the presence of the proscenium is neutralized not 
because the audience feels that they are on stage, but because they 
have the impression that since this is a rehearsal no formal barrier 
has as yet been set up between the stage and the auditorium.
Therefore, the "theatre in the theatre" structure not only 
provided the playwright with a means of presenting the various points 
of view of his characters and with a method of intermingling art with 
life by eliminating the major division between art and life— -the 
proscenium arch, but it also permitted him to demonstrate that art by 
being the only reality and that life by being only illusion prove
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conclusively that the fate of the human ego Is to discover that It Is 
but an ever more entangled web of fantasies destined to ultimate 
destruction, whereas the ego of an Imaginary character is a fixed, 
eternal thing. Pirandello proved this postulate to his own satis­
faction by contrasting the viewpoints of the six fictitious charac­
ters, viewpoints which will remain until the end of time, with the 
points of view of the actors, the director, and by implication, the 
audience, points of view that are ever-changing, ever creating new 
illusions and destroying the old.
Hence, the problem presented by Strindberg and Evrelnov was 
taken up by both Pirandello and Kaiser. To them the rendering of 
an Individual's point of view meant not only presenting its imminent 
manifestations but also suggesting its probable end. Both play­
wrights felt that a relativism which assumed that the truth resided 
in the individual viewpoint must also assume that the very existence 
of that viewpoint Implied its destruction. To Kaiser, the individual 
ego was doomed because it was committed to an unequal struggle with 
the group ego of an evil society. To Pirandello, the private ego 
carried within itself its own seeds of destruction. The Pirandel- 
lian ego, because it did not agree with the viewpoints of others, 
was forced to assume a mask that brought it closer to external 
reality and to the viewpoints of others. As these external view­
points multiplied, so did the masks. Moreover, the original masks 
were prone to change and become only illusions of masks as alien view­
points changed. Somewhere in this maze of masks and faces, the
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original face (if there ever was one) becomes lost or suffocated.
Thus, as the masks dissolve, so also does the total personality, 
carrying with it to destruction the dead or dying face.
As a container for his point-of-view study, Kaiser made use 
of the "station drama," a form which juxtaposes several short scenes 
united only by the consistency of theme and central character. In 
each scene he contrasted the viewpoint of society with that of the 
individual, moving always towards complete projection of the action 
through the eyes of the central character. Pirandello, on the other 
hand, sought to make his statement in the "theatre in the theatre" form, 
a structural framework which allowed him to contrast various view­
points as flesh and blood actors and imaginary characters passed 
freely from the rehearsal stage to the play with the play. Kaiser's 
experiments were later to be tried with some success by Eugene 
O'Neill in such plays as The Hairy Ape; an interesting variation on 
a pattern similar to Pirandello's is Andre Gide's The Counterfeiters, 
which contains a novel within a novel, within a novel.
The two playwrights invite one final comparison. Kaiser tended 
to make strong use of devices which had fallen into ill repute with 
the extemalistic school. In particular, he made frequent use of the 
monologue as a means of rendering inner thought. Pirandello repre­
sents a different trend in the pan-psychic movement. He attempts, 
whenever possible, to correlate his techniques with those of the 
Externalists. When he feels the need, he will not hesitate to use 
grotesque elements, such as the six characters themselves, but his 
general tendency is to remain with the extemalistic framework.
CHAPTER FIVE
ATTACKING THE PROBLEM BY THE REINTRODUCTION OF OLDER TECHNIQUES 
O'NEIL AND GIRAUDOUX USE OLD MEANS TO A NEW END
I
O'Neill: Strange Interlude
The new movements in European drama were slow to cross the 
Atlantic. During the time when Ibsen was producing his new symbolic 
dramas, when "free theatres" were springing up in London, Paris,
Berlin and Moscow, the emotional scope of America was, in the words of 
Richard Skinner, "almost equivalent to that of a highly developed 
vegetable."* Prior to 1915, the American stage could hardly offer 
any comparison to that of Europe. Clearly, the realism of Belasco 
and the efforts of such part-time playwrights as Langdon Mitchell and 
William Vaughan Moody could not be equated with or judged by the 
standards used to evaluate the work of Brahm, Antoine, Stanislavski 
and the host of extemalistic and pan-psychic playwrights who were 
quickly becoming known as masters in their own lifetime. In 1915, 
however, the tide began to turn. Nineteen-fifteen was, according to 
MacGowan and Melnitz, "that crucial year," for it was at that time that
*Richard Danna Skinner, Eugene O'Neill» A Poet's Quest (New 
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 12.
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the Provincetown Players began to produce the work of Eugene O'Neill."^ 
Within ten years, the seed first planted in that tiny playhouse had 
grown and borne fruit in abundance, and by 1924 O'Neill reigned 
supreme as the outstanding playwright of the New York stage and 
America's first dramatic genius. Moreover, by 1924 it was America's 
turn to be smug. Not only did it have a modern drama, but it also 
had perhaps the world's greatest practicing dramatist, for by this 
time the "trend had shifted" and "coincident with the improvement of 
the American product, the European drama began to fade."^
Thus, O'Neill came at the end of a period, and, as might be 
expected, he could hardly help but be eclectic. Certain of his exper­
iences tended to heighten his eclecticism. He came of a theatre 
family and had even toured as a bit actor in his father's perennially 
successful production of The Count of Monte Cristo. He had been the 
victim of a serious physical breakdown, and while recuperating during 
the winter of 1912-13, he "read just about everything I could get my 
hands on: the Greeks, the Elizabethans--practically all the classics—
and of course all the modems. Ibsen and Strindberg, especially 
Strindberg."^ Like many intellectuals of his time, he also read and
^MacGowan and Melnitz, oj>. cit.. p. 427.
^Edwin A. Engel, The Haunted Heroes of Eugene O'Neill (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 301.
^Barrett H. Clark, Eugene O'Neill, The Man and His Plays (New 
York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1936), p. 35.
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expected, he could hardly help but be eclectic. Certain of his exper­
iences tended to heighten his eclecticism. He came of a theatre 
family and had even toured as a bit actor in his father's perennially 
successful production of The Count of Monte Cristo. He had been the 
victim of a serious physical breakdown, and while recuperating during 
the winter of 1912-13, he "read just about everything I could get my 
hands on: the Greeks, the Elizabethans--practically all the classics—
and of course all the modems. Ibsen and Strindberg, especially 
Strindberg."^ Like many intellectuals of his time, he also read and
^MacGowan and Melnitz, o j j . cit.. p. 427.
^Edwin A. Engel, The Haunted Heroes of Eugene O'Neill (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 301.
^Barrett H. Clark, Eugene O'Neill. The Man and His Plays (New 
York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1936), p. 35.
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respected Nietzsche. Clark describes his going to rehearsal one day 
with a worn copy of The Birth of Tragedy stuffed into his coat 
pocket.*’ O'Neill had also done his share of thinking about the new 
psychology and about the theories of Freud and Jung. His attitude 
toward the latter was one of esteem with reservations. To him Jung 
was "the only one of the lot which interests me." Some of the 
psychologist's suggestions were "extraordinarily illuminating" to 
O'Neill, but in the final analysis Jung was "no deep student of 
psychoanalysis.
Hence, O'Neill was heir to a wide range of theatrical, philo­
sophical, and psychological thought and practice, and at one time or 
another he was to make use of it all. His background led him into 
an eclecticism which found him by turns a realistic, a symbolic, a 
naturalistic and an expressionistic playwright. His revolt against 
the type of romantic drama which had made his father's fortune and 
ruined his career as an artist caused O'Neill to turn first to Exter- 
nalism. But the man who felt that Strindberg was "the precursor of 
modernity in the theatre"? was not long in realizing that his bent 
lay in Pan-psychism. As Skinner points out, O'Neill has always been 
the "poet of the individual."
^Ibid., p. 4.
^Engel, oj>• cit., p. 81 f.
?Ibid., p . 83.
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But with O'Neill, the problem of the individual as a soul 
in distress or torment has been clearly supreme. It is 
the individual's rebellion against the mass, or his abject 
surrender to it that counts, rather than the action of 
the individual as representing the m a s s .8
Consequently, by 1920, O'Neill had turned from pure Extemalism 
and had completed his first point-of-view study and one of his finest 
plays, The Emperor Jones. The play probably has its roots in Strind­
berg's dream form, but its general station drama structure is clearly 
comparable to Kaiser's From Horn to Midnight. The same observation 
may be made of The Hairy Ape which was written the following year.
Both plays employ not only the station drama form but also the 
Kaiserian device of shifting from the universal to the individual 
point of view. O'Neill was aware of the similarity between his work 
and that of the German playwright, but he vigorously denied having 
been influenced by Kaiser. Jones was written, he claimed, "long 
before I had ever heard of Expressionism." The Hairy Ape, "a direct 
descendant of Jones," was planned before he had read From Morn to Mid­
night. which was a play he "did not think much of."^ Whether O'Neill 
was influenced unconsciously by Kaiser, or whether the two playwrights 
developed along parallel lines, there is no denying that their struc­
tural methods mirror one another. One of the most important resem­
blances was the propensity of both dramatists to use visual elements, 
scenery, lighting, properties, as a means of suggesting the central
^Skinner, oj>. cit.. p. 9.
9
Clark, oj>. cit.. p. 125.
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character'8 point of view. This technique was, of course, strongly 
championed by Evreinov and Meyerhold, but O'Neill was to develop it 
and rely on it to a degree hardly hoped for by the Russians.
Throughout the period of his pan-psychic experimentation—  
that is, from 1920 to 1930— O'Neil continued to try various juxta­
positions of the visual and oral elements of the theatre in search 
of the best means of depicting the point-of-view of a given individual. 
In 1925, for instance, his continued interest in visual statement led 
him to reintroduce the mask into the modem theatre. Just how 
important he felt this innovation to be to the writer of point of 
view studies can be seen from his statement that the mask was "the 
freest possible solution to the modem dramatist's problem as to how—  
with the greatest possible dramatic clarity and economy of means— he 
can express those profound hidden conflicts of the mind which the 
probings of psychology continue to disclose to use."10
O'Neill's use of the mask as a dramatic convention reflected 
not only his originality in terms of dramatic invention, but also an 
important development in the playwright's underlying philosophy. As 
we have already noted, O'Neill's masters were Nietzsche and Strindberg, 
and consequently he was b o m  into the new relativism and the new 
Dionysianism with certain aspects,of his philosophy ready-made. As 
Winther has observed:
i
*®Engel, o£. cit.. p. 93.
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In O'Neill's plays the 'good' is never a fixed quantity 
to which an action can be referred, measured and evaluated.
The 'good' is never the same. It changes with changing 
actions, is relative to each new situation.^
In addition to this relativism, there is in O'Neill a total "yea-
saying to life."
There is in him, as in Nietzsche, an almost savage will to 
power, a will to live life to its fullest with all its 
tragedy and sorrow, a will to face it with insult and 
scorn, scorn and insult flung with vengeance and hate 
against the brutal tyranny of the past.*2
For a time O'Neill was content to develop and explore the 
basic ideas of his masters. His relativism was just that. It was 
sometime before it occurred to O'Neill to draw any conclusions from 
relativism beyond that of presenting life in terms of individual 
lives. To the individual who has been cut off by modem thought and 
science from any universal values, from any sense of spirituality in 
a universal godhead, O'Neill could offer only the Nictzschean solution 
of a new paganism, a new Dionysianism founded on the needs and truth 
of the individual being. However, his sense of naturalistic deter­
minism, which is so sharply exemplified in Brutus Jones's inability to 
escape the heritage of his race, was sooner or later to force him to 
reason his relativism through to some sort of conslusion.
His first conclusion is much the same as Kaiser's: the all-
important individual ego is doomed to destruction because it is at war
H-Sophus Keith Winther, Eugene O'Neill. A Critical Study (New 
York: Random House, 1934), p. 121.
12Ibid.. p. 81.
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with overpowering forces over which it has no control. These forces 
are those of a crass and industrialized society. Thus, Yank can 
shout and strike at the puppets who walk Fifth Avenue, but in the end 
it is they who triumph and Yank is destroyed. In this unequal struggle, 
Kaiser saw hope in the social reformer; O'Neill looked to salvation in 
a new paganism. But "having sojourned to the Dionysian depths in 
Desire Under the Elms. O'Neill emerged, never to find his way back
again."13
O'Neill, having lost faith in the Nietzschean ideal, began to 
feel that there was no hope at all for the triumph of the individual 
because the evil lay more within than without. The source of the 
trouble lay in man's own romantic imagination. Like the crowds who 
flocked to see the impossible dream of his father's production of 
Monte Cristo. each man sought some escape from reality in a world of 
dreams and ideals. Hence, man's tragedy was grounded in his need for 
his dream and in his refusal to see that there was nothing he could do 
to force nature to give his dream reality. Thus, though Ponce de Leon 
goes in quest of love and fame, Marco Polo of power, and Lazarus of 
life eternal, all are to be disappointed, not because their dreams are 
bad but because they are impossible. Just as the crowds at Monte 
Cristo are not able to buy any more than a few moments of illusion for 
the price of a theatre ticket, so each man is doomed to discover that 
no matter how lofty his ideal, it is but a theatrical trick, an
l^Engel, o£. cit.. p. 135.
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Illusion.
This discovery comes hard to man, and when the truth does come 
it is usually too bitter to face. After all, his life has been 
supported by his dreams just as his dreams have been supported by 
his life. Hence, to hide his disappointments, man manufactures new 
illusions which he presents to himself and to the world as a replace­
ment for the old. Such is the way of Dion, the Dreamer of The Great 
God Brown, who wears a mask of Pan as a shield against the reality of 
the world as conceived by Brown. In short, man's dream is both his 
greatness and his weakness. The cheapest escapism and the supreme 
achievements of humanity grow out of the same romantic ideals, but 
no matter what form they take, they ultimately divide man against him­
self, make him confuse illusion with reality, and carry him to des­
truction. As Dr. Darrell says in Strange Interlude:
Romantic imaginationI It has ruined more lives than all 
the diseases! Other diseases, I should say! It's a form 
of insanity.
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that O'Neill's mat­
uring thought was drawing him closer to the conclusions of Pirandello: 
man is destroyed because he begins by attempting to adjust reality to 
his private dream and ends by so compounding dream and reality that 
his ego is first split and then destroyed. Pirandello wrote plays 
in which his characters talked about the masks and faces which they 
elected or were forced to wear; O'Neill, with his strong sense of 
the theatre-visual, had the characters actually wear masks in The Great 
God Brown. What had been metaphor to Pirandello became icon for O'Neill.
As O'Neill drew abreast of Pirandello philosophically, he also 
began to resemble the Italian playwright in other matters besides the 
use of masks. The tendency towards striking a compromise between 
realistic and non-rcalistic elements, a tendency which was observable 
in Pirandello,-becomes a marked characteristic of the later work of 
O'Neill. In 1926, O'Neill completed the final draft of Lazarus 
Laughed, the last of his "pageant dramas." In the same year he began 
work on a far more significant drama, Strange Interlude, a play which 
marks the end of a long period of pan-psychic experimentation which 
began with the writing of The Emperor Jones. In two important ways, 
Strange Interlude is a very Pirandellian work. First, like Six 
Characters. it is, after a manner, built as a play within a play. The 
two separate plays are the play which takes place on the external 
level and that which takes place by virtue of the interaction of the 
internal thoughts of each of the characters. Secondly, like Piran­
dello, O'Neill distorts the techniques of Extemalism only so far 
as is necessary to make his point. Hence, the play on the external 
level is as realistic as any of the social dramas of Ibsen, and, 
interestingly enough, could, with very little adaptation, make a 
perfectly coherent and reasonably playable piece in itself. Thus, 
like Pirandello, O'Neill is not adverse to using every possible drama­
turgic device of Extemalism. Such resemblances as the two play­
wrights bear to one another is hardly coincidental; they can be 
traced to the previously mentioned philosophical similarities. This 
is not to say that O'Neill's thinking was directly influenced by
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Pirandello, for he may well have evolved his conclusions independently.
Whatever the process, the American playwright was ultimately to see
life in much the same terms as the Italian did. In an article in
the American Spectator, O'Neill was to say:
One's outer life passes in a solitude haunted by the masks 
of others; one's inner life passes in a solitude hounded 
by the masks of oneself.
Thus, both playwrights resorted to some variation of the play 
within the play in order to present the impossible problem of defin­
ing ultimate reality in terms of the private, subjective vision, and 
both made use of the techniques of Extemalism as a means of throwing 
into sharp relief their presentation of the individual's point of 
view. With such similarity in both ideals and aims, one wonders why 
O'Neill did not arrive at a final solution identical to that of 
Pirandello?
There are several good reasons. First James Joyce's Ulysses 
had appeared in 1922, the year after Pirandello first formulated his 
new method. The interior monologue, as presented by Joyce, had by 
1927 become popularized in the novels of Waldo Frank, Sherwood Ander­
son, and Conrad Aiken. Thus, O'Neil had before him the new technique 
of the novel as a guide towards his own use of asides and soliloquies. 
The new novel technique, however, must be accorded its influence on 
O'Neill with some reservation. Although George Jean Nathan character­
ized Strange Interlude as a "combination of the method of the novel
^^Winther, o£. cit.. p. 276.
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and that of the d r a m a , t h e r e  is no reason to assume that O'Neill 
was making dramatic hay in the novel's sunshine. To the contrary, 
any assumption that O'Neill was imitating Joyce's technique seems 
rash and unfounded in light of the general developments in 'modem 
drama and in view of O'Neill's own theatrical background. As 
Engel points out, "O'Neill seems to have combined the technique of 
Overtones with that of The Adding Machine."^6 The first was written 
in 1913, the second was Elmer Rice's 1923 success. Both plays are
examples of the growing American interest in subjective points of
view. Whether Engel's observation about O'Neill's immediate dramatic 
examples is demonstratably true or not is questionable, but it does
suggest the important fact that O'Neill's major influences come
much more directly from the theatre than from the novel.
And it was O'Neill's theatrical background which provided a 
second cause for his divergence from the methods of Pirandello. 
Although O'Neill and Pirandello both began their careers as external- 
ists, they soon began to follow sharply differing dramatic paths.
When pure Extemalism failed to satisfy him, O'Neill was led into 
decidedly visual experimentation, a course which Pirandello never 
followed. It was through his interest in the visual theatre that 
O'Neill came to have a healthy respect for the so-called "producer's 
theatre," a theatre visual as'well as oral. Pirandello seems to have
l^Engel, o£. cit. p. 200.
16Ibid.. p. 203.
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been an "absolute opponent of the idea."*? it was the producer's 
theatre which probably lured O'Neill Into experimentation with actual 
masks, while Pirandello was content with talk. But strangely enough,
It was also the concepts of MacGowan, the producer, which probably 
brought O'Neill to his particular structural solution in Strange 
Interlude. In The Theatre of Tomorrow, published the year before 
the appearance of Ulysses. MacGowan had cried out that the "soliloquy 
will return again as a natural and proper revelation of the mind of the 
character. Even the aside may redevelop as a deliberate piece of
theatricalism."18
Finally, in addition to the ideas of MacGowan, O.'Neill had his 
own early theatrical experiences to guide him, experiences which 
were not granted to Pirandello. After all, O'Neill had grown up in 
the shadow of The Count of Monte Cristo. and in young manhood had 
even appeared on the stage with that august personage. Consequently, 
he himself had had first hand experience with the effectiveness of the 
old aside and soliloquy. Always a dramatist of the living not the 
printed theatre, O'Neill, once he felt that the mask had not made the 
completest possible statement, not unnaturally returned in Strange 
Interlude to a device which had worked effectively in the past, was 
familiar to him, and was being advocated by his close friend and pro­
ducer, Kenneth MacGowan.
^Williams, o£. cit.. p. 198.
*®Kenneth MacGowan, The Theatre of Tomorrow (New York: Boni
and Liveright Publishers, 1921), p. 243.
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In addition to their differing theatrical traditions, O'Neill 
and Pirandello also were at odds concerning ultimate values. To 
Pirandello, art at least transcended illusion in its immutability; 
O'Neill was not even willing to grant this premise. Art was but 
another mask. Thus Marsden flees from reality in his writing, even 
going so far as to "seduce himself in his novels." But, on the 
other hand, while Pirandello glorified art, O'Neill was to see 
life's hope in the very thing which is its greatest despair-- 
the romantic ideal. Hence in Strange Interlude though each character 
is destroyed by his idealistic dreams, he is also, through these 
same ideals, raised to a certain level of dignity and triumph. Nina 
and Marsden, for instance, have the memory of their afternoons and 
the knowledge that they have created happiness for Sam. Like God, 
then, the romantic ideal both gives and takes away. This is O'Neill's 
so-called hopeless-hope, a kind of triumph in defeat that could 
best be given a subtle treatment only in some sort of contrast between 
the Interior monologue and the external action and dialogue.
In the final analysis, O'Neill is more the Strindbergian than 
the Pirandellian. More exactly, he is the Strindbergian after 
Pirandello. Like his master, O'Neill sees art, life, and dreaming 
all as one, and he sees the romantic ideal as the culmination of all, 
the focus of the pull of opposites, the dispenser of both good and 
evil, which gives to life both its joys and its tragedy. Unlike Strind­
berg, however, O'Neill sees little hope for the individual, who has 
no Indra to return to, and who, Pirandello-like, will be t o m  apart
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by the pull of anti-poles. Because, then, of his Strindbergian 
divergences from Pirandello, because of his particular theatrical 
background, and perhaps because of the trends of the modem novel, 
O'Neill brought to the pan-psychic drama two old devices in a new 
disguise— the asides and the soliloquies of Strange Interlude.
Strange Interlude, as more than one critic has observed, is 
"the play which gives the most complex statement to the destructive 
power of the Romantic i d e a l . E a c h  of the characters stands as 
living proof of the ravages of one or more aspects of romantic 
destruction. Darrell and Marsden are destroyed by their romantic 
devotion to Nina and to their careers, Professor Leeds by his un­
realistic Puritan ideals, Nina by the Gordon myth. Their sickness 
is the modem sickenss; they are victims of the romantic imagination, 
"a form of insanity." Just as each of the characters give.expression 
to O'Neill's theme of the destructiveness of the romantic ideal, so 
too does the structure of Strange Interlude.
As pointed out previously, the romantic ideal creates life 
in terms of faces and masks; it is responsible for Nina's definition 
of life as "a long drawn out lie with a sniffling sigh at the end." 
O'Neill's use of the aside and soliloquy to present various points 
of view allows his structural patterns to depict for us the processes 
by which we turn life into a lie. First, he contrasts the characters' 
interior dialogue with their spoken dialogue to state the most basic 
lie of life: people say one thing and think another. Hence, Dr.
l^Winther; ojj. cit.. p. 32.
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Darrell tells Marsden that at the hospital Nina has been kissing and 
spooning with a number of patients, while to himself he thinks: 
"Spooning...rather a mild word for her affairs...but strong enough 
for this ladylike soul." Recognition of this sort of contradiction 
in life leads Nina to echo the statement of the Father in Six Charac­
ters: "I've suddenly seen the lies in the sounds called words." Words
to Nina are like the "simple platitudes of truth, those Gospel words 
we love the sound of but whose meaning we pass on to spooks to live 
by."
On a second, slightly more complicated level, characters may 
at rare moments say exactly what they think. By coordinating the 
asides and the soliloquies with the external dialogue, O'Neill 
emphasizes this rare occurrence. When characters say exactly what 
they think, they may not be lying themselves but they often upset 
the complacent lies of others. So, when Nina in Act One cries out 
bitterly that she should have--married or unmarried— given herself 
to Gordon the night before he left for war, her father is appalled. 
"Nina."1 he commands sternly, "This is really going too far." More
often than not, however, the shock at seeing another person drop
his mask for a moment remains internal. To express this, O'Neill 
turns again to the aside and the soliloquy. Take, for example, the 
following short scene.
NINA. For playing the silly slut, Charlie. For
giving my cool, clean body to men with hot hands
and greedy eyes which they called love.
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MARSDEN. (thinking with agony) Then she did!...the little 
filth! (in his flat voice) You mean you--(then 
pleadingly) But not— Darrell?
NINA. Ned? No, how could I? The war hand't maimed
him. There would have been no point in that. But 
I did with others— oh, four or five or six or seven 
men, Charlie. I forget— and it doesn't matter. They 
were all the same. Count them all as one, and that 
one a ghost of nothing. That is, to me. They were 
important to themselves, if I remember rightly. But 
I forget.
MARSDEN. (thinking in agony) But why?...the dirty little 
trollop...why?
By using the aside in this manner O'Neill is able to study 
Marsden's shock and anguish, while at the same time freeing himself 
from the problem of making Marsden externalize his thoughts, an action 
which would shift the general tide of the scene and greatly change 
Marsden'8 relationship with Nina.
O'Neill adds texture to his concept of life as lying by intro- 
duing a third and even more complex contradiction into the spoken 
word-hidden thought relationship, the contradiction brought about by 
a deliberate misunderstanding or confusion growing out of the person­
ality of the listener. Hence, when in Act Two, the distraught 
Nina sobbingly tells Marsden, whom she identifies with her late father, 
that he has always been "so kind and comforting! I've wanted you so," 
the love-sick writer thinks to himself: "wanted?...wanted?...not that
kind of wanted...could she mean?"
To O'Neill, then, these three kinds of deception and confusion, 
by themselves and in various simple and intricate combinations, are 
responsible for much of life's bitterness and tragedy. The clashing 
of viewpoints, and the labors of the intelligent to adjust their
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truth to the truth of others, while at the same time championing 
their own romantic ideals, is the burden and misery of life.
At the root of the difficulty of communicating to one another 
is the problem of communicating to oneself. Not only is life a lie 
in terms of our relations with other people, it is also most often 
a lie in terms of our relations with ourselves. Many are the times 
when we distort reality because the illusion is comforting and many 
are the times when we accept a lie through willful or natural 
ignorance. When, for instance, Professor Leeds says of Nina "in 
the present state of her mind the real and the unreal become con­
fused," Marsden recognizes this as a common plight. To himself he 
thinks, "as always in all minds...or how could men live?" O'Neill 
offers a fine example of the individual's deliberate confusion of 
the real and the unreal in the scene at the end of Act Four in which 
Nina seduces Dr. Darrell. Each creates a lie for himself, and each 
uses that lie to convince the other. To Nina, she is doing what 
she is doing for love of Sam, to make him happy. To Darrell, he 
is acting in the cause of science and friendship. At some level 
each knows the other is lying to himself and to his partner, but 
they have so managed to confuse reality with ideal that they come to 
the end of the scene in the masks of a man and woman humble before 
their joint altruism. In their thoughts, however, they are both 
crying out: "I shall be happyi" Nina, less realistic than the
scientist Darrell, must carry her lie with her to the end; as the 
curtain falls, her last thoughts are: "I shall make my husband
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happy!" Without recourse to the devices of the aside and the soliloquy, 
O'Neill would have been hard put to present the maze of inner and outer 
lies which give both complexity and meaning to this scene.
O'Neill, then, by reintroducing the aside and the soliloquy is 
able, first, to compare and contrast the various masks and faces of 
reality; second, to reveal inner thought and to study the interaction 
of inner and outer thought without disturbing the surface of the story; 
and, third, to tell the same story simultaneously from a number of 
different points of view. In fine, coming at the end of a long period 
of experimentation, he does not feel the need to seek out brilliant 
new technical means. He is at liberty to draw out what he considers 
to be the best of both the extemalistic and the pan-psychic forms. 
Consequently, he does not, at least in Strange Interlude, overburden 
his play with intricate and vague symbolism as does Ibsen; nor does 
he restrict himself to a single point of view as did Evreinov; nor 
does he, like Strindberg, cast the whole story as a barely conscious 
dream; nor does he, finally, introduce six or seven ghostly characters 
to make his point. He returns instead to a much earlier tradition 
and asks the romantic drama of another age to provide him with devices 
through which to present his modem concepts.
Asides and soliloquies eliminated, Strange Interlude is struc­
turally in the extemalistic tradition. As has been noted earlier, 
it involves only one set of events which occur in an ordinary spatial- 
temporal sequence, and the play could be presented totally without the 
asides and soliloquies. On its extemalistic level, it may be con­
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sidered as a passable, though slightly "soap-box-opera-ish," example 
of the Ibsenian version of the well-made play, more exactly, perhaps, 
as a combination of Ibsenian and Zolaesque naturalism. It is, in 
brief, the story of the loves of a woman from young womanhood to 
old age.
Just how important the asides and the soliloquies are to 
Strange Interlude can be seen from the fact that these conventions give 
virtually all the meaning to the play. They are made to carry the 
burden of presenting the shattered ideals of each of the participants. 
Nina's romantic image of Gordon, for instance, is developed most 
completely only in her hidden thoughts, just as Marsden's true feelings 
towards Nina are never voiced in her presence. But in addition to 
employing the aside and the soliloquy to add complexity to the char­
acters, O'Neill also uses the devices to great effect in telling four 
simultaneous and virtually contradictory stories with the same set of 
facts, an accomplishment which makes a telling point in his argument 
that life is but a lie. Perhaps the best example of O'Neill's 
"simultaneous method" is found in the chorus of dialogue and solilo­
quy which marks the end of Act Six, the climax of the play. All four 
of the major characters are seated together in Nina's living room.
Nina has succeeded in using them all. She has so orchestrated the 
role of each that her life at the moment is full and rich. Her 
delight in this she expresses in the following externalized speech:
Yes, you're here, Charlie— always! And you, Sam--and
Ned! (With a strange gaiety) Sit down, all of you!
Make yourselves at home! You are my three men! This
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is your home with me! (Then In a strange half-whisper)
Ssssh! I thought I heard the baby. You must all sit 
down and be very quiet. You must not wake our baby.
If this were an objective play, the curtain would fall here,
for the external action is complete. O'Neill, however, now proceeds
to split the one action into four actions. In a series of interior
monologues, he presents the scene from four different points of view.
The first of these is Darrell's. He thinks of telling Sam the truth,
but cannot because "to kill happiness is a worse murder than taking
life." Thus, there is nothing for him to do but "accept her terms."
"And your child is mine! your wife is mine!...your happiness is
mine.'...may you enjoy my happiness, her husband!" The action then,
from Darrell's point of view is a story of utter renunciation, the
romantic ideal of sacrifice.
Sam's story is simple, crass and uncomplicated.
Sure good to see Ned again...a real friend if there ever 
was one...looks blue about something...oh, that's right, 
Charlie said his old man had kicked in...his old man was 
rich...that's an idea...I'11 bet he'd put up that capital...
To the subtle Marsden, Nina is "the old queer Nina now...the
Nina I could never fathom."
Her three men!...and we are!...1?...yes, more deeply than 
the others since I serve for nothing...a queer kind of 
love, maybe...1 am not ordinary!...Our child...what could 
she mean by that?...Child of us three?...on the surface 
that's insane...but I felt when she said it there was some­
thing in it...8he has strange devious currents that become 
the one stream of desire...I feel with regard to Nina my 
life queerly identified with Sam's and Darrell's...her 
child is the child of our three loves for her...I would 
like to believe that...I would like to be her husband in 
a sense...and the father of her child after my fashion...
I could forgive her anything.
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Marsden's story is more inclusive, his perception of the totality of
the situation is the deepest and the broadest of the three men.
Still, his place in his story differs from his place in Nina's
story. To her he has long ago become the father of her male
triple god— -husband, lover, father. ' Throughout the first half of
the play,- Marsden does not always wear with good grace the father-
mask which Nina has forced on him. Still it has been better than
nothing, and at this point of the play he seems about to accept it
as reality. This acceptance will become more marked as the play
moves forward to its conclusion. Ultimately the mask will replace
the old face entirely, for at the end of the play when Nina calls
him "father...dear Old Charlie," Marsden thinks: "God damn dear old...
No! God bless dear old Charlie...who, passed beyond desire, has all
the luck at last."
As each mqtrin his thoughts becomes resigned to his place in
his own story, Nina thinks triumphantly:
My three men!...I feel their desires converge in me!... 
to form one complete beautiful male desire which I 
absorb...and am whole...they dissolve in me, their life 
is my life...I am pregnant with the three!...husband!... 
lover!...father!...and the fourth man!...little man!... 
little Gordon!...he is mine too!...that makes it perfect!...
Why I should be the proudest woman on earth!...I should be 
the happiest woman in the world...Ha-ha...only I better knock 
on wood...before God the Father hears my happiness!
How right and how wrong she is! In fact, how right and how
wrong they all are! It is just this aspect of O'Neill's use of the
aside and the soliloquy that makes it so very different from the use
to which it was put in premodem drama. When Hamlet's point of view
is contrasted with that of the King's in the chapel scene, the point
213
of the contrast Is to reveal Hamlet's error. The audience has 
possession of a single set of universal facts and standards and can 
judge his error accordingly. His soliloquy and that of the King's 
serve only to aid and clarify that judgment. But O'Neill's argument 
is that each viewpoint is as true and as false as the other. There 
is no error because from the viewpoint of each individual there is 
none to be made, but there is also much error because each character 
assumes a role for himself and the others which they, from their 
points of view, can only partially play. In essence then, O'Neill's 
asides and soliloquies do not clarify but actually confuse the facts. 
This is his deliberate intention, since without the conventions; the 
audience may feel inclined to judge the action universally and impar­
tially. With the addition of the two devices, the audience is forced 
to pass five different judgments on Act Six, that is, one judgment for 
each viewpoint, and one for the action as a comparison and synthesis 
of viewpoints. By forcing the audience through such a thought 
process, O'Neill places them in a position of finding it very dif­
ficult to reject his contention that life is a meaningless confusion 
of dreams and lies.
Thus the playwright's structure— by allowing him to capture a 
simultaneous welter of conflicting viewpoints— both presents and 
emphasizes his theme: life is a web of romantic ideals, a strange
interlude of masks and faces, reality and illusion, happiness and 
renunciation, which ends in a weary sigh and from which only death 
emerges as victor. To O'Neill, we are all like the characters in
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Strange Interlude. By the end of the play, each has lost his identity 
as he conceived it. Only the young have an ideal, since they have 
yet to live through the lying struggle. The others have "passed 
beyond desireV and are ready to have their life rounded with a sleep. 
Sam, who never had a face, who was a total mask, whose speech and 
thoughts always coincided because he always thought the thoughts he 
was supposed to think, has died. Darrell, who would sacrifice nothing 
for his career, who thought he could escape the disease of romantic 
imagination, has sacrificed all for the happiness of Nina and Sam, and 
at the end, even that mask has fallen away. He wants to do nothing 
but work in his biological station. He will not "meddle" in any­
one's life again. But even this dream is shattered. His experimental 
station is no longer his because Sam, in good middle-class faith, has
robbed him of it by willing it a half million dollars.
Nina has lost husband, lover, son,and happiness. She remains 
nothing but a shell and she wants nothing but to return to the state 
of early childhood, to the peace of sitting on her father's knee, 
thinking nothing, being "in love with peace." Charlie Marsden has 
a piece of his dream at last, but only a ragged piece. He is married 
to Nina, but not as husband or lover. Even in marriage he remains
"good old Charlie," even as a husband he wears the mask of a father.
Charlie feels that he "has won at last," but he has won by losing. He 
has won by denying the passion he felt for Nina and by replacing the 
face with the mask, by denying, in essence, his own personality as 
he conceived it.
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With the destruction of the egos of each of his major charac­
ters , O'Neill presents the -final plight of the modem who is both a 
determinist and a relativist. To hold to a philosophy that sees all 
truth as relative to the individual, the believer, like Strindberg, 
begins by assuming that the individual soul is in touch with some 
sort of divinity which gives meaning to his private insight. But 
when the relativist has come to the deterministic conclusion that 
all other gods have been replaced by the "modem sdience God," a 
God who has in his blindness and indifference made "life so perverted 
and death so unnatural," then he must look about for a newer, happier 
God. Like O'Neill, his first choice for the new God may be the 
Nietzschean Dionysus or Mother Earth. Thus Nina makes her act of 
faith to God the Mother.
We should have imagined life as created in the birth- 
pang of God the Mother. Then we would understand why we,
Her children, have Inherited pain, for we would know that 
our life's rhythm beats from her great heart, t o m  with 
the agony of love and birth. And we would feel that 
death meant reunion with Her, a passing back into Her 
substance, blood of Her blood again, peace of Her peace!
This, however, is but another romantic ideal. It is not long
before the thinking relativist •realizes that the rhythms of God the
Mother have little to do with the impossible jerks, starts, and fits
of the individual personality-shut up in a labyrinth of internal and
external masks and faces. Indeed, God the Mother is but' one of the
many illusions which we use to hide from ourselves. It may be by
some lucky coincidence we can in Her name momentarily arrange all the
masks and faces to suit ourselves, but to do this we must distort, as
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Nina does in Act Six, reality as seen by others. This distortion we 
call happiness. But it bears seeds of despair, for it cannot last for 
long. Others will soon object to the masks which we force upon them. 
Like young Gordon who refuses to be the object of maternal love, 
others will force us to change both their masks and ours, thereby 
causing us unhappiness.
Life, then, to a relativist like O'Neill is like a play, a 
poorly constructed one, an interlude. We come out of the nothingness 
of the womb, and although we are romantic enough to feel we have an 
important individuality, we are forced by our very concept of our own 
individuation to destroy ourselves and others. The best we can hope 
for is to make an early exit and find a little peace backstage. The 
only wisdom we can gain from such a play is that life is a "strange 
dark interlude in the electrical display of God the Father," the 
blind and pointless God of modern science.
With Strange Interlude the wheel of modem drama has come full 
turn. Isben's shunning of the aside and the soliloquy created modem 
Extemalism and made playwrights aware that they were using an object­
ive viewpoint. In an attempt to break through the barrier of 
third-person objective presentation, the pan-psychic movement 
experimented with various devices designed to present a first- 
person subjective point of view. At the end of the first great 
surge of modem drama came Eugene O'Neill who was not afraid to 
apply on a grand scale the once abhorred conventions of the aside and 
the soliloquy, and to employ them in such a way as to produce the
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effect of a simultaneity of internal and external action--to produce, 
in short, a veritable montage of thought, dialogue, action, and dif­
fering points of view.
It would be foolish to say that O'Neill's use of these devices 
is always sure. There are far too many Instances where what was said 
in the aside could just as easily have been said in the "spoken" dia­
logue. Sometimes this is done purposely, as, for instance, when the 
dramatist wishes to demonstrate the simplicity of Sam's personality.
At other times it seems meaningless and much of the lengthiness of 
the play can be attributed to the placing in asides and soliloquies 
ideas which were inserted uneconomically or which could have just 
as easily been carried in the external dialogue and action. But 
despite its weaknesses— most of which, as is usual with O'Neill, 
are rhetorical rather than structural--Strange Interlude demonstrates 
conclusively that the aside and the soliloquy have not outlived their 
usefulness as effective dramatic instruments. They can prove as 
useful to the modem relativistic playwright as they did to those who 
wrote in a more absolute tradition. Moreover, as O'Neill has estab­
lished, they can serve as a means of compromise between Extemalism and 
Pan-psychicism. Their value lies, above all, in their ability to give 
an impression of simultaneity of thought and dialogue, while at the 
same time presenting that thought directly to the audience.
Surely the audience must have appreciated them, for in its 
original production Strange Interlude made unique demands upon a modem 
audience. They were asked to spend such a lengthy evening in the
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theatre that It was necessary to take an Intermission £or supper.
They were asked to watch a realistic play which used devices they 
had been trained to think of as both unnecessary and unfashionable.
And what with all this, they were asked to listen to a play, with 
barely a laugh to cushion the effect, which spent a great deal of 
time driving home an unhappy point. Yet they came in sufficient 
numbers to keep Strange Interlude running for over 400 performances. 
Thus, the play has passed some important tests. It may not be great 
but it is both acceptable and successful literature.
II
Giraudoux: The Madwoman of Chaillot
In many ways, O'Neill's renovating of the soliloquy in Strange 
Interlude may serve as a signal of the end of an era in modern drama. 
Coming as it did at the close of the twenties, Strange Interlude is a 
play written just before the world was to enter upon a new and unfor­
tunate economic and political period. With the turn into the thirties, 
intellectuals throughout the world, embittered by the great depres­
sion, became more and more concerned with solutions to social and 
economic problems. In keeping with the spirit of the times, a new 
generation of playwrights arose who were not to be denied their right 
to have a say concerning the current economic distress. Problems of 
the soul were abandoned for problems of the social order. Extemalism 
was the mode best suited for the presentation of such difficulties, 
and, therefore, the oldest form of modem drama enjoyed a new hey-day. 
Experiments in Extemalism ranged from the realism of Waiting for
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Lefty to the Living Newspaper of the Federal Theatre to the Epic Drama 
of Bertholt Brecht.
Considering the pressing nature of the social and economic 
dislocations, it would not be surprising to find that during the 
thirties the pan-psychic drama went into a complete decline. This, 
however, was not the case, but it is true that the fevered experi­
mentation of the first fifty years lost much of its impetus. Striking 
examples of totally new structural innovations are much more difficult 
to locate, and, in general, the eclecticism already noted in the work 
of O'Neill became more pronounced as the world moved through the 
depression of the thirties and into the war of the forties. There 
were, of course, a large number of playwrights who exploited the 
standard themes and techniques of Pan-psychism. Priestly, for instance, 
investigated the Incongruities of the space-time continuum. Thornton 
Wilder attacked the problem of eliminating the "fourth wall." The 
movies, following the example of such point-of-view studies as 
Beggar on Horseback, ruthlessly exploited the dream sequence and the 
flashback. In Ireland, Sean O'Casey combined the techniques of 
Maeterlinck with those of German Expressionism to produce his dream­
like work, Within the Gates.
Thus, the period from the beginning of the depression to the 
end of World War II was characterized not so much by innovation as by 
synthesis. It was a period of consolidation of gains. Both the 
extemalistlc and the pan-psychic dramatists were less Interested in 
finding new forms than in constructing the best: possible arrangement
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of forms already established by the modern masters. With the outbreak 
of World War II, even this sort of experimentation was, for the most 
part, temporarily halted. In the stress of the war, playwrights grew 
silent or marked time by writing propaganda plays. Along with the 
rest of mankind they watched in stunned borrow as, for the second 
time in the 20th_century, a war demonstrated in harrowing fashion the 
inadequacies of a totally materialistic philosophy. As the war drew 
to a close, the world, having been duly impressed and appalled by the 
destructive power of science, looked for hope in things spiritual.
On the basis of the past history of the movement, it hardly 
seemed likely the pan-psychic playwrights could supply a new hope.
The history of Pan-psychism is one of profound pessimism. It began in 
the nightmare anguish of Strindberg's dream, and, for many of its 
practitioners, its ultimate view of life had come to be that of the 
tragic dilemma between the face and the mask. This history of pessi­
mism nothwithstanding, Paris had hardly been cleared of German 
soldiers before the people of that city were treated to a delight­
fully hopeful answer to Pirandello's tragic paradox--Giraudoux's The 
Madwoman of Chaillot. To the citizens of Paris, Giraudoux argued 
that having to wear a mask is not so bad, provided one selects the 
right mask.
Actually, The Madwoman is a point-of-view study in the tradition 
of Evreinov rather than in that of Pirandello, that is, the play is 
projected solely through the viewpoint of a single character. More­
over, since Giraudoux produced the major portion of his work in the
s
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eclectic thirties, the play is a synthesis of both old and new 
techniques. But its Intriguing qualities lie not so much in the 
fact of synthesis itself as in the things synthesized. A brief 
glance at Giraudoux's dramatic works will indicate that he was 
interested in two phenomena— the modem concept of the split or 
divided personality and the ancient and enduring power of the myth and 
fairy tale. Sooner or later he was destined to bring these two to­
gether in a consummate form. Thus, in one of his last plays, a play 
which he did not live to see produced in 1945, Giraudoux presented 
the theatre with a fairy tale within the framework of a single 
individual's point of view.
The reasons which led the French playwright to introduce the 
fairy tale into pan-psychic point-of-view study can be found partially 
in his background and partially in the statement which The Madwoman 
attempts to make. Writing of the forces which shaped Giraudoux's 
thought, Laurent LeSage points out that the earliest and most lasting 
influence on Giraudoux came from the German romantics, who formed his 
major interest in school and who continued to hold his attention when 
in 1905 he won a travelling scholarship to Munich to study at first­
hand German romantic literature.^ in this respect then, Giraudoux's 
dramatic heritage was that of most other pan-psychic dramatists. 
Surprisingly enough, he did not undergo that flirtation with Naturalism 
which characterized the early careers of such playwrights as Strind-
^^LeSage, op. cit.
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berg, Pirandello, and O'Neill. From the first he "ignored Flaubert, 
Zola, and Maupassant, and instinctively disliked Realism. Among the 
young German writers, Wedekind inspired his greatest admiration."^ 
Hence, Giraudoux came to the novel and later to the drama with the 
ideals of the German romantics and with a deep admiration for their 
literary heir, the Expressionist Wedekind. These German Ideals were 
essentially subjective and irrational, and their subjectivism and 
irrationality were to be increased by the vogue of Surrealism, the 
French counterpart of German Expressionism.
Giraudoux himself cannot be truly called a Surrealist, but he 
lived and wrote during the time of their widest influence and could 
hardly have remained unaffected by them. Moreover, as LeSage demon­
strates in his essay, "Giraudoux, Surrealism, and the German Romantic 
Ideal," both Giraudoux and the Surrealist took their basic inspiration 
from the same source--the German romantics.22 Surrealism, however, 
was to put much more faith in modern psychology than did Expression­
ism. The Germans had postulated a cult of the ego. "The sole criter­
ion of values should lie within the individual ego. The exterior 
world possesses no real autonomy and must depend on the ego for ani­
mation and meaning."23 The French Surrealists, on the other hand, 
postulated the cult of the unconscious. "Identifying peotry with the
2*Laurent LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works (Phila­
delphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), p. 23.
22LeSage, "Giraudoux, Surrealism, and the German Romantic Ideal."
23Ibid., p. 5.
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nonrational manifestations of the human spirit, Surrealists, like the 
Germans, sought to exploit every psychic state uncensored by r eason."24 
Another modem trend which manifested itself in France between 
the wars was also to have a strong influence on Giraudoux. This was 
the tendency of certain French playwrights, sometimes identified with 
Cubism and Surrealism, to return to a theatre dominated by myth, folk 
tale, or quasl-historical legend. This, of course, was an old tradi­
tion which had never quite left the modem theatre. It had flourished 
in the writings of the symbolists, and around this form as the form 
destined to rescue the stage for poetry had gathered an Important 
international group which included Yeats, Eliot, and Lorca. In 
France the use of myth and folk tale in the theatre was probably 
strengthened and encouraged by Surrealism's Interest in the unconscious 
and in the Jungian concept of myth as the revelation of man's univer­
sal unconscious heritage. Whatever the reason, France produced 
between the wars several outstanding advocates of theatre as myth, 
the most famous of which was Jean Cocteau, whose outstanding effort was 
The Infernal Machine. It was in this school that Giraudoux, whose 
uniqueness resists any close classification, may be said to hold at 
least an associate membership. If Giraudoux is to be called a Surrealist 
at all, then it is to this particular surrealistic tradition that he 
belongs, for Giraudoux was to work almost exclusively with some form 
of myth. Even that piece of his which is not built upon some existing
24ibjd.. p. 45.
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myth, Intermezzo, can hardly be considered anything but a modern fairy 
tale. Each bf his better known works— Ondine. Tiger at the Gates, 
Amphvtrion 38— are the retelling of a familiar legend. Thus Giraudoux 
was beholden to the surrealists for their championing of myth as form, 
and he was, together with the surrealists, in philosophic debt to the 
early German romantics and to their latter day heirs, the German 
expressionists.
Giraudoux's debt to the German's Included both the belief in 
the ego as the supreme guide to truth and also the tragic concept 
of the ego as an entity locked in hopelbss conflict with itself. To 
Maurice Valency, Giraudoux's recognition of the individual ego's 
"profound psychic dualism" was "the conflict that was to entangle his 
interest in one way or another during the whole of his life as a 
d r a m a t i s t . T h i s  internal conflict was to take many forms. In 
Siegfried. Giraudoux'8 earliest play, the conflict is between two 
cultures— French and German. A French soldier, the victim of 
amnesia, is rescued and rehabilitated by the Germans. Previously a 
brilliant French writer, he now becomes a brilliant German author.
The play itself concerns his inner struggle when his true identity 
is made known to him. In Ondine the internal struggle is between 
natural heritage and love. The water nymph leaves her own world to 
marry a mortal, only to find out too late that neither she nor her 
lover can overcome with love that part of their natures which makes
O C
JMaurice Valency, Trans., Jean Giraudoux. Four Plays (New York: 
Hill and Wang, Mermaid Dramabook Edition, 1958), p. xvi.
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them mortal and immortal respectively.
But Giraudoux's concept of the divided personality was not 
exactly that of the German's. To the irrationality of Surrealism 
and Expressionism, Giraudoux brought the undying rationality of the 
classic French mind. Romantic though he was, Giraudoux could not es- 
cape his Gallic heritage. Thus, Giraudoux's divided ego, as in 
Ondine. suffers only when the total personality gives way to that 
half which would force it from its natural position in the order of 
nature. If Giraudoux had a philosophic cornerstone it is a concept 
of a well ordered world in which each person retains his innate 
uniqueness while at the same time he accepts and lives the role 
assigned to him by nature. Thus, Alcmene prefers to be the wife of 
a mortal than the mistress of a god, and "the stiff-necked couples of 
Sodome et Gomorrhe sin in refusing to be man and woman living con­
tentedly together."2® As LeSage sums it up, Giraudoux is "urbane" 
enough to prefer to "remain on polite terms with the u n i v e r s e ."27 
He therefore "pursues a pretty dream of a world before the Fall," a 
world well ordered by nature.
With such a background as he had, Giraudoux could harldy reject 
the ego as Pirandello saw it, but he need not accept the Italian's 
conclusions as O'Neill did. Giraudoux's rationality offered him a 
different and more optimistic solution to the face-mask conflict, and
2®LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works. p. 161.
27Ibid., p. 157.
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this rationality brought him to offer to a war-weary world a new hope 
that grew out of the very phenomenon which led Pirandello into the 
blackest pessimism. Since the world is now suffering from certain 
people's urge to move out of their assigned sphere and upset the 
order of nature, and since the individual has both the power and the 
necessity to wear various masks, why not, asks Giraudoux, make those 
masks the single mask of a fairy tale world, a world before the Fall, 
in which the unnatural disorder of the world, at least for the indi­
vidual, is once more ordered? Thus The Madwoman of Chaillot is a 
Pirandellian dream play, a modern fairy tale. To the superficial 
observer, the play seems to be very much the same as any other 
fantasy, and it does purposefully have the air of a popular fairy tale, 
but it should not be confused with the traditional romantic fantasy.
It is no nearer to The Tempest, for instance, than is Strindberg's 
The Dream Play. The Madwoman is distinctly modern because while a 
work like The Tempest, as has been noted earlier, belongs to everyone 
in general and no one in particular, the dream of The Madwoman be­
longs to the Madwoman alone. It is her dream, a world seen through 
her eyes, and if we are to understand it at all, we must dream the 
dream with her. We may not remain merely onlookers, comparing and 
enjoying the differences between reality and the world of the Countess. 
We must, if we are to accept and understand the play as being more than 
a pleasant jest, actually join with the Countess as she creates her 
world. In this way, The Madwoman is like The Dream Play. It differs, 
however, from the Strindbergian dream in that it is a conscious
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dream. Strindberg is reporting the movements of his unconscious
mind. Giraudoux attaches more importance to the rational. His
Countess is deliberately creating out of whole cloth a world that is
in contradiction to reality. Her dream is a conscious creation of
her organizing intelligence and not a vision arising out of her
uninhibited Seele. She is thinking the cosmos not feeling the chaos.
She is perfectly aware that the point of view she is assuming is
both an internal and external mask, but she is quite happy with the
mask. In her little spat with Constance, for instance, she admits
there is a'disparity between the world as she sees it and the world
as she wishes to see it.
COUNTESS. We promise you faithfully that we'll believe 
it all over again afterwards, won't we, Gabrielle?
But tell us the truth this once.
CONSTANCE. How dare you question my memories? Suppose 
I said your pearls were false!
COUNTESS. They were.
CONSTANCE. I'm not asking what they were. I'm asking what 
they are. Are they false or real?
COUNTESS. Everyone knows that, little by little, as one 
wears pearls they become real.
As the Countess points out earlier in the play:
To be alive is to be fortunate, Roderick. Of course, in 
the morning, when you first awake, it does not always seem 
so very gay. When you take your hair out of the drawer, 
and your teeth out of the glass, you're apt to feel a 
little out of place in the world. Especially if you've 
just been dreaming that you are a little girl on a pony 
looking for strawberries in the woods. But all you need 
to feel the call of life once more is a letter in your 
mail giving you your schedule for the day— your mending, 
your shopping, that letter to your grandmother that you 
never seem to get around to. And so, when you've washed 
your face in rosewater, and powdered it— not with this 
awful rice-powder they sell nowadays, which does nothing 
for your skin, but with a cake of pure white starch—
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and put on your pins, your rings, your brooches, braclets, 
earrings and pearls— in short, when you are dressed for 
your morning coffee— and have had a good look at your­
self— not in the glass naturally— it lies— but in the side 
of the brass gong that once belonged to Admiral Courbet- 
then, Roderick, then you're armed, you're strong, you're 
ready--you can begin again.
This world of the Madwoman then is the world of the consciously
assumed mask. It is not a Cabinet of Dr. Caligarl. There may, of
course, be a certain pathos in the unfortunate disparity between 
the face and the mask, but there is not necessarily any tragedy. The 
problem is to adjust the disparity so that the differences disappear, 
not in the sense that the illusion is shattered but in the sense that 
it is strengthened. The greed and chaos of the world should be con­
verted to beauty and order, a beauty and order such as is found in
the land of myth, in the world as it existed in the legend of Eden.
The dictum which states that all truth is inner truth does not 
necessarily demand that the inner truth be a nightmare. It can 
just as easily be a romantic fantasy. Starting from this assumption, 
it was natural that Giraudoux should wed the mode of fantasy with 
the point-of-view method to turn the concept of the mask and the face 
into an affirmative statement.
The progress of the play then is the progress of the Madwoman's 
adjustment of reality to suit her personal mask. All dramatic con­
flict arises from this problem. At the opening some of the minor 
obstacles posed by reality have already been removed. Whatever her 
station in life was, the Madwoman is now a countess, albeit her court 
consists of waitresses and rag-pickers. This matters little, for
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these, at least, have the natural nobility which comes from living 
in harmony with the universe. Moreover, they form a dutiful and 
devoted court. They are happy and obedient because they realize that 
the commands of the Countess are not the unusual demands of a maniac, 
but the demands of a princess who cherishes a nobel dream of a good 
and ordered world. Their attitude towards the dream of the Countess 
is reflected in the little scene between the waiter and the 
President.
PRESIDENT. Waiter, ask that woman to move on.
WAITER. Sorry, sir. This is her cafe.
PRESIDENT. Is she the manager of the cafe?
WAITER. She's the Madwoman of Chaillot.
PRESIDENT. A madwoman? She's mad?
WAITER. Who says she's mad?
PRESIDENT. You just said so yourself.
WAITER. Look, sir. You asked me who she was. And 
I told you. What's mad about her? She's the 
Madwoman of Chaillot.
While many of the Countess's difficulties with reality are 
already solved, certain minor items still remain to be attended to. 
Young Pierre, for instance, roust come home with her, for among 
other little tasks, he "can take the mirror off the wardrobe door 
and deliver me once and for all from the old harpy that lives in the 
mirror." Then there is the matter of the Countess's role in the worlds 
created by her friends, the Madwomen of Passy, St. Sulpice and La 
Concorde. She must, for example, put up with Constance's imaginary 
dog, and with the not-quite»material people whom Gabrielle invites to 
tea. From time to time she becomes exasperated with the dreams of 
her friends^ but she is usually able to recognize that they are 
seriously attempting solutions parallel to her own. Her attitude in
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the face of her problems Is best exemplified by her pronouncement 
about Josephine's practice of waiting every day to see President 
Wilson.
In anyone else, Josephine, these extravagances might 
seem a little childish. But a person of your judgment 
doubtless has her reasons for wanting to talk to a man 
whom no one would listen to when he was alive.
The difficulties outlined above are, however, insignificant 
compared to the Madwoman's two major problems— • the bitter and ines­
capable memory of her lost lover, Adolphe Bertaut, and the rude 
intrusion into her gay and gentle world of a hateful reality, the 
realization that there exist greedy and power-mad men who destroy and 
dislocate the order of nature. The process of solving these two 
difficulties forms the major matter of the play. Adolphe Bertaut is 
a problem which she has been facing for years, and, naturally, she 
has made some headway. His physical deformity she has already 
turned into a mechanical mishap. "Adolphe Bertaut has no harelip. 
That was a scratch in the negative." But as yet she has been able to 
do nothing about the memory of his never having asked her to marry 
him, nor the memory of having seen him, years later, as a dirty and 
starving man who stole from under her hand a melon she herself was 
about to steal.
Her second major problem, the elimination of the greedy 
materialists in the world, is more immediate, since it is thrust upon 
her only lately. One day as she sits in her cafe, she sees and hears 
three men who plot to destroy Paris for the oil beneath the city. To 
these men, the Madwoman's world of natural order based upon the
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individual is dangerous. It is their enemy, civilization. She
listens as the President describes his concept of her friends.
Good heavens, look at them! Every size, shape, color and 
period imaginable. It's utter anarchy! I tell you, sir, 
the only safeguard of order and discipline in the modern 
world is a standardized worker with interchangeable parts.
The Countess then realizes that there are "people in the world who want
to destroy everything."
They have the fever of destruction. Even when they 
pretend they're building, it is only in order to destroy.
When they put up a new building, they quietly knock down 
two old ones. They build cities so that they can destroy 
the countryside. They destroy space with telephones and 
time with airplanes. Humanity is now dedicated to the 
universal task of destruction.
To neutralize the ugly reality of such men as the President and 
the Prospector, the Countess sends them to their death down an endless 
staircase. There is never any question of her ability to do this 
since they, like everything else, exist only in her mind. As her 
friend Constance has the astuteness to point out: "Very well then,
tell us what you have decided. Since you're asking our opinion, 
you've doubtless made up your mind." The question is not can she, 
but should she destroy them? As she herself says: "I don't have to
be merciful, but I must be just." In other words, she refuses to 
yield to an impulse without rational justification. She consciously 
elects to banish the disquieting element from her dream. She, at 
all times, has control over her fantasy.
Down the endless stairs with the President and the Prospector 
go all the other crass and mercenary men and women in the world. This 
is perfectly logical to the Countess; after all, "didn't the Deaf-Mute
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say they were all connected like the works of a machine." Thus, In 
groups, faceless and souless, appear the financiers, the engineers, 
the public relations men, and finally, the hard and compassionless 
wives of all three groups. All march down the stairs after the 
original pair. Before their execution, the Countess has seen to it 
that they have been duly tried and condemned. They have lived and 
died in her very subjective world, but with their trial she has 
demonstrated that it is not the world of a lunatic but a universe of 
conscious moral order.
Before sending her enemies to their execution, the Countess 
summons enough courage to settle once and for all the question of 
Adolphe Bertaut. This difficulty she deals with in her own very 
logical manner. Since it is obvious that he will never return 
to her, she rejects him. She forces Pierre to play the role of 
Adolphe, and in a curious conversation which becomes increasingly 
confused by the interplay between past and present tenses of verbs, 
the Countess gives Adolphe his dismissal.
PIERRE. No. I love you. I shall always love you, Aurelia.
COUNTESS. Yes, I know. That much I've always known. I
knew it the moment you went away, Adolphe, and I knew 
that nothing could ever change it. Georgette in his 
arms now— yes. But he loves me. Tonight he's taken 
Georgette to hear Denis— yes. But he loves me...I 
know it. You never loved her. Do you think I 
believed for one moment that absurd story about her 
running off with an osteopath? Of course not. Since 
you didn't love her, obviously she stayed with you.
And, after that, when she came back, and I heard 
about her going off with the surveyor— I knew that 
couldn't be true, either. You'll never get rid of 
her Adolphe Bertaut— never. Because you don't love 
her.
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PIERRE. I need your pity, Aurelia. I need your love.
Don't forget me...
COUNTESS. Farewell, Adolphe Bertaut. Farewell. Let go 
of my hand and give it back to little Pierre.
Once Adolphe Bertaut has been dealt with decisively and the last
of the corruptors of the Countess's universe have disappeared down
the stairwell, the world takes on a new glow. The Madwoman's mask
has very nearly replaced reality. "The air is pure. The sky is
clear. Life is beautiful again. On the street, utter strangers are
shaking hands, they don't know why, and offering each other almond
bars." The Countess hears music "which seems to thrill from the
uttermost confines of the universe." The voices of the friends of
animals, of flowers, of people and of friendship speak to her through
the music and thank her for freeing them. The Countess's success is
not complete, however. She must undergo one final trial. The voices
of the Adolphe Bertauts of the world call to her and make a proposal:
From this day on we shall hold fast to what we love. For 
your sake, henceforth, we shall be handsome, and our cuffs 
forever immaculate and new. Countess, we bring you this 
melon and with it our hearts. Will you do us the honor 
to be our wife.
This, however, the Countess cannot accept. This is asking too 
much of reality. She may be the Madwoman of Chaillot, but she's not 
crazy. "Too late! Too late!" she sadly tells the voices and sends 
them away. But it is not too late for Irma and Pierre. It is never 
too late for love to save young lovers from the difficult task of 
creating a mask to replace reality. Love will do this for them. 
Love--like the dream of love which she has created— will one day 
bring the world of crass reality into perfect accord with the world
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as seen through the point of view of the Madwoman of Chaillot. Love,
if it can triumph, will return the world to the state of Eden. It
will rid the world of "pimps" and engage it once more in the important
business of having morning coffee and feeding the cats. Meanwhile,
as we wait for love to save the world, we can do our share by creating
our own world in the image of love. This is the advice the Countess
gives to Irma and Pierre.
It's three hours since you've met and known and loved each 
other. Kiss each other quickly. Look at him, he hesitates.
He trembles. Happiness frightens him...How like a man.' Oh,
Irma, kiss him, kiss him! If two people love each other, 
let a single instant wedge itself between them, it grows—  
it becomes a month, a year, a century; it becomes too late.
Kiss him, Irma, kiss him while there is time, or in a 
moment his hair will be white and there will be another 
Madwoman in Paris. Oh, make her kiss him, all of you!
(They kiss) Bravo! Oh, if only you'd had the courage
to do that thirty years ago, how different I would be 
today! Dear Deaf-Mute be still— your words dazzle our 
eyes! And Irma is too busy to translate for you. (They 
kiss once more) Well, there we are. The world is saved.
And you see how simple it was? Nothing is ever so wrong 
in this world that a sensible woman can't set it right in 
the course of an afternoon.
The Madwoman then is Giraudoux's answer to Pirandellos pessimism. 
He does not deny the conflict between the face and the mask, nor the 
conflict between inner and outer reality, but he does not see the 
conflict as always resulting in the hopeless destruction of personal­
ity. To have a point of view, to see the world through ego-centered 
eyes, is a blessing to Giraudoux, always provided the ego which lies 
behind the eyes is motivated by humility and love. If this be the 
case, then if our face does not suit us, or if outer reality is unin- 
vitingly cruel, we have the wonderful ability to exchange that face
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for a more attractive mask or to soften or abolish completely outer
reality. If enough of us do this, consciously and sanely, motivated
always by love, then all ugly faces will disappear and the world will
become a universe of freedom within natural harmony.
No one will deny that the world of the Madwoman is pure fantasy,
and the Countess herself would be the first to admit it. But it is
the fantasy of a conscious artist, not the silly joke of a madman. It
is sanely conceived and rationally executed. Those who understand the
play only as a nonsense farce which attacks big business are not only
making an error, but they are also greatly restricting the theme and
Importance of a fine play. As Laurent LeSage observes:
La Folle de Chaillot is generally described as a philo­
sophical comedy about modern mercantilism. This is quite 
accurate if one does not imply that it is just a diatribe 
aimed at capitalism. Giraudoux defends more than he 
attacks, and his alms are surely not political. The 
cause here in question is the very unspecific one of 
poetry and idealism, a just measure of which is necessary 
to keep materialism and practical astuteness from dis­
figuring the earth.28
The world of the Madwoman is her personal fantasy, and as 
such it has as much truth as any other inner experience. It is as' 
true as the nightmare anguish of Strindberg and the torment of the 
jungle visions of Brutus Jones; moreover, it is a controlled fantasy, 
carefully created and fashioned by the poetic imagination of the 
Countess. Above all, it is one of the first point-of-view statements 
which makes an appeal to some form of rationality. One could hardly
^LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works, p. 80.
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call The Madwoman an intellectual drama, but it does hold forth some 
ideal of an ultimate world order rising out of the chaos of subjectiv­
ism.
O ’Neill, then, and Giraudoux offer two examples of pan-psychic 
playwrights who look to older techniques to make effective their 
modern studies in point of view. The two playwrights select differing 
traditional devices because each has a different point to make.
O'Neill found in the ancient conventions of the aside and the solilo­
quy two excellent means of presenting a humanity simultaneously shatter­
ed by inner conflict and by a web of confusion created by the inability 
to express to others its own point of view and a reluctance to compre­
hend alien viewpoints. Giraudoux saw in the presentation of a fairy 
tale through the viewpoint of the central character a method by which 
he could turn the despair of Pirandello into a statement of pathos 
rising into hope.
CHAPTER SIX
THE SOLILOQUY DRAMATIZED 
MILLER AND THE EXTERNALISTIC PRETENSE;
ANOUILH AND THE CLASSICAL COMPROMISE
I
Miller: Death of a Salesman
Not so very long ago, at a time when both Miller and Williams 
had only lately appeared in the Broadway firmament, a number of Ameri 
can drama critics took great pleasure in pointing out that the New 
York stage was the proud possessor of an important dramatic dichotomy 
On the one hand, there was Miller perpetuating the tradition of Ibsen 
on the other, there was Williams writing after the manner of Chekov. 
ThiB dichotomy was so obvious, so neat, so comfortable, really, that 
one wonders why, in this age of planned parenthood and planned 
economy, the two playwrights did not settle for planned creativeness 
and climb quietly into the niches so cleverly prepared for them? But 
then, playwrights have generally been perversely elusive, and thus it 
is that the dichotomy still exists, but Miller and Williams have long
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passed it by. There is no reason, of course, to discard a perfectly 
acceptable critical theory simply because there are no dramatists to 
whom it may be applied. After all, the playwrights may yet appear, or 
better still, it may be that Miller and Williams, who are still rela­
tively young men, might in the years to come backtrack sufficiently to 
bring their writing into closer accord with the ideals of certain 
critics. At present, however, the latter devoutly-to-be-wished consum­
mation does not seem likely, for it is hard to ignore the fact that 
while the popular dichotomy is based solely on the traditions of the 
external drama, both Miller and Williams have shown a strong interest 
in the pan-psychic problem of presenting first-person subjective per­
spectives. It may well be that, as some maintain, this interest in 
point of view is simply "heightened realism," but at the risk of being 
too subtle, it seems much safer and more accurate to describe the styles 
of the two playwrights as neo-pan-psychic.
To state the matter another way, both men are first and fore­
most playwrights of the living theatre. To be such means, among other 
things, to be highly sensitive to the idiom which will make the most direct 
and vivid impression on a contemporary audience. On Broadway after the 
war, as on Broadway between the wars, the chief means of exchange 
between playwright and audience was the common currency of Exter- 
nalism, and, therefore, it was in some real or counterfeit aspect
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of this coin that the two playwrights choose to deal. But, on the 
other hand, American audiences had become sufficiently educated by the 
subjective experiments of the twenties and thirties, especially those 
of the Theatre Guild, that they were not prone to offer vigorous 
resistence to departures from Externalism, especially if they felt 
that the play had at least one foot in objectivity. Both Williams and 
Miller, consciously or not, were aware of this attitude, and they soon 
learned to toss their audiences a bone of realism on which to gnaw, 
while they quietly moved the burden of their plays to more subjective 
comments. From behind the stalking horse of Externalism, they fired 
their subjective arrows. Theirs was a new subjective method, hiding 
quietly behind the pretense of Objectivism.
Any one of a number of Williams's works, The Glass Menagerie or 
Streetcar, for instance, would serve admirably as examples of the 
new method, but none of them offer quite so striking a mixture of 
subjectivity and objectivity as does Arthur Miller's Death of a 
Salesman. This bold and powerful play, which in 1949 took Broadway 
by storm, was the first, and to date perhaps the only, significant work 
to come from the young American playwright. Prior to Death of a Sales­
man. Miller had enjoyed some degree of success with All My Sons, a 
well-made piece which raised some critics' hopes that at last the New 
York stage had a true spiritual heir to Ibsen. When Salesman appeared
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many of these same critics felt that their hopes were more than real­
ized, for the play clearly wore many of the trappings of Ibsenism. 
These trappings however were somewhat misleading, for much of what 
might be called the Ibsenian quality of Death of a Salesman is not so 
much the result of Miller's straining after "realistic" prose, as it 
is the result of Miller's recognition of his own limitations and of 
the subsequent use which he made of those very limitations. Miller is 
neither a poet nor a literary man, and thus his dialogue often smacks 
more of the language of the street than of the study. This, however, 
is a more serious handicap to a novelist than to a playwright, and in 
terms of Death of a Salesman Miller actually turned his prose style to 
his advantage, for in Salesman Miller's posture is deliberately 
ambiguous. He wished to give the play as strong a quality of third- 
person objectivity as he could, not because he wished to make a 
totally objective statement, but because he wanted to lead his audi­
ence gently and unwittingly into accepting a strongly pan-psychic 
study. Consequently, he seems to have made little effort to avoid his 
own tendency toward pedestrian prose. Instead, he used his natural­
istic style as a narcotic which pacified those members of his audience 
who demanded Externalism in their plays.
Just why Miller, who had proven his mastery of Externalism in
t
All My Sons, could not make his statement through objective techniques
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can be seen from his concept of tragedy. In an essay written for the
New York Times. Miller states that he believes "that the common man Is
as apt a subject for tragedy In Its highest sense as are kings."
Miller feels that this Is true because he sees tragedy as:
the underlying fear of being displaced, the disaster 
inherent In being t o m  away from our chosen Image of what 
and who we are in this world. Among us today this fear 
is as strong, and perhaps stronger, than it ever was.
In fact, it is the common man who knows this fear best.*
Although Miller believes his concept of tragedy to be much the
same as that of classical tragedy, he is somewhat mistaken, for
Miller's sense of tragedy is completely and uncompromisingly modern.
A classic hero is not, like Willy Loman, interested in "claiming his
whole due as a personality." Take, for example, the position of Creon
in Antigone. He has no "chosen image of who and what he is." He has,
instead, a received image of who and what a king is. He acts in terms
of this image, that is, in terms of the universal not the individual
image of man. The conflict between Creon and Antigone is, in fact, a
conflict between universal values: all good kinsmen should act in
accordance with the laws of God and bury their dead; all good kings
have a responsibility to protect the peace of the state by enforcing
*M.W. Steinberg, Aspects of Modem Drama (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, I960), p. 229.
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the laws which they have fashioned. Such an unfortunate juxtaposition 
of two perfectly acceptable universal concepts Is the very essence of 
the tragic situation in a classical work. In short, classical tragedy 
proceeds from the universal to the specific.
Miller's tragic view, on the other hand, rests in a very modern 
manner on the individual. If universal concepts are present at all, 
they must be induced from the particular case. Creon comes to his 
throne with an image already prepared for him; Willy must build his 
own image. This, of course, is the necessary condition for modern 
man, for he is born into an aclassical world which is not pre-ordered 
for him. What he ultimately becomes is his own choice, because while 
there are a number of images to choose from, there is no single 
received image for modern democratic man. He cannot even, as in earl­
ier times, settle comfortably into the position of dutiful subject. 
Unfortunately, he is both king and servant, yeoman and lord, merchant 
and mechanic. Thus, Miller could not have been more contemporaneous 
and less classical in his view of life's tragic implications. Creon 
may fall as a king, but kingship remains. Willy's failure also 
implies the failure of the salesman ideal, since that ideal rests 
solely on Willy's concept of who and what a salesman is. As Charley 
says at Willy's funeral:
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Willy was a salesman. And for a salesman there is no rock 
bottom to life. He don't put a bolt to a nut, he don't 
tell you the law or give you medicine. He's a man way out 
there in the blue, riding a smile and a shoeshine. And 
when they start not smiling back— that's an earthquake.
And then you get yourself a couple of spots on your hat, 
and you're finished. Nobody dast blame this man. A
salesman is got to dream boy. It comes with the terri­
tory.
Briefly, then, the tragedy of such a playwright as Sophocles rests on 
classical deduction, Hiller's on modern induction.
It is possible to agree with Miller that "kings or the kingly" 
are not required elements of tragedy per se. but it must be recognized
that a social view that made it possible to create the concept of
kings and the kingly is absolutely essential to classical tragedy. 
Miller*8 kind of tragedy is only possible after philosophy has come to 
accept the belief that even the common man has the ability to manu­
facture a world in his own image, such a belief as is demonstrated in 
The Madwoman of Chaillot. Once this view has become thoroughly 
accepted, it is possible for a playwright like Miller to draw the 
tragic conclusions Inherent in it, conclusions which in other forms 
had beendtawnby O'Neill and Pirandello: man is doomed to tragic
defeat when his subjective image not only comes in conflict with 
itself, but also with the world as conceived by others. To Pirandello 
and O'Neill, this tragic defeat comes with a dying fall, with a long
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and despairing sigh. To Miller, it is stronger, with qualities of 
great moral beauty, for man may triumph over his tragedy if he is 
willing to die maintaining his ideal image. "The cotanonest of men may 
take on that stature to the extent of his willingness to throw all he 
has into the contest, the battle to secure his rightful place in the 
world."^
Thus, Miller sets for himself a dual problem in Death of a 
Salesman: he must, first, present a popular image of modern common
man, and he must, second, present that man in the process of creating, 
maintaining, and dying for his ideal image of himself and his world.
To solve the first aspect of his problem, Miller cast over his play a 
certain atmosphere of externality, since this is the quality which had 
come to be identified in the public mind with a serious treatment of 
the middle and lower classes. To meet the second aspect of his prob­
lem, Miller turned to the convention of first-person point of view, 
and presented much of the play solely through the subjective vision of 
Willy Loman. It is some time however before Miller moves from an 
objective to a subjective illusion, for the playwright carefully culti­
vates the sympathy of the audience by introducing the Initial situ­
ation and the whole Loman family as objects before turning to a
2lbid., p. 230.
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presentation of Willy as subject. Moreover, Miller never entirely 
discards externality, but instead, through the play, weaves a pattern 
of external and internal statements.
In this way, Miller moves at once on two levels of reality— the 
outer reality of the Loman family and the inner reality of Willy's 
mind. Moreover, we must not be misled into thinking that those scenes 
which take place in Willy's mind are simply pleasant theatrical 
trickery, a rehashing of cinematic flashback techniques. The whole 
structure is much more complicated than that, for often the flashback 
of the movies is little more than a tour de force, a device to display 
the versatility of the camera and the film editor, whereas Miller's 
method is a surprisingly real combination of total human thought, from 
the spatial-temporal reality of the object to the totally free asso­
ciation of the subject. So it is that at one and the same time the 
play is both built and composed. Howhere is this better demonstrated 
than in the fact that while spatially, i..e., architecturally, the 
climax takes place near the midpoint of the play, temporally the 
climax happens many, many years prior to the situation and circum­
stances in which Willy now finds himself. As Daniel E, Schnieder 
points out, the form of Salesman "is not that of 'flashback'technique, 
though it has been described as such":
It is rather the same technique as that of Hamlet: the
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technique of psychic projection, of hallucination, of the 
guilty expression of forbidden desires dramatized....Willy 
Loman, exhausted salesman, does not go back to the past.
The past, as in hallucination, comes back to him; not 
chronologically, as in "flashback," but dynamically with 
the inner logic of his erupting volcanic unconscious. In 
psychiatry we call this "the return of the repressed," 
when a mind breaks under the invasion of primitive
impulses no longer capable of compromise with reality.^
As Schneider correctly observes, Miller is approaching the 
technique of Shakespeare, but not so much in Hamlet as in Macbeth, 
in particular the banquet scene of Macbeth when Banquo's ghost returns
to haunt the troubled king. Or again, it could be said that Miller's
more immediate example is O'Neill's technique in Strange Interlude, 
for Miller is making use of a unique kind of soliloquy for much the 
same purpose that O'Neill used the soliloquy in Strange Interlude.
The difference is this: where O'Neill's soliloquies are verbalized,
Miller's are dramatized. Instead of presenting Willy's thoughts 
through the medium of language alone, Miller is exercising the right 
of the dramatist to render them basically in terms of action. In 
other words, Willy's soliloquies are more theatrical than literary, 
but, above all, they are direct presentations of his stream of con­
sciousness. As Biff says, in them Willy is "spewing out that vomit 
from his mind."
3
Daniel E. Schneider, M. D., "Play of Dreams," Theatre Arts. 
XXXIII (1949), 18-21.
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While there can be no doubt that Willy is not particularly con­
cerned with separating past from present, he is not, as some critics 
would have us believe, a pitiable psychotic. Like many other commen­
tators on Salesman. Schneider's choice of the term hallucination is 
ill-considered. Apparently such judgments of Willy are the result of 
the playwright’s stark juxtaposition of Willy's Intensely subjective 
vision against that of the objective views and actions of the other 
characters in the play. This is the basic weakness of Miller's mix­
ture of first and third-person points of view. It is the penalty the 
dramatist must pay for maintaining the pretext of Externalism. In 
other words, if objectivity is to be the point of departure, then any 
significant break with externality will, by contrast, tend to suggest 
mental derangement. Moreover, Miller adds to this effect by having 
Biff constantly Insist that Willy is insane. This is probably done 
to excuse and soften the rapid transitions from objectivity to sub­
jectivity, but Biff's protests often serve only to confirm the unimag- 
inatives* suspicions of Willy's mental collapse. Miller attempts from 
time to time to indicate to the audience that this is not the attitude 
which is to be taken, but apparently he is not totally successful. 
Fairly early in the play, for instance, he has Linda point out to 
Biff:
248
No, a lot of people think he's lost his--balance. But 
you don't have to be very smart to know what the trouble 
is. The man is exhausted...A small man can be just as
exhausted as a great man. He works for a company thirty-
six years this March, opens up unheard-of territories to 
their trademark, and now in his old age they take his 
salary away.
Linda's diagnosis of Willy's condition is correct; her insight 
into its causes, as might be expected, is only partially valid. Willy's 
loss of salary is but one of the many cherished ornaments which objec­
tive time and reality are now tearing away from his carefully archi- 
tectured image of who and what a salesman is in this world. The 
mutilation of a quiet residential neighborhood, the broken-down 
refrigerator, the dilapidated and still unpaid-for house, and, above 
all, the failure of his son Biff, all tend to make Willy aware that 
his passionately conceived and passionately pursued dream of success 
is no longer an ideal for the present, but an illusion irretrivably
lost in the past. But the dream once lost in the object, the passion
still remains in the subject, and it is this passion, now as over­
powering as it is unrealizable, which Miller sets out to portray.
Thus it is that each episode of the present forces upon Willy's 
consciousness the disparities between it and the dreams of the future 
which lay hidden in the past. His son Biff returns home, not as a 
conquering hero, but as a young man already defeated by life. No 
matter, Willy will find success for Biff in the events of the past,
249
In that happy time when Willy was a successful salesman and Biff a 
fine prospect for football stardom. But even the past refutes Willy's 
dream, or Willy refutes it himself, for his basic sense of honesty is 
strong enough not to allow him to erase from his consciousness those 
episodes which remind him that he was not the success he determined 
to be and that there were even times when he gave stockings to chance 
women while his wife sat at home and mended her own.
Ultimately, it is this sense of honesty which brings him to 
review in the washroom of a restaurant that hidden and unhappy espi- 
sode which finally and completely destroyed for Biff, and in conse- 
qence for the world, the image which his father had struggled so long 
and hard to build and maintain. This is the failure on which all 
others hinge, for the present woes are but minor compared to that 
great sorrow, the loss of his ideal posture in the mind of his first 
born son. The action of the present but serves to point up the 
futility of Willy's attempt to recapture Biff for the ideal, and Willy's 
tragedy resides in his willingness to die for an end which can never 
be realized. In a sense, however, since the image is and was always 
Willy'8 and Willy's alone, his laying down his life in sacrifice to 
that image does in some manner serve to fix and accomplish it. After a 
fashion of his own, Willy achieves his triumph.
To point up this highly subjective triumph meant that Miller
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must present as thoroughly as possible Willy's own point of view.
Since the image which Willy fights and dies for in the present had 
been developed in the past, it is in the episodes of the past that 
Miller presents the viewpoint of Willy alone; it is during these 
episodes that Willy's chosen image is rendered and explored. Against 
these episodes, the playwright setB the objectivity of the present. 
Miller has so contrived to interweave the two temporal areas that each 
event of the present suggests and calls forth a happening of the past, 
and hence gives the playwright another excuse for moving on to that 
level of reality represented by Willy's point of view. This inter­
weaving of two levels of reality has its moments of unmatched power. 
Take, for example, the climax of the play, the scene in the restaurant. 
Here we begin on the level of third person objectivity. Willy has just 
lost his job, and Biff has failed, as he has so often before, to find 
a job. Neither, however, can manage to comfort the other. Consciously, 
Willy refuses to recognize Biff's new defeat, but a secret locked 
somewhere within his soul refuses to be denied. It rises up to 
possess Willy's total awareness. Biff's present failure has called up 
an earlier, more important one. Willy can no longer deny his vision, 
and he rushes off to the privacy of the washroom where, shut off from 
the world, he can allow his most bitter memory an opportunity to replay 
itself on stage of his soul. In a few swift steps Miller moves from
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dialogue to soliloquy, from the objective to the subjective point of 
view. As the intensity of Willy's psychic agony mounts, as we watch 
with him his ingnominy at having his young son surprise him with 
another woman, we move from fear toward pity. It is at this point, 
just as the scene is about to tumble into full-bloom pathos, that 
Miller catches up and holds the tragedy of the moment by abruptly 
shifting back to third-person objectivity. In a nice stroke of 
romantic irony, Willy is suddenly once again in the washroom and a 
waiter is helping him up from his knees. The shock obtained from the 
shift in viewpoint is enough to place a strong check on our pity and 
hold us on that sharp edge of tragic terror. In such a scene as this 
the compromise between inner and outer reality could not have been 
more successfully handled. Here as nowhere else Miller has skill­
fully emphasized his treatment of Willy's internal life by sharply 
outlining the subjective experience with bold strokes of Externalism. 
Miller's particular use of objectivity recalls after a manner the deep, 
heavy lines of Rouault, lines which set off and call attention to 
those areas of the painting receiving unique or extensive treatment 
in color or modeling.
In the final analysis, we cannot help but admire the manner in 
which Miller went about solving the dramaturgic problem which he had 
set for himself. He wished to present a modern tragedy, a tragedy of
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the common man. To his audience, the concept of the common man was 
associated with Externalism, but to Miller's mind, the common man's 
tragedy lay in his passionate desire to lay down his life for his 
chosen image of himself. To present this image truly and sympathet­
ically called for some sort of treatment of a given individual's 
point of view. Therefore, Miller was forced, in the first instance, 
to combine both objective and subjective approaches. Having been 
forced into this combination, the playwright turned it to his advan­
tage. The present Miller rendered objectively; the pertinent past 
through Willy's point of view. To relate the two, Miller had each 
incident in the present serve as a stimulus which projected images 
from the past on the screen of Willy's consciousness. To portray 
these images as they flowed across the salesman's mind, Miller selected 
a device so closely akin to the soliloquy that we may call it the 
soliloquy dramatized. By thus blending the soliloquies with the 
external action Miller was able to present the tragic conflict between 
the world as we fashion it and the world as it fashions us. As M. W. 
Steinberg observes:
The function of the artist, for Miller, is to provide aware­
ness that 'society is inside of man and man is inside of society' 
and perhaps to help us to understand this relationship.4
4Ibid., p. 146 f.
Willy dies for his ideal image not, as some critics would have 
us believe, because he lacked insight into his situation, but because 
he refused to accept it as the only possible reality. Willy's insight 
is sufficient to his circumstances. Part of the function of the solilo­
quies in Salesman— as in Hamlet or Macbeth— is to establish this fact. 
Although Willy denies to Howard that he had anything to do with Biff's 
defeat by life, he soon recalls to himself the very time in the past 
when he shattered Biff's ideals. Actually, the question in Salesman 
is not as much a question of insight as it is a question of will.
Willy deliberately selects his own subjective vision, and rejects all 
counterproposals by others. It is the major function of the solilo­
quies to present that vision and to demonstrate the nature, scope, 
and importance of Willy's choice. The tragedy is not that Willy died 
in vain, pointlessly and never knowing why, but that he had to die 
at all. The tragedy lies in the irreconcilability of the subject and 
the object; in Willy's special case between the need of one man for 
some small measure of dignity and the Indifference of the social 
group, an indifference which forces Willy to lay down his life in 
order to keep intact his sense of personal worth.
Death of a Salesman has its share of shortcomings, not the least 
of which is the poverty of Miller's prose. But such critics as T. C. 
Worsley display an amazing critical myopia when they argue that the 
play's basic weakness lies in its "episodic time-switching and place-
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switching."
A friend of mine said to me recently of this school of 
American playwrights: They've discovered the secret of
American audiences, who, when they are in the theatre, 
would much rather be in the cinema. These devices belong 
to the cinema (and even in the cinema we have begun to 
groan when the flashbacks start). The playwright's ace 
is concentration of Interest and the Unities are behind 
that concentration.*’
This criticism seems to betray an unfamiliarity with the whole 
flavor of modern drama. Even more, it serves to place Shakespeare, 
or any user of the aside and the soliloquy, or, again, any violator of 
the unities, among the ranks of apprentice playwrights. What Worsley 
fails to recognize is that Miller is not "time-switching" or "place- 
switching," but reality-switching. When a playwright is dealing with 
inner reality he is not concerned with time and place at all, since 
these concepts have no place on the stage of the human mind. Every­
thing and everyone is always immediately present. To the objective 
viewer, Willy may be in a restaurant washroom, but in Willy's mind he is 
in a hotel room with his son and a prostitute. Miller's point is 
precisely this fact. If Willy's mind were capable of perceiving only 
the present, there would be no tragedy. But because Willy, like all 
men, is capable of an intense realization of past in present, of sub­
jective vision in objective reality, his position reaches the point
^T. C. Worsley, "Poetry Without Words," The New Statesman and 
Nation. XXXVIII, No. 961 (August 6, 1949) 146-147.
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where death becomes the only moral choice, the inevitable solution.
Perhaps Miller does confuse a large and unimaginative portion 
of his audience. Perhaps he should not have committed himself to the 
pretense of objectivity at all. But it is difficult to deny that 
once having done so, his statement gains greatly in importance by 
his willingness to examine the whole internal-external continuum. 
Moreover, his solution to the problem of combining the two kinds of 
human truth, while it may not be the best possible, is clearly supe­
rior to O'Neill's somewhat labored efforts in Strange Interlude. In 
short, who is to say, in terms of dramatic conventions not literary 
style, that Hamlet's considering aloud on an empty stage whether it 
is "to be or not to be" is any more effective than Willy's conjur­
ing up of a long dead brother with whom he can debate the same 
question. The most we can say about either of the two soliloquies 
as dramatic conventions is that the one reveals a character more 
linguistically minded, the other a character more visually minded.
II
Anouilh: The Waltz of the Toreadors
While Miller was making his peace with the American taste for 
Externalism, Jean Anouilh— the man whom Nicoll and Edward Marsh recog­
nize as "the most original dramatist of our present generation"^ and
^Nicoll, o£. cit.. p. 914.
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the modern dramatist "most worthy of study"7--was striking a compromise 
of a different nature— a compromise with the French classical tradi­
tion. While it is possible to say that in most countries the modern 
movements in arts and letters have meant above all else a rather 
complete break with any neo-classic traditions and, at times, an almost 
perverted surrender to the most excessive urges of romanticist think­
ing, it must be recognized that in all this glut of irrationality 
France has stood as the one exception. It is true, of course, that 
France is the birthplace of Surrealism and of the even more extreme 
Dadaism, but it is also true that France has fostered modem schools 
which are wholly or partially opposed to subjective excess. It is 
no accident, for instance, that while German painters reveled in the 
freedom of Expressionism, their French counterparts were developing 
the equally romantic but much more intellectualized Cubism. Briefly, 
throughout the last three quarters of a century. France has had its share 
of groups which cried out for more and ever more subjective freedom, 
but it was never without a number of great artists who set for them­
selves the task of turning the strength and liberty of the romantic 
spirit to the service of urbane rationality. It is to the latter 
group that Anouilh belongs. And although he is "a thorough romantic
^Edward Owen Harsh, Jean Anouilh: Poet of Pierrot and Pantaloon 
(London: W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 34.
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at heart,"® Anouilh has dedicated himself to bringing "lucidity and 
sanity to the tortured cry for mankind's conscience-striken loneliness 
that came from Strindberg half a century before."9
This trend toward sanity and lucidity is especially apparent 
in the French theatre, where it seems that the modern French romantic 
is not so much attempting to create a new classicism as to impose 
on his subjectivism the restraint and decorum of neo-classic standards. 
It is a trend that we have already noted in Giraudoux, and it stems, 
according to Francis Fergusson, from the "never-quite-broken French 
theatrical tradition," a tradition which made playwrights feel it was 
unnecessary "to join the cult: they reject all the prophetic, re-
vivalistic, or hypnotic attitudes and strategies of Wagner, in the name 
of the intelligence, the classic spirit, or the integrity of Art."1®
In this tradition Anouilh writes* and he is its latest and most 
extreme exponent. It may be that "in his romanticism Anouilh shows 
particularly close affinity to Jean Giraudoux,"11 but it is equally 
true that in his classicism Anouilh "seems to arrive at some conception
8Ibid.. p. 33.
9lbid., p. 34. 
iOpergusson, The Idea of a Theatre, p. 207. 
iiMarsh, oj>. cit., p. 192.
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of the theatre akin to that of the late Moliere."12 It is these two 
traditions which Anouilh attempts to blend in Waltz of the Toreadors. 
and he does an amazingly good job of it.
While Anouilh's tendency to compromise with the French classi­
cal tradition can be noted as early as his 1932 work, Thieves1 Carnival, 
it is most apparent and effective in his later works. In such a play 
as Waltz of the Toreadors. the similarity to Moliere's work is so 
strong that it has led Marsh to remark that "the structure of the play 
is exactly like a Moliere character c o m e d y . Marsh, however, is 
something less than precise, for while there are many striking similar­
ities in structure, it is in general quality rather than in exact
dramaturgy that Anouilh resembles Moliere. In Anouilh's most recent 
comedies of character, for instance, there is the same bitter-sweetness 
of tone, the same urge to go straight to the essence of a character,
the same "strong sense of universalities and abstract valuerf'1^ which
distinguish the loose classicism of Moliere. But it is, above all, 
in his constant concern with hypocrisy, with society's relentless 
corruption of innocence, that Anouilh most resembles Moliere.
These similarities notwithstanding, there are decided and
12Nelson, o£. cit.. p. 155
13Marsh, oj>. cit.. p. 174.
14lbid., p. 182.
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important differences between the modern and the Baroque playwright.
Anouilh belongs to what Nelson has called "the age of Pirandello," and
while we must agree with Nelson that Anouilh does not simply "tag
. along...in the wake of P irandello,there is no denying that
Anouilh is much concerned with Pirandellian problems of illusion and
reality, of Individual mutability, of man as a solipsistic phenomenon.
In these matters, Anouilh is closely akin to French Existentialism.
Concerning this Edward Marsh observes:
Before Sartre had made his specially atheistic brand of 
existentialism a household word Anouilh was basing dramas 
upon three of its main tenets, all typical of the mood 
of our times. There is first the conviction that every­
one is alone, that no full or adequate contact can be 
made with others, and every attempt to do so leads to 
frustration, or to erosion of self. Secondly, one is 
no more than the sum of one's past actions as seen 
through the eyes of others...Finally (one) is free to 
make his own values and need not accept anyone else's.^
These existentialist concepts, especially the latter two, are
not particularly compatible with the supremely rational world of
Moliere, and they fit but poorly within the neo-classic framework.
Nevertheless, Anouilh must have seen equal value in both the Baroque
and modern principles, for in The Waltz of the Toreadors he set for
himself the extremely difficult task of combining the two sets of
l^Nelson, o£. cit., p. 155. 
l^Marsh, o£. cit. ,p. 197.
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beliefs. In terms of structural conventions, this meant that he had 
to strike some sort of compromise between the omniscient approach of 
Moliere and the modern playwright's first person presentation. Sur­
prisingly enough, Anouilh's solution is highly reminiscent of Miller's 
dramatized soliloquy.
Until the last scene of the second act, The Waltz of the Torea­
dors romps along in a happy mixture of riotous farce and brilliant high 
comedy. The point of view is omniscient, and asides and monoloques 
are almost the rule rather than the exception. To be sure, General 
St. Fe has more than his share of asides and brief soliloquies, but 
this is to be expected from the major character. But in St. Pe's 
soliloquies end asides there is a hint of other, decidedly different, 
things to come, for from the beginning of the play we are vaguely 
aware that St. Pe's inner thoughts are of a different quality from 
the other characters. In his soliloquies, for instance, there is a 
stronger sense of introspection; they are true soliloquies, while 
the thoughts of the other characters are presented in monologues or 
in direct addresses to the audience. The emphasis on the General's 
internal state is increased by our awareness of the mysterious Madame 
St. Pe, whose raucous voice and unseen figure lurk behind the bright 
gaiety of the first half of the play.
Only once have we caught a glimpse of Madame St. Pe, and then
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only a limp body, more dead than alive, carried over the General's 
shoulder into the midst of a hilarious scene of comically thwarted 
suicides. Her dreary and unpleasant voice, however, is the first 
sound we hear as the curtain rises, and it is not long before we 
discover that she is constantly on the General's mind. No matter 
what the subject, his thoughts inevitably turn to her. It is for 
her that he has sacrificed his own happiness; for her he has kept 
his true love, Ghislaine, waiting seventeen years. For all his 
brave military exploits, for all the slaughter of Arabs in battle, 
the General is a coward before his wife. He cannot bring himself to 
hurt her. This pitiful situation he explains at some length to the 
Doctor, summing the whole unfortunate business up in the following 
speech.
It'8 easy to talk. You don't know the old biich--I 
mean my soul. When she is face to face with my wife, 
she bawls with disgust and fright; but when I make 
Emily cry, when she starts to whimper in her wheel­
chair— where I know she only sits in order to annoy 
me; when I'm at last about to throttle her— don't 
laugh, it has crossed my mind--and take my cap off 
the hallstand and decamp once and for all; do you know 
what she does then, the great goop? (my soul, that is).
She cuts off my legs, she floods me with pity, mean 
ignoble pity, and old memories of love from the days 
when everything was not dried up and stale between us.
She roots me to the spot. So then I hang my cap back 
on the peg again and I take my soul on a little jaunt 
to the brothel to see if it won't cheer her up a bit.
But for all the talk about her, Madame St. Pe appears only once,
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in the dead faint previously mentioned. Moreover, she talks to
no one but St. Pe. Through it all, therefore, we have the feeling
that whatever she may he in reality, the Madame St.Pe we hear about
exists only in her husband's mind. This suspicion is confirmed in
the second scene of Act Two.
Act Two, Scene Two calls for the play's only shift in locale.
From the bright, sunny drawing room of the General, we go to the
dreary sickroom of his invalid wife. This shift in locale also
signals a shift in the total quality of the play. Up to this point
Anouilh's comedy has sparkled with wit and madcap farce. Now the
humor becomes weird and macabre. The General, we find, is married
to a witch, a harpy of great strength who leaps up to dance on her
paralized legs and who constantly shrieks out vulgarities and
obscenities. Madame St. Pe truly hates her husband, and when asked
why she continues to cling to him, she replies in a most brilliant,
terrifying, and forceful manner with one of the universal truths of
marriage, one of the basic reasons why so many women marry and cling
to a man throughout a loveless lifetime.
To keep you, Leon. To keep you for always because I am 
your wife. For I do love you, Leon, on top of everything.
I hate you for all the harm you did to me, but I love you—  
not tenderly, you fool, not with seventeen years of waiting 
and letter writing, not for the bliss of being in your arms 
at night— we never made love together, you poor wretch, you 
know it--not for your conversation— you bore me— not for 
your rank either, nor your money--!'ve been offered more—
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I love you because you are mine, my object, my thing, my
hold-all, my garbage bln—
Driven to a frenzy by his wife's vulgarities, the General leaps 
upon her and seizes her by the throat. As he forces her down upon the 
bed, he cries out In summation of the whole scene: "Phantasmagoria!"
This Is exactly what the episode has been. In a sense the 
scene has taken place In objective reality, but how much of It Is 
verifiable objective occurrence, and how much Is the purely subjective 
reaction of the General we will never know. This much we do know: 
we have a view of the General's wife only as he could see her. The 
quality of the scene Is the quality of St. Pe's mind In the presence 
of his wife. Like the subjective portions of Salesman, the scene In 
Madame St. Pe's bedroom is a phantasmagoria of the General's own soul, 
a presentation of the dramatic illusion through his point of view, in 
short, a soliloquy dramatized. It Is a vivid, dramatically realized 
psychic condition, a condition earlier explained to the Doctor as: 
"when she is face to face with my wife, she bawls with disgust and 
fright...She cuts off my legs...She roots me to the spot."
After the climactic moment at the end of Act Two, the play 
returns, for the final act, to the drawing room of the General. Some­
thing of the bright quality found in the first half of the play is 
recaptured, but this time in a much more minor key. The wit is less
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sharp, more wistful. The farce is less vigorous, more melancholy than
ludicrous. Once again, St. Pe realizes that he has failed with his
wife. He cannot even kill her. By not being able to bring himself to
hurt anyone, he has hurt everyone, most of all himself. He now
realizes that "there's nothing left but a ludicrous old pantaloon who
never saw a single one of his gestures through to its conclusion."
I have the impression that Lieutenant St. Pe is lying 
bloodless on a field of battle, not even wounded in the 
fight--some idiot's rifle blew up in.his back a few 
minutes before zero hour— but that all the same he's 
going to die.
In truth, the play ends in a typically Molieresque manner.
Since the central character has been studied, the plot is quickly 
discarded. A deus ex machina, in the form of a priest, appears and 
informs the General that his secretary, and his rival in love, is 
' really his long-lost son. The General withdraws his claim to 
Ghislaine, and all depart— the young lovers to their new-found bliss, 
the Doctor to his own wretched wife, the priest and St. Pe's daughters 
to the church for a thanksgiving prayer. The General is alone with 
his shattered image of himself. It is all as the Doctor has said: 
GENERAL. Dear God, how will it all end?
DOCTOR. As in real life, or in the theatre, in the days when 
plays were plays--a contrived denouement, not too gloomy 
on the face of it, and which really doesn't fool a soul, 
and then a little later--curtain. I speak for myself as 
well as you. Your blood pressure's up to 250 and my gall 
bladder is a bag of stones. Make way for the young! May 
they commit the self-same follies and die of the self­
same diseases.
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Like Moliere, Anouilh even takes the time near the end of the 
play to toss a morsel of moral out to those who might feel the need 
of it:
GENERAL, (softly) Lieutenant St. Pe. I want to live. I 
want to love. I want to give my heart as well, dear 
God!
DOCTOR. General, nobody wants it anymore. Let it unswell 
quietly, that old over-tender sponge. You should have 
sown fewer wild oats and had the courage to hurt while 
there was still time. Life should be led like a 
cavalry charge, General. They ought to have taught 
you that at Saumur. Hy poor old friend, shall I tell 
you the moral of this story? One must never under­
stand one's enemy or one's wife. One must never 
understand anyone for that matter, or one will die: 
of it.
In an extremely short final scene, Anouilh sounds one of the 
bitterest notes of pessimism in all comic literature. The old General, 
left alone, contemplates suicide. Suddenly a new maid appears, and
the General's taste for a pretty face rises up to animate his broken
spirt.
GENERAL. Pamela. Fancy that now, Pamela. And the
prettiest bosom in the world too. What is all this 
nonsense about our having a soul? Do you believe
in it? He's a fool that doctor. Put down your
broom, my child. It's a bit late to be sweeping up 
now. And there is never enough dust on things. We 
must let it settle. You know, you'll find this is 
an easy sort of place. I'm an old youngster and I 
don't ask much— provided folks are nice to me. You 
haven't seen my roses, have you? Come I'll show you 
around the garden, and if you're a good girl I'll 
give you one. It doesn't bother you, does it,
Pamela, if I put my arm round your waist?
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MAID. No sir, but what will Madame say?
GENERAL. Madame will say nothing, so long as you don't 
tell her. That's a good girl. It's nicer like 
this, don't you think? Not that it means anything, 
but still, one feels less lonely in the dark.
What Anouilh has done in Toreadors is to present an old romantic 
brought to tragic straits by the corrupting power of society. The 
General's most impressive virtue, his compassion for human feelings, 
is the very thing which has been his great weakness. It is the 
breech in his defense through which society has poured its polution.
In his despair, the General has turned to lechery, but this has only 
added to the disintegration of his youthful dreams. At the opening 
of the play, he still feels that he can recapture his lost youth 
and dreams. In his thoughts he is still Lieutenant St. Pe., "gradu­
ated second from Saumur! No money, but plenty of courage and well 
thought of! Ready to give his all for France, for honor, for a 
woman!" By the end of the play, the General has realized that this 
is, as the Doctor says, "but a tender memory." He understands that 
his life is wasted and meaningless, that he has fallen victim to the 
same middle-class hypocrisy which he satirizes so brilliantly at the 
end of Act Two, Scene One. He has settled for less than the ideal, 
and he understands this. When his young secretary protests that he 
would rather go fast and drown, the General replies:
You are quite right, my boy. It's a sorry business grow­
ing old and understanding. Try all the same not to drown
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others, even in a good cause. That's what weighs heavy 
on a man, hurting other people. I have got used to 
everything, but not to that.
It is difficult to suggest a comparison between Miller and 
Anouilh. The Frenchman is so much the better writer, so much the 
superior dramatic architect, his general so much more interesting 
and complex than Willy Loman, that one hesitates to place the two 
playwrights side by side. Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity. 
Miller's tragic view is much the same as Anouilh's. Both see the 
catastrophe in life as the individual's loss of his chosen image of 
himself. Miller sees death as the only way in which the individual 
can keep his ideal uncorrupted. This is a solution which Anouilh 
has’also suggested in Antigone, but in Toreadors Anouilh has arrived 
at a different resolution, one which is both pessimistic and urbane.
In the face of defeat, one may submit with as much grace as possible. 
Willy*8 answer to life is a wild and desperate taunt, the pointless 
taunt of an insignificant beast lost in a concrete waste. St. Pe's 
resignation at least has the virtue of civilized dignity. .With the 
intelligence and insight at his disposal, he recognizes that seeing 
life as essentially meaningless need not force one into wild and 
incoherent actions. A system of intelligent order, however pointless 
at bottom, is certainly preferable to a frenzied irrationality, 
equally pointless in the final analysis. The one at least offers the 
hope of sanity.
Thus in the first instance, Miller and Anouilh face identical 
problems. They must find some means of establishing for the audience 
the ideal image which their central characters have fashioned for 
themselves. They must also present the dangers, subjective and 
objective, which lie in store for those fragile images. To do this, 
Miller depends most heavily on the dramatized soliloquy, Anouilh on 
the traditional aside and soliloquy. But at the climax of the play, 
at that point when the General's growing awareness of his loss of his 
ideal culminates in a terrifying psychic drama, Anouilh turns to a 
device which he himself calls phantasmagoria, in other words, a 
soliloquy dramatized. Anouilh is the better dramatist, and his 
interweaving of the traditional and the dramatized soliloquy, of 
objective and subjective viewpoints, is much less obvious, much more 
in keeping with the total quality of his play. But this does not 
prevent his technique from becoming, at the peak of the play, 
identical to Miller's special kind of soliloquy.
Here, however, the similarities between Salesman and Toreadors 
cease. Miller's tradition is that of Ibsen and Strindberg, Anouilh's 
that of Moliere. Thus while Miller seeks to blend modern objectivity 
and subjectivity, Anouilh attempts to unite subjectivity with the older 
omniscient universality. He pays homage to the classic spirit which 
argues that even if we wish to portray life as meaningless, we need 
not present it in an incoherent manner. Even meaninglessness can be
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presented meaningfully, even irrationality can be viewed sanely. Thus 
Anouilh returns to the orderliness of the Baroque theatre for his 
models and methods. In this manner, the audience obtains not only 
the General's viewpoint, but also the points of view of the other 
characters, and all of these subjective variations are thrown against 
the background of a single universal action in which all participate. 
Moreover, the audience not only knows what each character things 
and does, but also what the author feels about them all, for in the 
person of the Doctor, Anouilh has made use of the traditional 
confidant who listens to the General's problems and gives his— and 
by implication— the playwright's view of the whole matter.
Anouilh*8 is a romantic world, a modern world in which 
innocence and ideals are corrupted by time and society, in which 
man is lost in his own spiritual isolation, in which all things, in 
the final analysis, are meaningless. But it is also a world of 
civilized order, of sanity and lucidity, of intelligent wit and 
rational restraint. Whether this rationality is forced on the play 
by Anouilh's selection of a form akin to that of Moliere's, or whether 
Anouilh's own sense of order brought him to impose an old form on a 
modern theme, the two do exist together in the same work of art, and 
their blending sounds a new note in modern drama. Once a playwright 
has begun to place the check of classical logic on modern subjectivism,
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once has has by that step tacitly admitted that subjective truth 
is not a law unto itself, he has taken an important turn away from 
the "cult of the ego."
The history of the pan-psychic drama, the history of most 
modern drama, has been one of profound pessimism. There have been 
few exceptions to this rule, and Anouilh's work is certainly not 
one of them. His is perhaps an even deeper pessimism than that of 
Pirandello. But it may be that with Anouilh this pessimism has touched 
bottom; perhaps his rationality is an omen of different things to come. 
The cult of the ego, the emphasis on the world as a reflection of the 
subject, has brought us to the point of hopeless and helpless con­
fusion. Among the images, words, and symbols which bob along in 
our streams of consciousness, among the maze of internal and external 
madks of ourselves and others, we search for some sort of order.
It may be that Anouilh has located the object of our search. It 
may be that he has taken a significant step towards the returning of 
the subject to a more sensible relationship to the object, towards 
gaining a saner balance between the individual and universal ego.
He may not dispel our pessimism, but he at least clears up a great 
deal of our confusion.
Anouilh is still young, and modern drama has not run its course. 
It is difficult at this point to see clearly any decidedly new
direction. Predictions would be foolish. Still there are no 
denying the signs. Modern drama has become increasingly boneless, 
increasingly decadent. Externalism has long ago lost its vigor 
and is at present the plaything of the crassly commercial theatre. 
The more important Pan-psychism has tended more and more toward 
complete incomprehensibility. For the better playwrights, the 
trend has been towards compromise, such compromises as are found 
in Death of a Salesman and The Waltz of the Toreadors. For the 
moment, Western drama in general seems to have hit a plateau, and 
there is no denying that France is the only country at present 
which is producing a new and exciting drama. And in France, Anouilh 
is the leading playwright. Who knows, but that his harkening back 
to the theatre of Moliere is a signal that some sort of new 
classicism is at hand?
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE: A SUMMARY
Whether we rejoice in it or despair of it, whether we mili- 
tantly support it or wearily disdain it, it is difficult to deny that 
we are the latest participants in a long romantic revolution, a 
revolution whose beginnings are buried somewhere in the late 18th- 
century, but whose modem manifestations did not appear until the 
latter quarter of the 19th-century. It was at that time that the 
growing forces of modernism forced the emergence of a distinctly 
different outlook, a new philosophy that began by rejecting many of 
those concepts that had sustained Western man's image of himself 
from the time of the Delian League to the days of the British Empire, 
and a philosophy that was ultimately both a decided break with the 
past and, at the same time, an inevitable result of the century of 
romanticist thinking which had preceded it.
Long before the birth of modernism, romantic zealots had re­
jected the concept of Reason as a guide to human conduct. With the 
fall of the rational ideal, all the tenets-of classicism which looked 
to Reason for support were seriously weakened. As the 19th-century 
progressed, the most important of these beliefs, the long-standing 
twin concepts of absolutism and universality--the two strongholds of 
a view of human actions in terms of moral decisions--became less and 
less vital to the romantic mind. Thus it was that Romanticism began
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by successfully replacing Reason with Passion as a clue to human 
motives, and, as the 19th-century approached its final quarter,
Passion came increasingly to mean individual as opposed to universal 
passion. It was this latter view that gave the primal impulse to 
modern thinking.
A new awareness of the uniqueness of the individual, then, 
lies at the root of that burst of Intellectual and artistic activity 
which brought the 19th-century to a close on a note of feverish ani­
mation. The new focus on the worth and value of the specific led many 
of the early modems to discard finally and completely the philosophic 
bases of Western classicism. In place of the old absolutism was set 
a new relativity which devalued universals and prompted intellectuals 
to seek final truths in the very subjectivity of the ego. Essentially 
this meant a new religion of the individual, a new realization of the 
world in terms of the subject not the object. In respect to the arts, 
modem relativism forced a stronger appreciation of the role of the 
observer, and this in turn prompted many artists to search for new 
forms which would stress the importance of the observer over the 
thing observed.
In essence, the emphasis on the observer and his special post 
of observation meant that the ancient artistic problem of presenting 
the inner thoughts and moods of any and all characters was transformed 
into the modem problem of rendering the unique viewpoint of a given 
individual to the exclusion, for the time being, of all other points 
of view. At first, this.problem was attacked through an attempt to 
substitute a new third-person objectivity in place of the older
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omniscient method. The obvious inadequacy of third-person technique 
brought forth fresh experimentation, new attempts to represent the 
object through the subject.
As the century turned, modem preoccupation with an ego- 
centered world began to take on a stronger and stronger atmosphere of 
irrationality. The new science of psychoanalysis eagerly pressed 
beyond the limits of human consciousness. To the psychoanalyst the 
key to all action was the sub- and the unconscious, those depts of the 
soul which contained forces primitive and overpowering, forces which 
often made a shambles of man's moral and intellectual structure. The 
problem of point of view thus became the problem of presenting 
acceptable artistic approximations of the sometimes savage and usually 
incomprehensible moods of the Seele. In short, the artist as a modem 
relativist began with the assumption that the ego did not exist in the 
world, but that the world existed in and for the ego. When rapidly- 
evolving modem thought began to see the ego as an Irrational phen­
omenon, the world as such became irrational. As Strindberg has his 
Officer say: "If logic is absurd then the world is absurd." And,
indeed, to the modem mind it was] The problem of point of view, 
therefore, became one of seeking conventional means of presenting the 
irrationality of the universe through the irrationality of the ego.
The solution to this puzzle was a device variously known as the radi­
ation of the ego, the interior monologue, or the stream of conscious­
ness.
A particularly talented and interesting group of contemporary 
novelists began to offer some striking studies in point of view. So
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impressive were the experiments of such writers as James, Proust, 
Joyce, and Faulkner, so vocal were their critics and admirers, that 
it was presently assumed by some that the presentation of the new 
relativism through the convention of point of view was the exclusive 
achievement of the novelist and that the method was, in fact, 
indigenous only to the novel. This assumption is difficult to 
support, for the issue of point of view is a primary issue of most 
modern arts. In duly altered form it is to be found in most of the 
spatial as well as the temporal arts. Without doubt, it is the 
central structural problem of a number of important contemporary play­
wrights, but though critics of the drama have taken notice of its 
presence from time to time, they have attached far too little signifi­
cance to it. Such an oversight is probably prompted in the first 
instance by the meek acceptance of the pronouncements of the critics 
of fiction, and in the second instance by the wide spread view of 
dramatic realism as an end rather than as a stage in the development 
of modem subjective forms. So completely enraptured were actor and 
audience alike with the third-person approach of Ibsenian Exteraalism 
that they assumed it to be the norm and goal of modem drama, and they 
were prone to view any nonobjective presentation of relativism as a 
perversion of, rather than a necessary break with, the inadequate 
objective approach. It is this attitude which is probably responsible 
for so much confusion in modem dramatic criticism, so much hair­
splitting and equivocation, so much quibbling over whether a work is 
realistic or naturalistic, expressionistic or surrealistic. Who can
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really tell the difference between the two former schools or the two 
latter schools? For that matter, who really needs to do so?
Actually, viewed in terms of method--which is, after all, the 
key feature of any given period— the development of modem drama 
follows two broad directions— Extemalism and Pan-psychism. Moreover, 
in the final analysis, the former is but the necessary and primary 
stage of the latter; that is, modem drama originally attempted to 
present a new, relative world view by rejecting the omniscience of the 
well-made play and by substituting in its stead a third-person objec­
tivity. When the third-person method proved incapable of making sub­
jective statements, a number of important playwrights of our era, men 
like Strindberg, Pirandello, and O'Neill, turned to an approach to 
the dramatic illusion through first-person subjective dramatization.
In this respect, then, the development of modem drama is parallel to 
that of the modem novel from the objectivity of Zola to the total 
subjectivity of Finnegan'a Wake.
Moreover, the parallelism of the two forms is the thing to be 
stressed, for it is a mistake to assume that any experimentation with 
point of view in the drama is but a late and naive imitation of the 
techniques of the novelists. In truth, the modem dramatist's inter­
ests in the issue of point of view were evidenced quite early. While 
Henry James was casting about for a means to present Isabel more 
subjectively, Henrik Ibsen was doing much the same thing with Hedda, 
and some ten years before Proust began dredging his stream of con­
sciousness, Strindberg had already placed on the stage the grotesque 
panorama of his own tortured metaconscious states. While it is true
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that by 1914 Proust, Joyce and Dorothy Richardson had opened to the 
novelist extraordinary new avenues for the study of the human subject, 
it is also true that by the same time Strindberg and Evreinov had per­
formed a similar service for the drama. After the first decade of the 
20th-century the problem of both the serious modern novelist and the 
serious modern dramatist was the problem of rendering introspection, 
not intrigue, of presenting the ego chiefly in relation to itself 
alone.
It has been the purpose of this study to view the various 
aspects of this problem as they manifested themselves in the work of 
eight important modem dramatists. The study, then, is primarily a 
study in dramatic form, and the focus has been centered throughout, 
where it rightfully belongs, on the works of art themselves. But it 
has also been the aim of this investigation to demonstrate the sig­
nificance and suggest the scope of the convention of point of view in 
modem dramatic literature. Accordingly, the playwrights selected for 
study were chosen because as dramatists representative of our times, 
they serve to place this work in the mainstream of dramatic criticism, 
and because as writers truly alive to the spirit of the age, they set 
about inventing or perfecting new theatrical solutions to the problem 
of point of view.
As early as 1884 Ibsen began, in The Wild Duck, to seek a new, 
subjective perspective, but he was never willing to discard his own 
objective method. Therefore, although he strained dramatic symbolism 
to the limit in Hedda Gabler, the play remains where it began, locked 
behind the plane of the proscenium arch. It thus fell to the lot of
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the great externalist playwright, August Strindberg, to break through 
the restraints of the third-person method. Strindberg's experiments 
with staging his own stream of consciousness were soon followed by the 
monodramas of Evreinov, and by 1912 a truly fresh perspective for the 
dramatic illusion had been created. Thereafter, many of the leading 
playwrights of German, Italy, France, and the United States took up 
the structural problem stated so strikingly by Strindberg and 
Evreinov. What each playwright did with the new dramatic perspective 
depended upon his own view, of the individual in relation to the 
objective world.
Among the eight playwrights studied herein the solutions have 
been various. To Strindberg, Evreinov, and Giraudoux, inner truth 
was viewed as relative almost exclusively to itself alone. Conse­
quently, in The Dream Play. The Theatre of the Soul, and The Madwoman 
of Chaillot. the three playwrights made their total statement through 
the subjective point of view of a single person. Kaiser, Miller, and 
Anouilh, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on the tragic dis­
parity between the subject and the object. Thus, in their works they 
attempted various combinations of subjective and objective points of 
view. O'Neill and Pirandello stand midway between the two trios in 
the sense that they came to view life as an enormously complex maze 
of interior and exterior conflicts. To make such a statement the 
two dramatists, in Strange Interlude and Six Characters in Search of 
an Author, sought out methods of making both an objective and sub­
jective statement simultaneously.
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Whether any one of these playwrights, or any playwright for 
that matter, is totally successful in his use of the new method is 
doubtful, not because the technique is impossible to the drama, but 
because in the final analysis the subjective perspective, in the 
drama as in the novel, is committed to a much too single-minded view 
of human conduct. In light of this fact, the same general criticism 
can be applied to both the modem literary forms. There is far too 
much pretentious obscurtiy, obscurity which does not grow out of 
difficult and involved thought, but out of a belief that the irra­
tional impulses of the individual are of significance and interest to 
all, and, consequently, should be offered in their most chaotic, most 
Dionysian state, directly to the audience or reader. It is this un­
healthy and seemingly inescapable aspect of the rigidly-adhered-to 
point of view method which has probably caused a recent trend towards 
compromises with more traditional and more communicative dramatic 
forms. Playwrights such as Hiller and Anouilh have attempted a 
return to saner and more lucid comments by combining pan-psychic 
techniques with those of Extemalism or those of Classicism.
What will be the ultimate place of the subjective perspective 
in drama is impossible to say. As present, it is the latest and most 
logical conclusion of a long period of romantic self-contemplation, 
and as long as the star of the romanticist is in the ascendency, 
there is no reason to believe that the subjective perspective will 
ever fall into total disfavor as an important dramatic convention.
Its virtues are many; its weaknesses the weaknesses of the age. The
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subjective perspective is the problem that lies at the root of modem 
drama, the issue which splits contemporary playwrights into two great 
schools, the issue which transcends the boundaries of the various 
"ism's," the issue which is the most distinctive feature of the 
modem theatre, the issue which both shapes and explains our sense of 
spiritual isolation. In short, the dramatization of the subjective 
perspective is the central problem of-post-Ibsenian drama.
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